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Abstract
This thesis addresses questions in the field of Family Economics regarding the effect of
education on teenage motherhood and choice of spouse, and the influence of local labour
market conditions on domestic violence.
The first part of the thesis presents evidence regarding the effect of education policy
on teenage fertility. Chapter 1 analyses the impact of an exogenous increase to education,
induced by a legislative change to the minimal schooling requirement, on the propensity
for early motherhood. The findings indicate strong evidence that the schooling reform had
a substantial downwards impact on adolescent fertility, which persisted beyond the new
compulsory school leaving age. The second chapter presents an evaluation of the Education
Maintenance Allowance, a conditional cash transfer program implemented to increase
the post-compulsory education participation rates of young people from disadvantaged
families. The results reveal that the programme was successful at increasing participation
rates, with a stronger response observed for teenage boys. This increase in participation
had a significant impact on teenage motherhood, driven equally by a decline in the number
of conceptions and an increase in the abortion rate. Weaker, but suggestive evidence is
found that the programme mitigated youth crime.
The second part of the thesis addresses marriage and partnership questions. The third
chapter investigates the impact of an education reform which induced a cohort disconti-
nuity in the level of qualifications received by individuals, and finds that cohorts in the
neighbourhood of the reform threshold cannot achieve typical matching patterns. Specifi-
cally, spouses choose smaller age gaps and accept differently qualified partners. The fourth
and final chapter examines how changes in unemployment affect the incidence of domestic
abuse. Combining data on individual experience of intimate partner violence with lo-
cally disaggregated labour market data, the analysis shows that a womans propensity to
experience partner abuse decreases with male unemployment, but increases with female
unemployment.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis addresses questions in the field of Family Economics in two parts, each com-
prised of two chapters. In Part I evidence is presented regarding the effect of two different
education policies on teenage fertility. First the influence of an educational reform which
increased the duration of compulsory schooling is considered, secondly a programme to
increase post-compulsory participation in education is analysed. Part II of the thesis
addresses marriage and partnership questions, specifically investigating marriage market
responses to a cohort-level education reform, and the impact of local labour market con-
ditions on the incidence of intimate partner violence.
The first chapter asks whether education policy can provide an effective tool to reduce
the incidence of teenage motherhood. Data from the largest UK household-level survey
is used to investigate the impact of a change in legislation implemented by the UK gov-
ernment in the early 1970s known as the Raising of School Leaving Age (RoSLA), which
increased the duration of compulsory schooling by one year, on the timing of fertility
using a regression discontinuity design. The findings indicate strong evidence that the
schooling reform induced a downwards impact on fertility not only at the age at which the
reform ‘bites’, but also persisted beyond the new compulsory school leaving age. Overall
the analysis suggests that the increase in mandatory education caused a postponement of
fertility over the teenage years only with the influence of the reform dissipating after age
20.
A different type of education policy is examined in Chapter 2. Specifically the impact of
a conditional cash transfer programme, the Education Maintenance Allowance, which also
incorporated elements of a financial incentives programme is examined. This programme
was implemented in the United Kingdom in order to encourage participation in post-
compulsory education by young people from low-income households. The results indicate a
significant positive impact of the programme on staying-on rates, with a stronger response
13
1. Introduction
observed for teenage boys and those individuals eligible for the maximum allowance, who
have the poorest familial pecuniary conditions. This increase in participation induced
a substantial reduction in teen maternity rates, driven almost equally by a decline in
conceptions and an increase in the abortion rate. Weaker, but suggestive evidence is
found that the programme influenced youth crime.
The third chapter investigates another implication of the RoSLA legislative change
to the duration of compulsory education, the reform also considered in Chapter 1, which
induced a cohort discontinuity in the level of qualifications received by individuals. As
marital matches around the world are characterised by two pervasive features: first women
marry older men, second spouses have similar education levels, this cohort discontinuity
implies that typical matching patterns cannot be achieved for individuals born close to
the reform implementation date. Specifically, spouses choose smaller age gaps and accept
differently qualified partners. As their potential partners are from untreated cohorts,
women in early reform cohorts form marriages with lower positive assortative matching
on education, whereas men can increase the degree of homogamy as their likely spouses are
also subject to the reform. These opposing effects imply gender heterogeneity in education
reform effects.
The fourth and final chapter examines how changes in unemployment affect the in-
cidence of domestic abuse. A theory is developed which predicts that male and female
unemployment have opposite-signed effects on domestic abuse: an increase in male unem-
ployment decreases the incidence of intimate partner violence, while an increase in female
unemployment increases domestic abuse. Combining data on individual experience of
intimate partner violence with locally disaggregated labour market data, the analysis pro-
vides strong evidence in support of the theoretical prediction, and shows that a womans
propensity to experience partner abuse decreases with male unemployment, but increases
with female unemployment. This latter chapter is forthcoming in the Economic Journal.
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Part I
Education Policy and Teenage
Fertility
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Chapter 2
Compulsory Education and
Teenage Motherhood
2.1 Introduction
Teenage motherhood is widely regarded as an important socio-economic issue for two
key reasons. First, individuals who are restricted in their human capital investment in
adolescence may not reach their lifetime’s economic potential. Second, there is an im-
portant inter-generational dimension associated with early childbearing, as the children
born to teenage mothers tend to have poorer outcomes, and also themselves have a higher
probability of becoming mothers at an early age (Paniagua and Walker, 2012).
These direct and indirect consequences of teenage motherhood have been widely doc-
umented. Analysis based on observed differences between women who gave birth as a
teenager and women who became mothers at an older age find substantial adverse ef-
fects of early childbearing on a number of lifetime outcomes, such as lower levels of edu-
cational attainment (Moore and Waite, 1978; Klepinger, Lundberg, and Plotnick, 1995),
and significantly higher rates of poverty, welfare receipt and lower household income
(Bronars and Grogger, 1994; Ermisch and Pevalin, 2003). Studies that address the po-
tential endogeneity of the fertility decision to ascribe a causal effect of adolescent moth-
eerhood reveal somewhat disparate results both with respect to the impact on the mother
herself (see, inter alia, Chevalier and Viitanen, 2003; Hotz, McElroy, and Sanders, 2005;
Fletcher and Wolfe, 2009; Ashcraft, Ferna´ndez-Val, and Lang, 2013) and the outcomes of
the child (Francesconi, 2008). Such analyses with arguably a closer comparison group tend
to indicate that teen mothers would have poorer economic outcomes even if they had de-
layed motherhood. Indeed, Kearney and Levine (2012) suggests that for some individuals
the decision to become a young mother is a rational choice in response to low expectations
16
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of future economic opportunities, rather than an unintentional consequence. In short,
the weight of evidence overwhelmingly points to the existence of negative effects both in
the short and long-run. Hence interventions that mitigate adolescent fertility rates are
regarded as plausible mechanisms through which to improve the life trajectories of young
women whom project a high proclivity toward teenage motherhood.
Given the interdependence of the education and early fertility decision, one potential
channel of influence is education policy. In the context of mitigating teenage motherhood
interest lies in the ability of the institutional environment to affect the timing of fertility.
Exogenous differences in the duration of mandatory schooling have been used to elicit the
causal effect of education on the likelihood of becoming a teenage mother. Changes in
legislation regarding the minimum age at which an individual becomes eligible to leave
school were first used by Black, Devereux, and Salvanes (2008) to investigate the effect of
education on teenage fertility1. The authors propose two mechanisms through which the
legislation changes exert an effect on fertility. First the “incarceration effect”, which in
the spirit of the findings of Jacob and Lefgren (2003) regarding the impact of schooling
on youth crime, can be understood that as individuals are required to remain at school
for one year longer, this reduces the opportunity to engage in risky activities, which leads
to downward pressure on their fertility. Second, the “human capital effect”, whereby
individuals reduce their fertility in response to receiving more education and hence better
labour market prospects as a result of the legislation change.
Using data for both the US and Norway - two countries with very different institutional
environments - they obtain remarkably similar findings2. The results indicate only weak
evidence for an incarceration effect, and the authors therefore conclude that the observed
significant negative effect of education on teen fertility is driven primarily by the human
capital effect. One potential reason for this finding could be that, in both countries,
the reforms that were used for identification had a relatively minor “bite”, affecting a
comparatively small fraction of youth.
But other institutional features also imply variation in the amount of schooling that
individuals obtain without varying the age at which they leave school. Two examples in-
clude school entry policies and changes to the length of the school day. McCrary and Royer
(2011) exploit that in the US different school-entry policies imply that individuals who are
1A tranche of literature uses this strategy to elicit the causal impact of education on overall fertility,
with diverse findings. Using variation in education induced by compulsory schooling laws in 8 European
countries, Fort, Schneeweis, and Winter-Ebmer (2011) find an increase in education is associated with a
large decrease in childlessness and increase in child parity, whereas Monstad, Propper, and Salvanes (2008)
find no overall effect in Norway, and Leo´n (2004), using US census data, finds a decrease in the average
number of children per woman. In the UK Braakmann (2011) using survey data finds a marginal increase
overall fertility, whereas Clark, Geruso, and Royer (2014) using cohort-level administrative data find little
effect in completed fertility.
2Using General Household Survey data, Silles (2011) finds effects of a similar magnitude for the UK.
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born in adjacent months face different required lengths of schooling, but can effectively
leave school at the same time. In terms of the mechanisms outlined in Black et al. (2008),
the variation in education generated by the school entry policy should only have an impact
on teenage fertility via the human capital effect. Using data from California and Texas
to investigate the impact of education on a number of socio-economic outcomes they find
no effect of education on the timing of fertility, which, in contrast to Black et al. (2008)
suggests a relatively minor importance of the human capital effect. Berthelon and Kruger
(2010) evaluate a policy intervention in Chile which increased the length of the school
day. The policy had been widely criticised as previous evaluations indicated a negligible
effect on educational attainment, suggesting no human capital effect. However the anal-
ysis shows that the intervention induced a significant impact on non-academic outcomes,
specifically an amelioration of risk behaviours such as teen fertility and crime participation.
The authors posit that this effect is entirely due to increased incarceration, as adolescents
received more adult supervision per day and therefore had less time to engage in risky
activities. These aforementioned studies indicate conflicting evidence with regard to the
channels through which the mandatory schooling requirement influences the likelihood of
early childbearing.
This paper investigates the effect of education policy on adolescent fertility in England
and Wales, exploiting exogenous variation in the length of compulsory schooling induced
by an institutional change, the Raising of School Leaving Age (RoSLA), implemented by
the UK Government in 1972. The contribution of this paper to the literature is threefold.
First, the analysis considers a legislative increase to the compulsory school leaving age
which, in contrast to those studied in Black et al. (2008), impacted a significant proportion
of the population. Second, as eligibility for the reform was determined by a single cut-off
date the analysis proceeds using a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) and the paper
contributes by addressing methodological concerns with implementing RDDs which have
been highlighted in the recent econometrics literature. Third, as the UK has one of the
highest rates of teenage pregnancy in Western Europe, the paper contributes to the body
of international evidence that analyses the influence of education policy on the timing of
fertility.
The analysis uses data from the Labour Force Survey, the largest representative UK
household survey, exploiting an institutional change which increased the duration of com-
pulsory education by one year. As the legislative change was implemented nationwide at
a single point in time, it can be thought of as a natural experiment, which induced ex-
ogenous variation in the length of education received by an individual. The variation was
determined solely by a discontinuous function of an observed covariate, the individual’s
month and year of birth, and therefore the estimation proceeds through a regression dis-
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continuity design (RDD), an approach which allows the identification of causal treatment
effects in quasi-experimental settings. The analysis employs both parametric and non-
parametric methodologies to estimate the direct impact of the reform, and a two-stage
‘fuzzy’ RDD approach is used to address a pertinent policy question, namely quantifying
the consequence of increasing mandatory education by one year on teenage motherhood.
The results suggest that the impact of RoSLA varies non-monotonically throughout the
teen years and, in contrast to Black et al. (2008), reveals strong evidence of the incar-
ceration effect, as well as the beyond incarceration effect which may be attributable to
increased human capital acquisition. The findings are robust to the empirical methodol-
ogy employed and the sensitivity of the estimates to the choice of bandwidth is explored.
In addition, the analysis is extended to examine the extent of the bite of the reform by
investigating the extent of the impact of the treatment beyond just the teenage years, the
results suggesting that RoSLA essentially caused a postponement of fertility to the late
teenage years, with no observed impact of the reform after age 20.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2.2 summarises the in-
stitutional context. Section 2.3 describes the data used in the analysis. The econometric
methodology is outlined in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 presents the results and offers inter-
pretations, Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Institutional Setting
Compulsory schooling was introduced to the UK towards the end of the 19th Century,
with separate rules governing school-starting and school-leaving ages. A child is required
to commence education no later than the beginning of the academic year3 after which she
reaches the compulsory school-starting age of 5 years, which has remained unchanged since
its inception through the Forster Education Act (1870). The first minimum school-leaving
age of 10 years was introduced by the Elementary Education Act (1880), with incremental
increases to the school-leaving age introduced by subsequent legislation4.
This paper concentrates on the exogenous variation in the minimum education require-
ment induced by the Education (Butler) Act (1944), which initially established a minimum
compulsory school-leaving age of 15. The act made provision for a further raise of the
3In England and Wales the academic year runs from September 1st until August 31st in the next
calendar year.
4The Elementary (School Attendance) Act (1893) increased the age requirement to initially to 11, and
up to 12 with an amendment to the act in 1899; another increase up to age 14 followed the Fisher Act
(1918); the Butler Act (1944), enacted in 1947, enabled further rises first to age 15 and subsequently
16; the Education Act (2008) introduced an initial increase to age 17, and from September 2015 requires
formal participation in education or training of individuals in England and Wales until their 18th birthday.
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school leaving age up to age 16, but did not mandate a specific implementation date.5 In
the immediate post-war period implementation was not possible due to acute shortages
in capital, material and labour, the latter so extreme that during the 1950’s there were
calls to reduce the length of compulsory education in order to increase the size of the
labour force pool. However following the Crowther Report (1959) there was a distinct
shift in attitude in favor of increasing the duration of mandatory schooling, leading to the
announcement in 1964 of the government’s intention to implement an increased school-
leaving age in September 1970. Preparations for the age-rise were extensive and included
a revised curriculum, large-scale teacher-training to increase the supply of teachers, and
a building initiative enlarging schools to accommodate the increased number of students.
These preparations were halted due to fiscal constraints imposed following the 1967 deval-
uation of sterling, with the government delaying implementation by two years. The new
school-leaving age was finally introduced by Statutory Instrument 444 (1972), commonly
known as the Raising of School Leaving Age (RoSLA6), implemented in September 1972
thus affecting academic cohorts born from 1st September 1957 onwards.
The reform impacted the leaving decisions of individuals in the lower tail of the educa-
tion distribution only. Figure 2.1(a) depicts the fraction of individuals leaving education
before the age of 16 by their academic cohort of birth. This proportion was steadily de-
clining prior to the implementation of RoSLA, but there is an immediate drop of approxi-
mately 20 percentage points exactly coinciding with the introduction of the new minimum
school-leaving age, indicating that the RoSLA reform constituted a binding constraint for
this proportion of the school age population. Compliance with the increased mandatory
age was almost ubiquitous. Since the Education Act (1962) an individual did not become
eligible to leave school on the exact day he attained the compulsory school-leaving age,
instead two school exit dates were imposed - the end of the Spring term (at Easter) for
individuals within an academic cohort whose birthday lay between September and Jan-
uary, and the last day of the Summer term for those attaining school-leaving age between
February and August. The implication of this ‘Easter Leaving Rule’ was that summer-
born children born at the end of the academic year would become eligible to leave school
just before the birthday where they reached compulsory school-leaving age. Specifically as
the end of the Summer term usually falls around the end of June, one sixth of the first co-
hort directly affected by RoSLA (those born in July and August 1958), could leave school
at age 15 and still be compliant with the minimum school-leaving age requirements, and
therefore in Figure 2.1(a), the proportion of individuals leaving education by age 15 does
not fall to exactly zero after the implementation of the increased schooling requirement.
5Section 35 of the Act states that the subsequent raise should occur ‘as soon as the Minister is satisfied
that it has become practicable to raise to sixteen the upper limit of the compulsory school age’
6A comprehensive history of the RoSLA can be found in Woodin, McCulloch, and Cowan (2013).
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Figure 2.1: Participation in Education
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
Pr
op
or
tio
n
50 55 60 65
Academic Cohort of Birth
(a) Left education before age 16
.
55
.
6
.
65
.
7
.
75
.
8
Pr
op
or
tio
n
50 55 60 65
Academic Cohort of Birth
(b) Left education before age 17
.
3
.
4
.
5
.
6
.
7
Pr
op
or
tio
n
50 55 60 65
Academic Cohort of Birth
(c) Post-compulsory
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
.
5
.
6
Pr
op
or
tio
n
50 55 60 65
Academic cohort
None CSE/O’Level A’Level
(d) Highest qualification level
Consistent with previous studies (see e.g., Chevalier, Harmon, Walker, and Zhu (2004);
Dickson and Smith (2011)), the data indicate that there were no ripple-upwards effects
of the RoSLA throughout the duration of education distribution. Figure 2.1(b) shows
that there is no discontinuity in the downward trend of the proportion of individuals leav-
ing education by age 17, indicating that the RoSLA did not induce an increase in the
proportion of students participating in post-compulsory education. Indeed as verified in
Figure 2.1(c), prior to implementation over 60% of students already participated in post-
compulsory education, but approximately half of these individuals remained in school to
age 16 only7. As a consequence it can be observed that the post-compulsory education
rate actually fell approximately 30 percentage points coincidental to the introduction of
the reform, afterwhich it reaches a relatively stable level consistent with the RoSLA re-
form inducing an increase in schooling for those individuals in the lower tail of the years
7The first tier of academic qualifications in England and Wales are taken at age 16, which prior to
RoSLA may have been the inducement for these individuals to remain in education beyond the minimum
requirement
21
2.3. Data 2. Compulsory Education and Teenage Motherhood
of education distribution up to the new minimum school leaving age but not beyond. This
is further supported by examining qualifications obtained: Figure 2.1(d) illustrates the
trends in the highest academic qualification obtained by individuals. In the RoSLA year
there is a drop in the proportion of individuals without academic qualifications of almost
15 percentage points, approximately equal to the increase in the proportion of individuals
obtaining either a Certificate of Secondary Education (CSE) or Ordinary Level (O’Level)
qualification, examinations which are sat in the academic year in which an individual turns
16. In contrast, there is no impact of the RoSLA on the proportion of individuals with an
Advanced Level (A’Level), an examination taken at age 18.
2.3 Data
The analysis combines data from the 1975-2006 Labour Force Surveys (LFS). The survey,
which is the largest representative household-level survey in the UK, contains detailed
information on each individual within a household including month and year of birth,
ethnicity, age at leaving full-time education, area of residence, and country of birth.
The outcome of interest in the analysis, the age at which an individual entered mother-
hood, is determined from the ages of the mother and the eldest child within a household at
the time of the survey using the “own-children methodology” developed by Grabill and Cho
(1965). This reverse-survival technique has been shown to generate age-specific fertility
rates from LFS survey data which are consistent with those calculated from administrative
data (Murphy and Berrington, 1993). Implicit in this procedure is that a mother-child re-
lationship can be observed only if both individuals are present in the same household at
the time of the survey. Thus in the case of parental separation the child is assumed to be
resident with the mother, so that the observed mother-child relationship is biological. The
determination also assumes away child mortality, and therefore the eldest child observed is
primogeniture. Although these two factors may induce measurement error, it is likely that
any effect would be small.8 As the LFS contains measures of both month and year of birth
it is possible to determine maternal age to within one month, a more accurate calculation
than is possible with census data.9 A further advantage of the detailed reporting of date
of birth in the LFS is that it enables precise assignment of individuals to their academic
8The proportion of multi-family households has declined from 3% in 1961 to approx 1% in 2001 (Social
Trends 32, Office of National Statistics (2002)), with over 90% of stepfamilies in 1990 being comprised of
children from a previous relationship of the mother (Social Trends 38, Office of National Statistics (2008)).
There has been an upward trend in single-parent families, but a fairly constant proportion of these (circa
85%) are lone-mother families (Social Trends 38, Office of National Statistics (2008)). Childhood mortality
rates have been declining over time - the under-15 mortality rate stood at 31 per 100,000 in 1980, falling
to 15 per 100,000 by 2000 (Child Mortality Statistics, Office of National Statistics (2010a)).
9For instance, the US census records year of birth only for the 1940 and 1950 censuses, thereafter also
quarter of birth allowing a calculation of maternal age to within 3 months at best (Black et al., 2008).
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cohort of birth, which would not be possible if only calendar year of birth was reported.
To avoid truncation of the distribution of teenage mothers, the sample is restricted
to women aged between 20 and 30; the lower bound reflects that to determine whether
an individual is a teen mother or not the observation must be taken after adolescence,
the upper bound reflects the fact that during this period individuals started to leave the
parental home from age 16 onwards, so above the age of 30 it may not be possible using
information on individuals residing in a household to accurately identify whether a woman
became a mother in her teenage years.
Although the LFS does report country of birth, for all but the latest surveys this
measure is aggregated to the national level for UK-born individuals, as constituent coun-
tries of the UK are measured from only the 2nd quarter of 2001 onwards. Additionally,
the LFS reports contemporaneous region of residence only at the time of the survey, and
therefore does not have information on where an individual spent her childhood. This is
problematic as the education system in Northern Ireland and Scotland differs from that
in England and Wales, and in particular education in Scotland is governed by separate
rules and legislation. For this reason the sample is restricted to those women who were
born in the UK, but were resident in England and Wales at the time of the survey, with
the implicit assumption that these individuals would have been subject to the English
education system. It is therefore possible that the sample is affected by random mobility,
however internal migration between constituent countries of the UK is assumed small.10
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std Dev Variable Mean Std Dev
Academic Cohort 57.75 4.876 Age at survey 25.38 3.063
Age left F/T Education 16.61 1.824 Subject to RoSLA 0.605 0.489
White 0.974 0.160 No of children 1.787 0.811
Mother at 15 0.003 0.053 Mother by 15 0.003 0.051
Mother at 16 0.012 0.107 Mother by 16 0.005 0.073
Mother at 17 0.028 0.166 Mother by 17 0.017 0.129
Mother at 18 0.042 0.200 Mother by 18 0.045 0.208
Mother at 19 0.050 0.218 Mother by 19 0.087 0.282
Mother at 20 0.051 0.221 Teen Mother 0.137 0.344
Number of Observations 137,502
Table 2.1 displays the descriptive statistics for the main sample used in the analysis.
The individuals were all subject to the Butler Act (1944), thus facing a minimum school-
leaving age of either 15 or 16. Academic cohorts range from 1947/48 to 1964/65, with 61%
10Internal migration statistics are not available prior to 1991, however Stillwell, Boden, and Rees (1990)
using doctor registration data from 1975-1986 estimate that the bulk of internal migration over this period
was within rather than between countries of the UK.
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of individuals within the sample subject to the post-RoSLA schooling regime (minimum
school-leaving age of 16). The sample is predominantly white11; 13.7% of the sample
are teenage mothers, 8.7% are mothers before the age of 19, 4.5% before age 18, 1.7%
before age 17, 0.5% before age 16 and 0.3% before age 15, proportions reflective of those
recorded in administrative data. Amongst mothers in the sample, the number of children
per mother is 1.78. This is lower than official estimates of total fertility rates, but reflects
that the sample measures fertility only up to a maximum age of 30 rather than completed
fertility per woman.12
2.4 Empirical Methodology
As the RoSLA reform was implemented nationwide at a single point in time, it can be
thought of as a natural experiment inducing exogenous variation in the length of educa-
tion received by an individual. As this variation was determined solely by a discontinuous
function of an observed covariate, the individual’s birth date, the estimation proceeds
through a regression discontinuity design (RDD), an approach which allows the identifica-
tion of causal treatment effects in quasi-experimental settings. The method dates back to
Thistlethwaite and Campbell (1960), who introduced the approach analyzing the impact
of winning a scholarship on subsequent academic outcomes. More recently RDDs have
gained popularity in applied economics and have been used to investigate, inter alia, the
impact of impact of class sizes on scholastic achievement (Angrist and Lavy, 1999), voting
shares (Lee, 2001) and labour market discrimination (Hahn, Todd, and van der Klaauw,
1999).
The RDD approach is based on the idea that a discontinuity in the assignment function
to a treatment is induced in situations where individuals are deterministically assigned to
the treatment based on whether the value of an observed covariate, the running variable,
Zi, falls on either side of a specific threshold value Zi = z
∗. The intuition is that individ-
uals in the neighbourhood of the threshold value are identical in all other characteristics,
apart from whether or not they are assigned to the treatment. Therefore by comparing
individuals ‘close’ to the discontinuity from either side of the threshold, a causal effect of
the treatment can be identified. As there is local randomization additional covariates are
not necessary, but may improve precision of the estimates (Lee and Lemieux, 2010).
11The under-reporting of ethnic minority groups is well-known in the LFS. In an attempt to address
this issue, ‘boost’ samples, which over-sample in areas with a high population density of under-represented
groups, have been taken since 1984.
12The average number of children per woman in the sample is 1.18, which is comparable to cohort fertility
rates in administrative data. ONS estimates of children per woman range from 0.99-1.62 for women aged
30 between birth years 1947-1983 (ONS, Cohort Fertility, England & Wales, Office of National Statistics
(2010b)).
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The assumptions to achieve identification in this context are hence twofold: a) that
individuals are randomly selected into the RoSLA ‘treatment’; b) that the timing of the
introduction of RoSLA is not related to unobserved characteristics that determine teenage
motherhood. Whether an individual was subject to the increased school-leaving age can
be considered to be as good as randomly assigned for two reasons. Firstly, individuals are
assigned to academic cohorts according to their date of birth, which cannot be perfectly
controlled. Second, there is no possibility of announcement effects, whereby forward-
looking parents could time the birth of their children according to RoSLA eligibility, as
detailed in Section 2.2 plans to raise the school leaving age were not made public before
1964, by which time the first individuals who would be impacted by RoSLA had already
been born.
Formally the RDD estimate αRDD is calculated by taking the difference in the expected
values of the outcome variable either side of the threshold of the observed running variable:
E[αRDD|z] = E[Y1 − Y0|Z = z∗]
= lim
z∗←z+
E(y1i |z∗)− lim
z−→z∗
E(y0i |z∗)
= lim
e→0
E(y1i |z∗ + e)− lim
e→0
E(y0i |z∗ − e) (2.1)
where Y1 and Y0 are respectively the ‘treated’ and ‘untreated’ population means; y
1
i and
y0i are observations of individuals respectively to the right or the left of the discontinuity;
the threshold level of the running variable is denoted Z = z∗. When the support of
the running variable is continuous, e can be infinitely small close to the discontinuity
so that the limits in (2.1) exist, and it is appropriate to use non-parametric methods in
the estimation (Hahn, Todd, and van der Klaauw (2001)). As eligibility for the reform is
deterministic, this representation is a ‘sharp’ RDD.
2.4.1 Non-parametric Estimation
The analysis uses kernel-weighted local polynomial smoothing to estimate the expecta-
tions either side of the threshold value of Zi, with the treatment effect calculated as the
difference between the predicted values calculated at the discontinuity. Although trian-
gular kernels, by assigning larger weights to observations at the threshold in principle
have better boundary properties (Fan and Gijbels, 1996), in practice kernel choice does
not exert a significant impact on the magnitude of the estimates and rectangular kernels
have become the de facto standard (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008). The order of polynomial
smoothing is guided by the Bayesian Information Criterion13. Bootstrapped coefficients
13The Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) indicated that a linear polynomial was appropriate over all
outcome variables. The BIC applies a larger penalty for higher order terms than the Akaike Information
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and standard errors are calculated.
The running variable in the analysis is the distance in time between an individual’s
birth and the implementation of the RoSLA reform. Time is clearly continuous, how-
ever a practical issue arises because the data contains only discrete measures, so that the
lowest granularity that this distance can be calculated is in months. Lee and Lemieux
(2010) argue that as long as the running variable, Zi, is finely distributed the econo-
metric complication is limited, as in practice data will always contain discrete measures
(Imbens and Lemieux, 2008). In essence the concern with a discretely measured running
variable is that it is not possible to allow e to become infinitely small in the neighbourhood
of the discontinuity. Thus there is an irreducible gap between observations on either side of
the threshold, and the casual effect of the programme is only identified with a parametric
assumption regarding the assignment function (Lee and Card, 2008).
2.4.2 Parametric Estimation
Recall from equation (2.1), the estimate of interest is E[Y1 − Y0|Z = z∗]. The issue at
hand with discretely measured data is that it is possible to observe E[Y1|Z ≥ z∗], the
outcome of the set of individuals at precisely the threshold or above who are subject
to the treatment, and E[Y0|Z = z∗ − e], the outcomes of the set of individuals strictly
below the threshold who are not treated. With discrete Zi, e takes on a finite number
of values over the range Z = zj , j = (1, .., J), which implies that the limits in equation
(2.1) do not exist. Specifically, the closest realisation below the threshold, where z∗ = zk,
is E[Y0|Z = zk−1] and therefore to predict E[Y0|Z = zk−0] a parametric approach is
required. As the outcome variable is binary, probit regressions are estimated using a
treatment dummy, T , indicating whether the individual was subject to the RoSLA reform,
and include a polynomial function of the running variable, zj . Including interaction terms
between the treatment dummy and the polynomial allows the polynomial coefficients to
differ either side of the discontinuity14.
Criterion, which proved to be less definitive, but indicated either a linear or quadratic polynomial according
the outcome variable in question. As the role of the polynomial is to reflect the underlying data generating
process that governs fertility, rather than fertility at a specific age as measured by the relevant outcome
variable, the same order of polynomial was applied across all specifications.
14Although the polynomial is allowed to have different coefficients either side of the discontinuity, the
same order of polynomial is applied, reflecting that the polynomial is capturing the underlying data-
generating process. Lee and Lemieux (2010) note that constraining the coefficients of the polynomial to
be the same on both sides of the discontinuity is inconsistent with the intuition behind the RDD approach
as data from above the threshold would be used to estimate E[Y0|Z = z∗] and data from below the cutoff
would be used in the calculation of E[Y1|Z = z∗]. However this approach is often seen in the literature,
see for example Silles (2011), as imposing this constraint will lead to more efficient estimates.
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The estimation equation thus becomes:
Yij = α0 + β0Tij + γ0P
l
j + δ0(Ti × P lj) + aj + ij (2.2)
where Yij is the outcome for individual i born at a distance of j, in months, from the
relevant threshold; Tij is a dummy variable indicating whether an individual born in
month j was subject to the RoSLA reform, thus β0 captures the impact of the treatment,
and is hence the parametric estimate of αRDD; P lj is a vector of polynomial functions of
zj , with (l ∈ N) denoting the order of the polynomial; aj is a specification error term that
describes the difference between the true value at each zj and the estimated polynomial
function; ij is an idiosyncratic error term.
The magnitude of the coefficient estimates of interest can be sensitive to the choice
of polynomial in the running variable. A certain degree of smoothing may be desirable
to minimise the influence of outliers and seasonality, although at a cost of deterioration
in the model’s fit. Higher degree polynomials follow the data more accurately, but may
overstate outliers. With small bandwidths the number of higher degree polynomials is
limited as J constrains the total parameters that can be estimated. The optimal order of
the polynomial is again guided chosen according to the Bayesian Information Criterion.
With this approach it is necessary to include more conservative standard errors to reflect
modeling uncertainty. Lee and Card (2008) advocate inflating standard errors in relation
to their goodness of fit statistic G,15 and therefore (2.2) includes the specification error
term aj , which is assumed identical either side of the discontinuity and to be random and
orthogonal to Z. The estimation computes robust standard errors with random, identical
specification errors by clustering on zj .
In practice both the parametric and non-parametric approaches should yield similar
estimates of the RDD parameter as long as the discretisation of Z is not too coarse.
Therefore Section 2.5 presents results utilising both methodologies in order to illustrate
that the analysis does not rely on one particular method or specification.
15The Lee and Card (2008) G-statistic is calculated as:
G ≡ (RSSR −RSSUR)/(J −K)
RSSUR/(N − J)
where RSSR is the residual sum of squares for the model using polynomial functions and RSSUR for
the unrestricted model using dummies respectively. Under the assumption of normality, G follows an
F(J−K,N−J) distribution, with K the number of parameters estimated in the restricted model, N the
number of observations and J the total number of values in the support of Z. The null hypothesis is
that there is no systematic difference in the residual sum of squares in the restricted and unrestricted
estimations.
27
2.4. Empirical Methodology 2. Compulsory Education and Teenage Motherhood
2.4.3 Bandwidth Choice
A key issue in both the parametric and non-parametric approaches is the determination
of the appropriate size of the window around the discontinuity to use in the estimation.
From a theoretical perspective, by taking the limits either side of the threshold the small-
est window width around the discontinuity yields unbiased estimates of the true treatment
effect. However such an estimation would use only a paucity of data points and there-
fore have little statistical power. Wide bandwidths use a greater number of observations
and will produce more efficient estimates, however a degree of bias may be introduced
by including observations far from the discontinuity, the concern being that there may
be unobserved changes over the bandwidth period, for instance to legislation or benefit
entitlement16, which could independently impact the proclivity toward teen motherhood,
potentially confounding the analysis. It might also be expected that the magnitude of the
treatment effect is different for those cohorts closer to the timing of the implementation.
In addition, too great a window size may indicate a sizable treatment effect even when
the data is smoothly distributed around the discontinuity. There is therefore an inherent
trade-off between bias and efficiency in choosing the appropriate window of observations
to include in the estimation.
Ludwig and Miller (2007) propose an optimal bandwidth selection procedure specific
to a RDD context. For each candidate bandwidth, h, the cross-validation function is
computed via a leave-one-out procedure, whereby for each observation, i, a regression is
estimated omitting observation i and the difference is calculated between the predicted
value for observation i from this regression, yˆ(zi), and the actual value yi. To reflect that
RDD estimates are estimated at the boundary, if the value of the running variable for
observation i is to the left of the threshold, then the regression uses only observations
where zi − h ≤ z < zi. If observation i has a value of Z to the right of the threshold then
the regression uses only observations where zi < z ≤ zi + h. Repeating this procedure for
each observation i with every possible bandwidth h yields the cross-validation function
CVY (h) =
1
N
∑
i=1N(yi − yˆ(zi))2. The optimal bandwidth is then the value of h that
minimises CVY (h), the mean square difference of the predicted value to the true value of
Y (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008).
2.4.4 Fuzzy RD
The methodology presented thus far allows the estimation of the impact of an increase in
mandatory education from age 15 to age 16 on adolescent motherhood. However a more
16The Child Benefit Act (1975), enacted 1977, replaced family and child tax allowances paid to the
household with child benefit paid directly to the primary child caretaker (usually the mother). Therefore
estimates using a window width larger than 5 years may reflect the introduction of this benefit entitlement.
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general determination of the impact of schooling duration on fertility behaviour may be
pertinent to policy formation. As the education and fertility decisions are interrelated17,
a simple estimation of the impact of schooling on fertility using Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS) may produce biased estimates.
Using an instrumental variable (IV) approach is a standard method to address such
endogeneity. In the context of regression discontinuity design, the IV approach is a ‘fuzzy’
(FRD) regression discontinuity (Trochim, 1984). The FRD differs from the sharp design,
described by (2.1), insofar that treatment assignment is not required to be a deterministic
function of Zi. Instead the probability of receiving treatment as a function of the running
variable, Pr(Ti = 1|zi), is discontinuous at the threshold, Zi = z∗, as there are factors
unobserved by the econometrician that can influence assignment to treatment, such that
treatment participation is not perfectly predicted by the cohort rule. Hahn et al. (2001)
argue that the FRD allows the determination of a Wald estimator even when the standard
IV assumption is violated. As the estimates are applicable only to the sub-population of
individuals, for whom the RoSLA reform actually induced an increase in the schooling
(the ‘compliers’), the estimated coefficients therefore describe a Local Average Treatment
Effect (Angrist and Imbens, 1994)18.
As in (2.2) the estimation allows for random, identical specification errors in the es-
timation and receive robust standard errors by clustering on zj . The two step approach
can be written as:
AGELEFTij = α1 + β1Tij + γ1P
l
j + δ1(Ti × P lj) + a1j + ν1ij (2.3)
Yij = α2 + ξ ̂AGELEFT ij + γ2P lj + δ2(Ti × P lj) + a2j + ν2ij (2.4)
In the first stage (2.3), the impact of the RoSLA treatment on school-leaving age for
individual i born at a distance of j months from RoSLA implementation is estimated,
and then included in the second stage equation (2.4). Thus the Wald estimate, ξFRD,
describes the causal effect of one year of schooling on the fertility outcome of interest Yij ,
and is thus equivalent to the ratio of the sharp RDD estimate from equation (2.2) and the
17Specifically there may be non-observed characteristics that affect both the fertility and education deci-
sion. The specification may also suffer from reverse causality: an individual with low academic attainment
may choose to become a mother early. This was described by Harris, Duncan, and Boisjoly (2002) as the
‘Nothing-to-lose’ hypothesis, as such an individual would be likely to have poor economic opportunities
regardless of the timing of her fertility. However it is also plausible that an individual who experiences
early fertility may elect to curtail her education prematurely in response to motherhood.
18Individuals (the ‘always takers’) who would always stay in school until age 16 would not have been
affected by the increase in school leaving age. As the reform mandated compulsory attendance, the
population of ‘never-takers’ should not exist. Key to identification is the monotonicity assumption that
RoSLA had a non-negative effect on an individual’s duration of schooling, so that individuals who in
absence of the reform would have remained at school after age 16 reduce their duration of education in
response to the RoSLA legislation (the ‘defiers’) are ruled out.
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first stage estimate, β1, so that ξ
FRD = α
SRD
β1
. This has an intuitive interpretation: as
not everybody responds to the treatment, the reduced form estimate has to be multiplied
by the inverse of the proportion of the affected population.
2.5 Results
In Section 2.5.1 the main results explore the impact of the RoSLA reform first over each of
the individual teenage years, and also the cumulative effect over the years of adolescence.
To examine the extent to which RoSLA bites, the analysis is extended by investigating
the extent of any impact of the treatment beyond just the teenage years. The robustness
and sensitivity of the analysis is explored in Section 2.5.2. In Section 2.5.3 the analysis is
extended to examine at the policy relevant question, the impact of years of education on
the timing of entry to motherhood.
2.5.1 Main Results
To illustrate the transparency of the sharp RDD approach, the results are first presented
graphically. Figure 2.2(a) depicts the impact of the reform on the probability of becoming
a mother at age 16, whereas the cumulative of becoming a mother before the age of 17 is
shown in figure 2.2(b). These graphs are estimated using the local polynomial smoothing
approach, as described in Section 2.4.1, with a bandwidth of 48 months and a smoothing
polynomial of degree 1. In each case the timing of the implementation of the RoSLA
reform has been normalised to 0. Appendix A displays the full set of results over each of
the outcome variables.
Considering fertility at each of the individual teen years, the graphs in Appendix A are
indicitive of a clear difference in fertility before and after the reform, for all but mother
at age 17. As RoSLA raised the age of compulsory schooling from age 15 to age 16, the
observed effect at age 16 reflects the immediate ‘bite’ of RoSLA and can be interpreted
as the direct incarceration effect associated with the requirement to complete one year
of additional schooling. At ages beyond 16, the RoSLA constraint is not binding, and
therefore any observed effect cannot be attributed to incarceration alone. The graphs
illustrate a non-monotonic impact of the reform over the teenage years, with negative
effects for motherhood at age 16 and at age 18, a negligible effect at age 17, and positive
effects at age 15 and age 19.
Analytical results are presented in Tables 2.2 and 2.3. Panel A displays results esti-
mated using the parametric procedure as detailed in section 2.4.2, for the probability of
becoming a mother at a specific year of age, or before a certain age respectively (thus
teenage motherhood is defined as entering motherhood before the age of 20). The first
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Figure 2.2: Graphical Results - Sharp RDD
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Notes: The graphs display local-linear polynomial smooths, as described in Section 2.4.1, using a bandwidth of 48
months, a smoothing polynomial of degree 1, and a rectangular kernel, of the probability of becoming a mother a)
at age 16 and b) before age 17. The horizontal axis measures the distance, in months, of individuals’ births to the
RoSLA cutoff. The scatterplot indicates the proportions of mothers in each month-bin. The dashed lines are 95%
confidence intervals of the local polynomial.
estimation uses the preferred bandwidth of 48 months, then estimates using half and dou-
ble the preferred bandwidth are displayed to illustrate the robustness of the results to
the choice of bandwidth (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008). Panel B shows the bootstrapped
estimates and coefficients from the non-parametric method described in Section 2.4.1.
Examining first the estimations with fertility at a specific age as the outcome vari-
able, the regression coefficients reveal evidence of both an ‘incarceration’ and a ‘beyond
incarceration’ effect. The negative significant effect of 0.40 percentage points at age 16
reflects the direct impact of the increase in the schooling requirement, and can therefore
be interpreted as the incarceration effect of RoSLA. This implies that the effect of re-
quiring young women to stay an additional year at school is to reduce the incidence of
pregnancy at the age of 16 by 36.73% relative to the sample mean. Although a positive
effect at age 15 of 0.15 percentage points is observed, translating to a large increase in the
incidence of pregnancy at this age, the estimate is imprecise due to the very small fraction
of individuals who experience such early motherhood. A back-of-an-envelope calculation
indicates approximately one quarter of the decrease in incidence of motherhood at age 16
may be attributed to individuals bringing fertility forward to age 1519.
The pertinent question is whether the remainder of the decrease in incidence of mother-
19This quantitatively small effect may be attributed to individuals with preferences for extreme early
fertility, who in absence of the RoSLA would have postponed motherhood to age 16, due solely to the social
norm of not having a child whilst still in education. However with the increased schooling requirement
these individuals find that the perceived cost of delaying fertility one more year is so great that the reform
actually induces them to enter motherhood earlier than they would have done in absence of the increase
in mandatory schooling.
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Table 2.2: Sharp RDD - Mother at specific ages
At 15 At 16 At 17 At 18 At 19
Panel A:
BW = 48 0.0015 -0.0040∗ -0.0019 -0.0081∗∗ 0.0058∗
N = 64,359 (0.0011) (0.0022) (0.0026) (0.0034) (0.0031)
% change 49.67% -36.73% -6.85% -19.63% 11.41%
BW = 24 0.0000 -0.0059∗ -0.0021 -0.0038 0.0049
N = 31,566 (0.0015) (0.0030) (0.0035) (0.0051) (0.0036)
BW = 96 0.0008 -0.0047∗∗∗ -0.0032 -0.0072∗∗∗ 0.0025
N = 124,458 (0.0008) (0.0014) (0.0020) (0.0026) (0.0025)
Panel B:
BW = 48 0.0014∗ -0.0043∗∗ -0.0020 -0.0076∗∗ 0.0055
N=64,359 (0.0007) (0.0018) (0.0028) (0.0031) (0.0035)
Notes: Panel A displays estimates from the parametric estimations, as described in Section 2.4.2, of
each dependent variable over columns, with different bandwidths over rows. Robust standard errors,
which allow for random and identical specification errors, are reported in parentheses. Panel B shows
bootstrapped coefficients and associated standard errors from the local-linear polynomial smoothing
procedure described in Section 2.4.1, using 1,000 replications. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
hood at age 16 is due to individuals delaying fertility by one year only (a pure incarceration
effect) or by more than one year. If pure incarceration only is present, then fertility should
shift by one year, which would induce a positive impact of 10% at age 17. However, the
coefficient in Table 2.2 suggests that there is no significant impact of the reform at age 17,
in turn implying that some individuals who were not directly constrained by the RoSLA
reform also delayed their fertility. This consequently should induce a positive impact at
age 18, but the coefficient reveals that there is also a significant decrease in fertilty at age
18 of 0.81 percentage points, almost double the level impact seen at age 16, but implying
a lesser decrease of the incidence of motherhood of 19.63% due to the larger number of
individuals entering motherhood at this age. Therefore the results provide strong evidence
of both incarceration and an additional downward impact of the reform on fertility that
cannot be explained purely by incarceration. Furthermore, at age 19 there is a signifi-
cant positive impact on fertility of 11.41%, which suggests that overall RoSLA induced a
postponement of fertility to late teen years.
The estimates in Table 2.3 reflect the cumulative effect of the individual year impacts
displayed in Table 2.2. The coefficient for mother by age 16 captures the impact of
the RoSLA treatment on the probably of entering motherhood for all ages up to but
not including the individuals 16th birthday. Thus the coefficient for mother by age 17
cumulates the ‘by 16’ effect with the ‘at 16’ effect from Table 2.2. Here the clear evidence
of the incarceration effect is indicated by the coefficient on mothers by age 17, whereas
the beyond incarceration effect is evident from the increasing magnitude of the coefficients
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Table 2.3: Sharp RDD - Cumulative effect over teen years
By 16 By 17 By 18 By 19 By 20
Panel A:
BW = 48 -0.0007 -0.0048* -0.0067* -0.0145*** -0.0088*
N = 64,359 (0.0013) (0.0024) (0.0037) (0.0046) (0.0053)
% change -14.52% -29.69% -15.18% -17.06% -6.57%
BW = 24 -0.0018 -0.0076** -0.0096* -0.0133* -0.0082
N = 31,566 (0.0019) (0.0036) (0.0051) (0.0074) (0.0078)
BW = 96 -0.0002 -0.0049*** -0.0082*** -0.0154*** -0.0132***
N = 124,458 (0.0009) (0.0016) (0.0027) (0.0036) (0.0041)
Panel B:
BW = 48 -0.0007 -0.0050** -0.0070** -0.0146*** -0.0090
N = 64,359 (0.0012) (0.0021) (0.0035) (0.0046) (0.0056)
Notes: See notes to Table 2.2.
for older teenage mothers.
To investigate the extent and duration to which the overall effect of RoSLA on fertility
bites,20 the analysis is extended to investigate fertility outcomes beyond the teenage years.
In order to determine the effect on cumulative motherhood ‘by’ a particular age the sample
must be restricted to individuals strictly above that age, that is to observe whether an
individual became a mother at any age before her 25th birthday, we must observe her at
age 25 or above. Table 2.4 presents the estimates of cumulative fertility by year up to by
age 25. Results for each year of motherhood before age 25 use the sample of individuals
aged 25-30; before age 24 use the sample of individuals aged 24-30 and so on.
The estimates in Table 2.4 confirm that the treatment exerted a significant impact
over the teenage years only. The coefficients for each outcome in each of the sub-samples
are consistent in sign and magnitude, displaying the same pattern of an increasing magni-
tudes for ages before 19, and a decrease in the size of the effect before age 20 (consistent
with the positive impact at age 19 as shown in Table 2.2). After age 20 the impact of
RoSLA on fertility is quantitatively small relative to the sample mean, and statistically
indistinguishable from zero.
20Note that the analysis of the impact of RoSLA on fertility is restricted to the incidence and timing
of fertility. To investigate quantum fertility requires knowledge of completed fertility, which is generally
measured as the number of children per woman at age 45. However, as previously discussed, in order to
accurate determine teenage motherhood it is necessary to restrict the sample to individuals aged between
20 and 30, and therefore it is not possible to investigate the impact of RoSLA on the number of children
per woman. Administrative data indicates that there is no difference in completed fertility between pre-
RoSLA and post-RoSLA cohorts beyond the long-run (downward) trend (ONS, Cohort Fertility, England
& Wales, 2010), a result also found in the cohort analysis of Clark et al. (2014).
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Table 2.4: Sharp RDD - Extended results - cumulative years
By 16 By 17 By 18 By 19 By 20 By 21 By 22 By 23 By 24 By 25
25 - 30 sample -0.0009 -0.0019 -0.0062 -0.0164∗∗∗ -0.0132∗ -0.0040 0.0011 -0.0017 -0.0052 -0.0110
N = 39,912 (0.0015) (0.0029) (0.0043) (0.0058) (0.0067) (0.0070) (0.0078) (0.0088) (0.0084) (0.0094)
24 - 30 sample -0.0015 -0.0036 -0.0066 -0.0151*** -0.0095 -0.0016 0.0037 -0.0012 -0.0059
N = 45,621 (0.0014) (0.0028) (0.0041) (0.0053) (0.0061) (0.0067) (0.0080) (0.0085) (0.0080)
23 - 30 sample -0.0011 -0.0040 -0.0066* -0.0150*** -0.0090 -0.0028 0.0034 -0.0014
N = 51,164 (0.0014) (0.0027) (0.0039) (0.0049) (0.0057) (0.0065) (0.0082) (0.0084)
22 - 30 sample -0.0007 -0.0046* -0.0071* -0.0163*** -0.0108* -0.0030 0.0029
N = 56,204 (0.0014) (0.0027) (0.0039) (0.0049) (0.0056) (0.0064) (0.0079)
21 - 30 sample -0.0008 -0.0048** -0.0060* -0.0154*** -0.0106* -0.0029
N = 61,023 (0.0013) (0.0025) (0.0036) (0.0047) (0.0055) (0.0060)
20 - 30 sample -0.0007 -0.0048** -0.0067* -0.0145*** -0.0088*
N = 64,359 (0.0013) (0.0024) (0.0037) (0.0046) (0.0053)
Notes: The table shows estimates from local parametric estimations, as described in Section 2.4.2, of each dependent
variable over columns, using different sub-samples over rows as indicated. Robust standard errors, which allow for
random and identical specification errors, are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
2.5.2 Sensitivity Analysis
Panel A from Tables 2.2 and 2.3 included estimates using three different bandwidths, the
preferred, as well as double and half this bandwidth, to illustrate the robustness of the
estimates to the choice of bandwidth. The preferred bandwidth was chosen according
to the cross-validation procedure as described in Section 2.4.3, calculated and examined
for each of the outcome variables in turn. This analysis did not yield a unique optimal
bandwidth appropriate for all outcome variables, however a bandwidth between 36 and
60 months was consistently indicated.
Figure 2.3: Cross-Validation
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Notes: The graphs display the cross-validation function calculated as described in Section 2.4.3. The optimal
bandwidth is given by the minimand of the function CVY (h) =
1
N
∑
i=1N(yi − yˆ(zi))2.
As an illustration, Figure 2.3(a) displays the cross-validation function for mother at
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age 16 over bandwidths ranging from 15 to 72 months. The function decreases in value as
the size of bandwidth increases, but the graph suggests that increases in bandwidth above
40 exert little difference in the magnitude of the function. The cross-validation function
for mother at age 18 is displayed in Figure 2.3(b). In this case the function does suggest
a clear minimand, at approximately 40 months. The cross-validation functions for each of
the outcome variables are displayed in Appendix A.
A corollary to the cross-validation procedure is to directly examine the sensitivity of
the estimates to bandwidth choice. Figure 2.4 displays the magnitude of the coefficients
estimated using bandwidths ranging between 18 and 72 for fertility at (a) age 16 and
(b) up to, but not including age 17. The estimated impact displays some sensitivity to
smaller bandwidths, but the magnitude of the estimates is essentially stable for bandwidths
greater than 40. This is a reflection of what was seen in Figure 2.3(a), that increases
in bandwidth exert little effect on the cross-validation function for bandwidths greater
than 40. Appendix A includes the full set of results displaying the sensitivity of the
estimates to bandwidth choice over each of the outcome variables. The graphs generally
indicate stability in the estimated coefficients for all outcome variables at bandwidths from
approximately 40 onwards, apart from the estimates for mother at age 18 (also affecting
cumulative fertilty by ages 19 and 20), which achieve stability after approximately 60
months.
Figure 2.4: Sensitivity of Estimates to bandwidth choice
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Notes: The graphs display the magnitude of the estimates, along with the 95% confidence interval, over different
bandwidths based on the parametric regression discontinuity design as described in Section 2.4.2.
At the boundary the comparison is between individuals born at the end (August) of
one academic cohort with individuals who are born at the beginning (September) of the
next academic cohort. The key identifying assumption is that individuals in the neigh-
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bourhood of the discontinuity are identical in characteristics apart from their assignment
to the treatment. However there may be fundamental differences in individuals accord-
ing to their relative and social age within an academic cohort and therefore the RDD
estimation, which is essentially a between-cohort comparison at the boundary, may just
reflect compositional differences of those born at the beginning versus the end of a co-
hort. For instance, Crawford, Dearden, and Meghir (2010) find that relative age within
a cohort exerts an important influence on academic outcomes, younger individuals in a
cohort perform on average significantly worse than their older peers in assessments, which
the authors attribute to the absolute age of the individual when taking the test. In the
context of fertility behaviour, a priori it may be expected that older individuals within a
cohort would have higher fertility due to their higher emotional and physical maturity, as
forging a relationship requires a set of social skills that are likely to be more developed in
individuals born earlier within a cohort. In addition because fecundability increases over
the period of adolescence (Wood and Weinstein, 1988), older individuals are more able to
conceive. However, analyzing the fertility outcomes within academic cohorts in Sweden,
Skirbekk, Kohler, and Prskawetz (2004) find that individuals born at the beginning of a
cohort actually enter motherhood up to 4.9 months later than those born at the end of
the academic cohort, which the authors attribute to the ‘social age’ effect.
Table 2.5: Placebo Analysis
Panel A At 15 At 16 At 17 At 18 At 19
1951 -0.0032** 0.0011 0.0002 0.0010 -0.0005
N=42,803 (0.0014) (0.0026) (0.0031) (0.0043) (0.0043)
RoSLA 0.0015 -0.0040* -0.0019 -0.0081** 0.0058*
N=64,359 (0.0011) (0.0022) (0.0026) (0.0034) (0.0031)
1964 -0.0023** 0.0013 -0.0032 0.0000 -0.0032
N=73,021 (0.0009) (0.0017) (0.0025) (0.0033) (0.0034)
Panel B By 16 By 17 By 18 By 19 By 20
1951 -0.0019 -0.0009 -0.0006 0.0004 -0.0002
N=42,803 (0.0025) (0.0040) (0.0035) (0.0068) (0.0106)
RoSLA -0.0008 -0.0049** -0.0068* -0.0147*** -0.0089*
N=64,359 (0.0013) (0.0024) (0.0037) (0.0046) (0.0053)
1964 -0.0016 -0.0002 -0.0034 -0.0033 -0.0066
N=73,021 (0.0012) (0.0020) (0.0036) (0.0040) (0.0050)
Notes: The table shows estimates from parametric estimations, as described in Section 2.4.2,
of each dependent variable over columns using the preferred bandwidth of 48 months, with the
discontinuity defined in different years over rows. Robust standard errors, which allow for random
and identical specification errors, are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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In order to confirm that the results presented in Section 2.5.1 are indeed driven by the
reform rather than inherent between cohort effects two further robustness checks are un-
dertaken. Firstly a falsification exercise is undertaken, placebo regressions are estimated
under the assumption that RoSLA was implemented prior to or after actual implemen-
tation. The results of the placebo analysis are displayed in Table 2.5, which are not
consistent with the estimates that use the correct RoSLA assignment. The sign, magni-
tude and significance of the coefficients differ non-systematically, suggesting that observed
effect on fertility is in fact driven by the implementation of RoSLA.
Table 2.6: RD-DiD estimates
Panel A At 15 At 16 At 17 At 18 At 19
Pre-RoSLA DiD 0.0013 -0.0066*** -0.0116*** -0.0188*** 0.0006
N = 79,852 (0.0010) (0.0017) (0.0029) (0.0036) (0.0035)
Pre-Post RD-DiD 0.0008 -0.0043*** -0.0037* -0.0091*** 0.0007
N = 137,502 (0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0028)
Panel B By 16 By 17 By 18 By 19 By 20
Pre-RoSLA DiD 0.0003 -0.0062*** -0.0179*** -0.0363*** -0.0355***
N = 79,852 (0.0012) (0.0022) (0.0037) (0.0051) (0.0061)
Pre-Post RD-DiD 0.0000 -0.0043*** -0.0080*** -0.0169*** -0.0165***
N = 137,502 (0.0009) (0.0015) (0.0026) (0.0036) (0.0042)
Notes: The table shows estimates from the Regression Discontinuity difference in difference procedure, as
described in Section 2.5.2 of each dependent variable over columns, using non-overlapping windows of obser-
vations and a bandwidth of 36 months. The Pre-RoSLA RD-DiD is estimated over the 47/48 - 52/53 and
53/54 - 59/60 windows. The Post-RoSLA RD-DiD is estimated over the 53/54 - 59/60 and 60/61 - 64/65
windows. The Pre-Post RD-DiD is estimated over all three windows. Robust standard errors, which allow for
random and identical specification errors, are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Second, following Danzer and Lavy (2013), a difference in difference approach is ap-
plied in the context of the regression discontinuity design (RD-DID). This procedure ex-
plicitly nets out any inherent between cohort differences at the August-September thresh-
old by using three non-overlapping windows of observations21- the pre-RoSLA period
(academic cohorts 1947/48 - 1952/53), the post-RoSLA period (1960/61 - 1964/64) and
the period around the RoSLA discontinuity (1953/54 - 1959/60). For each sub-period the
running variable is defined as the distance in months from the relevant August-September
threshold. Two versions of following specification are then estimated:
Yij = β0 +β1Rightij+β2RoslaRightij+Σ
3
k=1Periodk+γ0P
l
j +δ0(Ti×P lj)+aj+ij (2.5)
21Distinct windows are required to form the counterfactual observations. In order to accommodate the
total observation window a bandwidth of 36 months is used in the estimations
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where Yij is the outcome of interest for individual i born at a distance of j from the
relevant threshold; Right is an indicator variable for an observation being on the right-
hand side of the relevant discontinuity; Period are period dummies for each window of
observations; RoslaRight is a dummy equal to 1 if the observation is on the right-hand side
of the discontinuity in the period around the RoSLA discontinuity, thus β2 describes the
RD-DiD estimate. The γ and δ capture the polynomial smooth in the running variable.
Table 2.6 presents the results of the difference-in-difference analysis considering first
the pre-RoSLA period only as counterfactual observations, and second using both pre
and post-RoSLA periods for comparison. The estimates are qualitatively similar to those
presented in the main analysis and therefore adjusting the original RoSLA coefficients to
account for any inherent between-cohort discontinuities does not an induce a significant
impact on the sign or magnitude of the RDD estimates.
2.5.3 Further Estimations
Figure 2.5: Graphical results - Fuzzy RDD
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Notes: The graphs display local-linear polynomial smooths, as described in Section 2.4.1, using a bandwidth of 48
months, a smoothing polynomial of degree 1, and a rectangular kernel, for a) age an individual left school (first-stage
of the fuzzy RDD) and b) the probability of becoming a mother before age 19 (second-stage of the fuzzy RDD) .
The horizontal axis measures the distance, in months, of individuals’ births to the RoSLA cutoff. The scatterplot
indicates the proportions of mothers in each month-bin. The dashed lines are 95% confidence intervals of the local
polynomial.
Finally the analysis considers the impact of education as measured by years of schooling
on adolescent fertility in a two-stage approach. In the first stage the impact of the RoSLA
reform on schooling duration, measured by the age at which an individual finished full-
time education is measured. This prediction is used in the second stage to analyse the
effect on the probability of entry to motherhood. Figure 2.5 presents these two stages
graphically.
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The analytical results are reported in Tables 2.7 and 2.8. The top panel presents
the Wald Estimates using the preferred bandwidth of 48 months, as well as estimates
produced using half and double the preferred bandwidth. The middle panel displays
results of simple OLS regressions of the impact of years of schooling on the probability
of teen motherhood, and the bottom panel presents the reduced form and first stage of
the estimation (for expositional convenience only the preferred bandwidth estimates are
reported in these latter panels).
Table 2.7: Fuzzy RDD - Impact of years of education - individual years
At 15 At 16 At 17 At 18 At 19
Wald Estimates
BW = 48 0.0047 -0.0147 -0.0064 -0.0250∗ 0.0202∗
N= 64,359 (0.0035) (0.0082) (0.0086) (0.0124) (0.0100)
BW = 24 -0.0010 -0.0207 -0.0079 -0.0126 0.0179
N = 31,566 (0.0050) (0.0124) (0.0120) (0.0184) (0.0126)
BW = 96 0.0024 -0.0176∗∗ -0.0132∗ -0.0244∗∗ 0.0091
N = 124,458 (0.0025) (0.0054) (0.0065) (0.0092) (0.0081)
OLS
Years of Education -0.0004** -0.0030*** -0.0069*** -0.0088*** -0.0096***
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003)
IV
Reduced Form 0.0014 -0.0043* -0.0019 -0.0073** 0.0059*
(0.0010) (0.0023) (0.0027) (0.0033) (0.0030)
First stage 0.2934∗∗∗ 0.2934∗∗∗ 0.2934∗∗∗ 0.2934∗∗∗ 0.2934∗∗∗
(0.0586) (0.0586) (0.0586) (0.0586) (0.0586)
Notes: The table shows estimates from local parametric estimations, as described in Section 2.4.2, of each dependent
variable over columns, using a bandwidth of 48 months. First-stage F-statistic = 25.07. Robust standard errors,
which allow for random and identical specification errors, are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01
The OLS coefficients consistently indicate that there is a negative relationship between
an individual’s propensity of early motherhood and the age at which she left full-time ed-
ucation. However, as discussed in Section 2.4.4, there may be omitted variables which
imply that the residual term is correlated with years of education. If the unobserved het-
erogeneity is such that it asserts a positive impact on the propensity for early motherhood
and a negative impact on schooling, then the OLS coefficients will be biased upwards.
Conversely if the unobserved heterogeneity impacts both teen motherhood and years of
schooling in the same direction, then the OLS estimates will be understated. This potential
endogeneity is addressed using the FRD procedure described in Section 2.4.4. Recall this
is analogous to an IV approach, where the RoSLA treatment is applied as an instrument
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for schooling. The identification assumption is that the timing of the RoSLA implemen-
tation is orthogonal to unobserved determinants of motherhood, and therefore the effect
of the reform on fertility can be understood as operating only through its impact on years
of education. The first stage reveals that the reform had a significant positive impact on
years of schooling, raising it on average by approximately 3 months, which reflects that
prior to implementation of RoSLA a substantial proportion of the school age population
already stayed at school until at least age 16, as depicted in Figure 2.1(c). Considering
the wald estimates over the individual years, Table 2.7, of the effect of the duration of
education on teen motherhood, these differ from the OLS estimates non-systematically:
the coefficients on mother at age 15 and mother at age 19 change sign (from positive
to negative) indicating that the OLS estimates of these coefficients are downwardly bi-
ased. The coefficients on mother at age 16 and at age 18 are the same sign (negative)
as the OLS coefficients, and are larger in magnitude indicating that the OLS estimates
are understated. The coefficient on mother at age 17 also has the same sign (negative)
but is smaller in magnitude than the OLS coefficient. These observations imply that not
only does RoSLA have a varying impact on fertility depending on the age of the mother,
but also that the correlation between unobserved factors and years of schooling varies
throughout the teen years.
Table 2.8: Fuzzy RDD - Impact of years of education - cumulative years
By 16 By 17 By 18 By 19 By 20
Wald Estimates
BW = 48 -0.0026 -0.0173 -0.0237 -0.0487∗∗ -0.0226
N= 64,359 (0.0047) (0.0094) (0.0122) (0.0164) (0.0187)
BW = 24 -0.0058 -0.0248 -0.0296 -0.0398 -0.0207
N = 30,338 (0.0065) (0.0150) (0.0188) (0.0269) (0.0297)
BW = 96 -0.0011 -0.0193∗∗ -0.0346∗∗∗ -0.0575∗∗∗ -0.0519∗∗
N = 118,388 (0.0031) (0.0062) (0.0098) (0.0132) (0.0161)
OLS
Years of Education -0.0007*** -0.0037*** -0.0106*** -0.0194*** -0.0290***
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0006)
IV
Reduced Form -0.0008 -0.0051* -0.0070* -0.0143** -0.0084
(0.0014) (0.0026) (0.0038) (0.0045) (0.0053)
First stage 0.2934∗∗∗ 0.2934∗∗∗ 0.2934∗∗∗ 0.2934∗∗∗ 0.2934∗∗∗
(0.0586) (0.0586) (0.0586) (0.0586) (0.0586)
Notes: see notes for Table 2.7. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Considering the cumulative fertility estimates, Table 2.8, the first stage of course is
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identical to that in Table 2.7. A comparison of the OLS and the wald estimates reveals that
they all share the same sign, in contrast to the results in Table 2.7 for the estimations at
each of the individual teen ages. The cumulative estimates thus suggest that any positive
correlation between the measure of education and unobservables (such as at age 16) is
offset by negative correlation (for instance at age 15).
To reconcile the differences between the reduced form (sharp RDD) and the wald
(fuzzy RDD) estimates, recall that the SRD measures the causal effect of the reform,
which is the average effect of being subject to the RoSLA regime in comparison to the
pre-RoSLA regime (on average an extra three months of schooling). In contrast, the FRD
approach rescales the reduced form results so that the Wald estimates reflect the effect on
the propensity for motherhood of an additional year of education for the sub-population of
individuals who were induced to increase the duration of schooling by the RoSLA reform.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper has investigated the impact of an increase in the minimum compulsory school-
leaving age on teenage fertility rates, using data from the UK Labour Force Survey, the
largest representative UK household survey. The findings indicate a non-monotonic impact
over the individual teenage years. In contrast to previous research, the results provide
strong evidence of a large incarceration effect. This discrepancy may be explained by
the proportion of individuals directly affected by the institutional change to mandatory
education. The Norwegian reform analysed by Black et al. (2008) increased the duration
of schooling by two years, yet the estimated increase to individuals’ education was just
0.122 years, indicating that only a small fraction of the population were impacted. In
contrast the UK’s RoSLA, compelling an increase to compulsory schooling of just one
year, increased the average years of schooling by 0.293 years due to the higher proportion
of individuals affected. Hence although the incarceration effect, by capturing the shift in
fertility for the age at which the legislation bites, may be thought of as just a mechanical
response to the extra year of schooling induced by the legislation change, the evidence
suggests that if mandating a higher school graduating age raises the schooling durations
of a large share of the school-age population, teenage fertility rates will be substantially
affected.
Unfortunately, the data used in this analysis does not allow examination of the mech-
anism that results in the beyond incarceration effect, the question therefore remains to
what extent this is attributable to the impact of education on human capital acquisition.
Extending the analysis beyond the teenage years revealed that the impact of RoSLA was
to essentially induce a postponement of fertility from early teen to the late teenage years,
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with a large increase in the incidence of fertility at age 19, and the impact of the increase
in compulsory education tailing off after age 20. Given that these individuals contin-
ued to bear children at a relatively young age, a question for future research is whether
this postponement of fertility positively impacted outcomes for these mothers and their
children.
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Chapter 3
Post-compulsory education
incentives and non-educational
outcomes
The best defence against social exclusion is having a job, and the best way to get a job is
to have a good education, with the right training and experience.
(Prime Minister Tony Blair, 1999)
3.1 Introduction
In 1999 the Connexions Strategy was launched by the UK Government to address concerns
that an increasing proportion of the population was becoming detached from society,
specifically that skill deficits and associated worklessness create a welfare burden and social
disharmony. A key policy initiative became the expansion of education opportunities for
young people, to facilitate the acquisition of requisite skills to ensure successful entry to
the labour market. Of primary concern was the relatively low post-compulsory education
participation rate of individuals from lower socio-economic groups, with the perception
that precisely these individuals tend to have higher rates of societal problems such as
substance abuse, crime and teenage pregnancy. This group of individuals in particular
may face financial impediments, or the opportunity cost of forgoing immediate employment
may be such that continuing education beyond the mandatory requirement is not a viable
option (Rees, Williamson, and Istance, 1996).
This study examines the impact of the Education Maintenance Allowance (EMA), an
intervention combining elements of a conditional cash transfer programme and a financial
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incentives scheme, implemented in the United Kingdom1, on non-educational outcomes,
specifically teenage fertility and crime rates. The EMA provided a financial inducement,
available for a maximum of two years, for individuals remaining in education after the
compulsory school-leaving age, which was means-tested on the basis of familial income, in
order to encourage participation in further education and improve the academic achieve-
ment and vocational skill levels amongst young people from low-income families. The
findings indicate that the programme led to strong increases in post-compulsory partic-
ipation among eligible males in both years of programme availability, and for eligible
females in the second year of post-compulsory schooling, which induced a significant de-
crease in the underage maternity rate. Weaker, but suggestive evidence is presented of a
decrease in youth offending rates, predominately driven by the increase in participation
by young men.
The paper contributes to the literature in three ways. First, the analysis considers
the impact of a conditional cash transfer programme in a non-developing country setting,
and is also related to the literature regarding the ability of financial incentives to induce
educational improvements. Secondly, this paper adds to the literature on the capability of
education policy to exert influence on non-educational outcomes. Third, this is the first
paper to evaluate the EMA programme outside of the initial pilot period, and to specifi-
cally examine some key non-academic outcomes that the programme was implemented to
influence.
Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programmes offer monetary incentives that are paid
to eligible individuals contingent on specified behaviours. They have become a feature in
many developing countries to encourage investments in human capital (Rawlings and Rubio,
2005), where outcomes such as nutrition, health and education are often targeted. A
number of studies have documented the influence of CCT programmes on risky adoles-
cent behaviours. Gutie´rrez, Bautista, Gertler, Herna´ndez, and Bertozzi (2004) find that
the Oportunidades programme in Mexico to encourage increased engagement with health-
care services led to a reduction in smoking and alcohol use amongst adolescents, but the
programme had no impact on the incidence of condom use. With regard to schooling pro-
grammes and fertility, Handa, Halpern, Pettifor, and Thirumurthy (2014) find that the
Kenya Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable Children resulted in a decrease of 6
percentage points in sexual activity, and a 4 percentage point higher use of condoms.
Baird, Chirwa, McIntosh, and O¨zler (2010) analyse a randomised control trial in Malawi.
The programme provided cash transfers conditional on school enrollment, finding that
self-reported sexual activity decreased by 38%, with the incidence of pregnancy declining
1The United Kingdom is comprised of four constituent countries: England, Northern Ireland, Scotland
and Wales. Due to data availability the analysis is restricted to England, the largest constituent country,
only.
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by 30%. These latter studies provide evidence that CCT programmes to increase school
attendance have a spillover effect on adolescent fertility.
CCT programmes are gaining popularity in more developed economies. Programmes
to encourage participation in secondary education include the Macedonian CCT for Sec-
ondary School Education, New York’s Opportunity NYC, and the Australian AUSTUDY
programme. The former provided household cash transfers, conditional on school enroll-
ment of children. Armand (2013) finds that households where payments are directed to
the mother have a 9.8 percentage point higher probability of the children being enrolled or
having completed secondary school. Evaluations of Opportunity NYC, where payments
for school attendance were shared between parents and the child, find an improvement
in outcomes amongst high school students, but no measured impact for younger pupils
(Riccio, Dechausay, Greenberg, Miller, Rucks, and Verma, 2010). In contrast the AUS-
TUDY provided financial support directly to young people completing their final two
years of education. Dearden and Heath (1996) find the programme induced a significant
increase in participation rates.
Programmes providing financial incentives to students as a reward for attaining specific
educational goals have mixed results. Leuven, Oosterbeek, and van der Klaauw (2010)
find that achievement based rewards elicit positive improvements amongst high-ability
students only, but discourage students of lower ability, whose long-term performance is
negatively affected. In contrast, Angrist and Lavy (2009) find cash awards for low achiev-
ing students elicit positive results, which are predominantly driven by students at the
‘margin’ of certification. Furthermore the programme induced substantial long-run effects
on the likelihood of enrollment in higher education. In school-based randomised trials
conducted in a wide group of schools Fryer (2011) finds that student incentives are more
successful at increasing achievement when rewards are conditional on inputs to the educa-
tion production function rather than explicitly tied to specific attainment levels, a finding
supported in Barrow and Rouse (2013), where students significantly increase time and
effort devoted to educational activities as a result of incentives to meet a combination of
benchmarks.
To summarise, the existing evidence suggests that both CCT and financial incentive
programmes have the potential to encourage positive investments in education; that the
group of students targeted by the programme, the programme goals and the payment
structure are all important determinants a programme’s degree of success. The EMA pro-
gramme incorporates elements of both a financial incentive and a CCT programme, where
a weekly disbursement is contingent on attendance only and the payment for achievement,
available at the end of each term, is designed to reward engagement with, or completion
of, a course. These two aspects potentially address discouragement of low-ability students.
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The question remains, thus the focus of this paper, is whether the EMA programme by
incentivising participation amongst individuals from low-income families, can affect ado-
lescent risk behaviours.
Early childbearing is an issue which has attracted considerable attention in the lit-
erature. Teenage mothers tend to be characterised by low levels of academic attain-
ment (An, Haveman, and Wolfe, 1993; Kiernan, 1997), and are more likely to come from
economically disadvantaged or instable families than women who delay childbearing.
Ermisch and Pevalin (2003) finds that the key determinant of teenage motherhood is prior
familial pecuniary conditions, reflecting that adolescent motherhood may be the conse-
quence of childhood economic disadvantage. Therefore the group of individuals targeted
by the EMA programme also contains the specific set of young women with a higher
propensity of early fertility.
Increasing the mandatory education requirement has been found to influence the inci-
dence of teenage fertility. Black et al. (2008) relate exogenous changes in the compulsory
school-leaving age to a lower incidence of teenage motherhood, proposing two mechanisms
through which more schooling leads to to reduced fertility: firstly individuals are ‘incar-
cerated’ for a longer period in formal education, which may preclude opportunities to
participate in risky behaviours. Second, the increased investment in human capital may
raise the opportunity cost of early fertility. Insofar that the EMA incentivised voluntary
rather than mandatory participation in education, the former mechanism is not directly
applicable. However, evaluating a Swedish education policy which prolonged the length of
post-compulsory schooling, Gro¨nqvist and Hall (2013) find that although the increased ed-
ucational requirement was not mandatory, the availability of a more academic programme
of longer duration induced a significant decrease in early childbearing for individuals who
chose this option.
The relationship between schooling and crime has been well documented. Using US
data, Lochner and Moretti (2004) find that increased schooling reduces an individuals
likelihood of arrest and incarceration, which they attribute to reduced criminal activity
rather than a decrease in prosecution rates. Machin, Marie, and Vujic´ (2011) exploit ex-
ogenous variation in the length of schooling induced by a UK legislative change. Their
results indicate significant decreases in property crime driven by the reduction in the
proportion of individuals leaving school without an educational qualification. Regarding
youth crime, the evidence of the effect of schooling on juvenile crime rates is mixed. For
instance Jacob and Lefgren (2003) find that on school days there is a decreased rate of
property crimes, but that the incidence of violent crimes actually increases. In contrast,
Berthelon and Kruger (2010) evaluating a Chilean school reform that increased the num-
ber of hours spent in school per day, find a significant reduction in the adolescent crime
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rate. Chioda, De Mello, and Soares (2012) examine the impact on crime of Bolsa Famı´lia,
a CCT programme implemented in Sa˜o Paolo, Brazil. The authors exploit exogenous
variation in programme participation induced through the expansion of the programme
to adolescents aged 16 and 17, finding evidence of a substantial decrease in youth crime
of 21%, driven by changes in peer interactions.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 3.2 describes the Education
Maintenance Allowance programme in detail. Section 3.3 outlines the data used in the
analysis. The econometric methodology is summarised in section 3.4. Section 3.5 presents
the results and offers interpretations, section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Institutional Setting
3.2.1 Education System
Compulsory education has been a fundamental feature of the English education system
for over a century. The academic year begins on September 1st and runs to August
31st. A child is required to commence school no later than the beginning of the academic
year after which she turns 5, and must remain in full-time education until the legislated
school-leaving age2. The first tier of academic qualifications, the General Certificate of
Secondary Education examinations (GCSEs), are completed by June 30th in the final
compulsory academic year. Conditional on performance in these examinations, those
individuals opting to remain in education choose between academic courses leading to
the second tier of academic qualifications, Advanced Levels (A’Levels) or enrolling in
vocational courses.
After completing compulsory education, young people can choose to continue with
education on a voluntary basis at Further Education Institutions (specialist colleges or
schools), work-based learning (government or private training schemes tied to employ-
ment), or employment. Outside these options individuals are classified as ‘Not in Edu-
cation, Employment or Training’ (NEET). During the late 1990’s approximately 10% of
the 16-18 population was classified as NEET, and the trend was on an upward trajectory.
Furthermore a fundamental concern arose regarding the skill levels of school-leavers, as
the proportion of 18 year olds remaining in education was 20% lower than the EU aver-
age, and adult illiteracy rates were amongst the highest in Europe (Social Exclusion Unit,
2001).
2During the period of analysis considered in this paper individuals in England reached the legislated
school-leaving age on June 30th in the academic year they turn 16. Following the Education Act (2008)
the school-leaving age has been raised up to age 17 (18) for those individuals eligible to leave school after
Summer 2013 (2015), which is outside the period of analysis considered by this study.
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3.2.2 The Education Maintenance Allowance
The Education Maintenance Allowance (EMA) was a conditional cash transfer programme
implemented by the UK Government with the aim of increasing the participation rate in
post-compulsory education by young people from low-income households. In England the
programme ran for a total of 12 years, Figure B.1 in Appendix B presents a timeline of
key features of the programme.
Prior to a national rollout, the intervention was subject to an extensive pilot period.
The first pilots were launched in September 1999 in 15 Local Authorities (LAs) in England
and one council area in Scotland. The areas chosen for the pilot were not random, rather
areas with lower than average post-compulsory participation and educational attainment
were chosen for the initial phase. Control areas, similar in attributes to the pilot areas, were
selected to facilitate an evaluation. The pilot was extended to a further 41 English LAs in
September 2000, and to three more Scottish areas in 20023. Reports of the quantitative
evaluation of the first pilot areas in the first and second year of the programme were
released in March 2001 and 2002 respectively, which indicated significant positive impacts
of the intervention on participation of individuals eligible for receipt. In response to these
initial findings, the UK Government in July 2002 announced its intention to rollout the
programme nationally from September 2004.
Eligibility for the allowance was determined by the familial (household) income of
the individual. In the initial phase individuals living in households where total income,
net of government transfers, was less than £13,000 were eligible for the maximum EMA
payment of £30 a week. The minimum payment was set at £5 per week for individuals
in households where net income was not higher than £30,000, and a linear taper was
applied to set the level of EMA payment for those in households between the minimum
and maximum thresholds. Relative to the median household income level in the first
year of the pilot, £15,400, this implied that a substantial proportion of the population
were eligible for the allowance. In addition to the weekly payment, all individuals in
receipt of EMA were eligible to receive termly bonuses of up to £100, depending on their
academic achievement and attendance record. The benefit could normally be claimed for
3The areas in the first phase of the pilot were Bolton, Nottingham, Cornwall, Doncaster, East Ayrshire,
Gateshead, Greenwich, Lambeth, Leeds, Lewisham, Middlesbrough, Oldham, Southampton, Southwark,
Stoke-on-Trent and Walsall. Control areas, for the evaluation of the initial phase, were Blackburn-with-
Darwen, Blackpool, Derby, Devon, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, Norfolk, Portsmouth, Redcar and Cleveland,
Rochdale, Rotherham, Stockton-on-Tees. In the second phase the pilot was extended to Barking and Da-
genham, Barnsley, Birmingham, Bradford, Brent, Camden, Kingston-upon-Hull, Coventry, Ealing, Hack-
ney, Halton, Hammersmith and Fulham, Haringey, Hartlepool, Islington, Knowsley, Lancashire, Leices-
ter, Liverpool, Luton, Manchester, Newham, North East Lincolnshire, North Tyneside, Northumberland,
Salford, Sandwell, Sheffield, South Tyneside, St Helens, Suffolk, Sunderland, Tameside, Tower Hamlets,
Wakefield, Waltham Forest, Wandsworth, Wigan, Wirral, Wolverhampton, Worcestershire. The final pilot
areas were Dundee, Glasgow and West Dunbartonshire.
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up to two years, and could be used to attend either academic or vocational full-time post-
16 education. These income thresholds and payment amounts were kept fixed in nominal
terms, implying that the generosity of the programme decreased over time, as not only the
real value of the weekly payments and term bonuses, but also the proportion of individuals
eligible for receipt decreased with the duration of the pilot programme.
With the national rollout the threshold level for the maximum payment was increased
to £19,630, the minimum payment was increased to £10 a week and the taper was replaced
with an intermediate payment of £20 a week, for those individuals whose household income
fell between the two thresholds. These changes imply that the programme under the
national rollout was more generous, both in terms of the payments and the proportion
of individuals eligible for the maximum award, but less generous in terms of the value of
the maximum weekly disbursement, as this was held fixed at the nominal value of £30.
Further increases to the eligibility thresholds occurred over the two subsequent years4. As
in the pilot period, after the national rollout the income thresholds and payment amounts
were not indexed to inflation, implying that overall the generosity of the programme
decreased over time in both dimensions, as not only the real value of the allowance, but
also that the proportion of individuals eligible for receipt decreased with the duration of
the programme5.
In October 2010, as part of the austerity measures introduced in the wake of the
Great Recession, the UK Government announced its intention to withdraw the EMA
from England. The programme was closed to new applicants in January 2011, and the
final payments were disbursed at the end of the academic year 2011/12. The devolved
Governments of Scotland and Wales have retained a scaled down version of the EMA,
with a single income threshold at the maximum EMA payment level, and have eliminated
the achievement and retention bonuses.
Figure 3.1 displays the proportion of the area level population, aged 16-17 at the
start of the academic year, who were in receipt of the EMA by local authority pilot
status for England. Given that the overall generosity of the programme decreased over
time, it could be expected that the highest take up should occur within the first years
of the programme, and decline thereafter. However, during the first pilot year take-up
of the allowance was relatively low, reflecting that the programme was not announced
until April 1999 by which time the majority of students in their final compulsory year
would have already made choices regarding post-compulsory participation in September.
4The threshold for the maximum payment was increased in September 2005 to £20,270. Both thresholds
were increased for a final time in September 2006 to £20,817 and £30,810 for the maximum and minimum
payments respectively.
5Table B.1 in the Appendix compares the income thresholds to median income for the duration of the
programme.
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Figure 3.1: EMA Take-up
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Notes: The graph displays the proportion of the area level population, which
received EMA payments in the first two post-compulsory years of education,
in EMA pilot and non-pilot areas by academic year.
Take-up substantially increased in the second pilot year, as these new students had prior
knowledge that the programme was in place when making their school-leaving decisions,
with only marginal increases seen in the subsequent pilot years. The national rollout
saw further increases in take-up in the pilot areas, due to the increased generosity of the
programme, with receipt increasing annually up to the academic year 2009/10, in non-pilot
areas EMA receipt over the duration of the programme remained relatively constant in
comparison. Take-up fell in the final years of the programme in England, as the allowance
was closed to new applicants after the first quarter of the academic year 2010/2011.
A number of quantitative and qualitative evaluations of the impact of the programme
in the initial pilot areas released each year of the pilot programme6. Using survey data
collected during the pilot period Dearden, Emmerson, Frayne, and Meghir (2009) found
that the impact of the programme was substantial, increasing full-time education rates
by 4.5 and 6.7 percentage points in the first, and first two, years respectively. In analy-
sis using administrative data Chowdry, Dearden, and Emmerson (2008), find smaller but
still sizable impacts of the programme during the pilot period, a 3.0 (2.0) percentage
point increase in the proportion of female (male) students. These estimates provide a
useful benchmark for the area-level analysis in this study, see Table B.2 in Appendix B.
Analysing the impact on juvenile crime rates in the first three years of the programme,
Sabates and Feinstein (2007) find that the initial EMA pilot areas had a decrease of 1
6There were at least 16 different reports of the pilot evaluation, the final of which being
Middleton, Perren, Maguire, Rennison, Battistin, Emmerson, and Fitzsimmons (2005).
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conviction per 1,000 pupils in the burglary rate relative to non-EMA areas.
3.2.3 How could the EMA affect non-educational outcomes?
The EMA lowers the cost of post-compulsory education, and therefore we would expect
an unambiguous increase in participation for the proportion of individuals eligible for
the programme. Black et al. (2008) propose two mechanisms through which a legislative
increase in the length of education can impact teenage fertility: the ‘incarceration effect’,
where the requirement to spend longer at school reduces the opportunity to engage in risky
behaviours; and the ‘human capital effect’, remaining in education raises an individual’s
stock of human capital, potentially improving their future economic prospects. In contrast
to their setting, the EMA programme was not mandatory, so incarceration in this context
has a different interpretation. For those individuals remaining in education the loss of
opportunity for risky behaviour occurs as a result of a voluntary choice, thus by revealed
preference it must be the case that the individual derives a higher utility from continued
education than the forgone opportunity. Hence the direct effect of the EMA for these
individuals is to increase the opportunity cost of non-educational activities. But although
eligibility for the EMA was limited to only a sub-sample of the population, any increase in
participation induced by the EMA would also induce a change to the peer group for not
only the EMA participants, but also of individuals who in the absence of the programme
would have continued education or who would have stopped schooling. Thus this indirect
effect of the EMA to ‘peer composition’ potentially affects all individuals within the cohort.
Hence the natural starting point of the analysis is to use the variation over time and areas
in programme availability and generosity to investigate the impact of the programme on
outcomes of the local population.
Two types of adolescent risk behaviour are considered in this study, teenage fertility
and youth crime. Although teenage fertility rates may be affected by the behaviour of
both adolescent males and female, it is an outcome that can be measured for females only.
Conversely, youth crime is widely understood to be more prevalent amongst adolescent
males. In the context of youth crime both the incarceration and human capital effect
result in an increase in the opportunity cost of committing a crime. In addition to the
change in peer composition effect outlined above, a longer schooling duration increases
the interaction amongst young people with their peers, which may influence the proclivity
towards criminal activity in either direction.
Similarly, the direction of the impact of an increase in post-compulsory participation
on teenage fertility outcomes is unclear due to the change in student mix. Remaining in
education also implies continued access to sexual health services at school or college facil-
ities. Therefore those continuing education receive a potential reduction in contraception
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costs, which should have a downward effect on the conception rate. But as a pregnancy
is a consequence of a social interaction, the change in peer group may result in a change
in the frequency of social interactions, which could impact the conception rate in either
direction. As the maternity rate is determined by the conception rate and the abortion
decision, the impact on maternities is also ambiguous. However the prior on the percent-
age of conceptions leading to abortion is that there would be an unambiguous positive
effect. The fertility decisions of young women who leave school at the compulsory leav-
ing age would not be affected by the EMA. Those who are induced into post-compulsory
education, who consequently become pregnant, are unlikely to be less likely to terminate
a pregnancy than if they had not continued in education. For any individuals who were
ineligible for the EMA, remained at school past compulsory age and became pregnant
as a result of the change in peer group induced by the EMA, it is plausible that they
would have a higher aversion to early motherhood, and hence be more likely to terminate
a pregnancy.
3.3 Data
In order to evaluate the impact of the programme the ideal dataset would contain individ-
ual level measures of past and current EMA receipt and participation in post-compulsory
education, as well fertility and crime measures. However this information is not available
in one source, and therefore the analysis relies on two separate datasets. Individual-level
responses regarding participation and fertility are compiled from the Labour Force Survey
(LFS), which also contains information on household income and area of residence enabling
the determination of whether an individual was eligbile for EMA receipt. Unfortunately
there is no indicator in the LFS regarding whether an individual actually received the
EMA. As data regarding the proportion of individuals receiving the EMA in each area is
available a second dataset is compiled at the area level, using administrative data from
England, Scotland and Wales at the top-tier Local Authority (LA) level from a range of
official sources.
3.3.1 Individual-level Data
The dataset for the individual-level analysis combines data from the 1995-2013 Quarterly
Labour Force Surveys. The survey is the largest representative survey in the UK, and
contains detailed information of each individual within a household, including income,
labour force status, gender, birth-date and ethnicity. Each household remains in the survey
for five successive quarters, but as income information is available in the first and fifth
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wave only, individuals enumerated in these waves only are included in the sample7. The
data is divided into sub-samples according to the academic birth cohort of the individual.
Indicator variables are constructed using the geographical identifiers available within the
secure data environment to indicate whether the area in which an individual lives had the
EMA programme, and using information on the household income eligibility thresholds
applicable to the area of residence to indicate whether an individual resides in a household
eligible for EMA.
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics of the individual-level sample
All Males Females
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
FT education - year 1 0.758 0.429 0.718 0.450 0.799 0.400
FT education - year 2 0.637 0.481 0.598 0.490 0.678 0.467
Ethnicity:White 0.892 0.311 0.893 0.309 0.891 0.312
Ethnicity:Black 0.025 0.158 0.025 0.155 0.026 0.160
Ethnicity:Asian 0.051 0.219 0.049 0.216 0.053 0.223
Ethnicity:Other 0.032 0.176 0.033 0.180 0.030 0.172
British 0.952 0.215 0.953 0.212 0.950 0.217
EMA available 0.499 0.500 0.494 0.500 0.504 0.500
Household eligible for EMA 0.689 0.463 0.690 0.463 0.689 0.463
Household eligible for max EMA 0.469 0.499 0.466 0.499 0.472 0.499
Non-Working Household 0.199 0.399 0.196 0.397 0.201 0.401
Parent education - high 0.389 0.487 0.392 0.488 0.386 0.487
Mother 0.047 0.215
EMA available at 16 0.453 0.497
N=45,636 N=23,243 N=22,393
Descriptive statistics are displayed in Table 4.1 for individuals in the first two post-
compulsory schooling years. The table reveals substantial age and gender heterogeneity
in the proportion of individuals enrolled as a full-time student. In the first year after the
compulsory education requirement 76% of the sample report being in education, which
declines to 64% a year later. Females in both years are 8 percentage points more likely to
be a student than males. In contrast there are no gender differences in individual char-
acteristics such as ethnicity or nationality. Half the sample resides in a local authority
which has implemented the EMA programme. Household characteristics are also similar
across gender: approximately 70% of individuals in the sample reside in a household with
income below the threshold requirement for programme eligibility, 47% in a household
with income lower than the threshold for the maximum EMA payment. The proportion
of individuals in households with no working parents is 20%, 39% of parents have quali-
7Through the longitudinal structure of the LFS an individual may be enumerated more than once in
the sample. However as the estimation considers individuals in a single academic year, using the 1st and
5th waves of the survey implies that the individual is observed only once in any academic year.
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fications that exceed the basic academic qualification level obtained through compulsory
schooling. For the fertility analysis, a variable is constructed to indicate whether the EMA
was available in the area of residence when the individual was in her first post-compulsory
academic year. The proportion of mothers in the sample is 4.6%.
3.3.2 Area-level Data
For the area-level analysis a panel dataset is compiled of annual (academic year) area
averages. Due to a large restructure of Local Government boundaries in April 1996, the
data commences in academic year 1995/96 as the previous area structure is not directly
comparable to the current Local Authority boundaries. Programme take-up, fertility,
crime and post-compulsory participation rates are combined with area-level demographic
variables from the LFS, aggregated using the supplied person weights.
Fertility measures were obtained from the Office of National Statistics (ONS), who re-
lease annual teenage conception rates, defined as a conception occurring to an individual
aged less than 18, and the proportion of these conceptions that led to a recorded outcome
either a maternity (live or stillbirth) or a legal abortion. Bespoke tabulations were com-
missioned for the analysis which recalculated the annual data to approximate the academic
year8. The date and age at conception is calculated from the birth date in the case of a
maternity, where a gestation time of 38 weeks is assumed. In the case of an abortion, date
of birth of the woman and precise gestation of the foetus is recorded, from which the date
and age at conception is determined. Miscarriages, and conceptions terminated through
the use of emergency contraceptives (the day-after pill) are not recorded. However as
long as the EMA did not induce a change in the miscarriage rate or the use of emergency
contraceptives, the distribution of the outcome variable with regard to these measures will
be unaffected, and the validity of the estimation remains. Since the Abortion Act (1967)
the termination of a pregnancy is legal in the UK, and has been available via the centrally
funded National Health Service since 1974. Therefore it is unlikely that individuals would
resort to a non-registered provision. There are a small number of areas where one or more
of the fertility measures is suppressed due to ONS confidentiality regulations, these are
generally small areas with an event count of 10 occurrences or fewer.
The crime measure considered in the analysis is the rate of first time entrants to the
criminal justice system, defined as individuals receiving their first reprimand, warning or
conviction. The Ministry of Justice have collated this data from the Police National Com-
puter (PNC) at a quarterly periodicity since 2000. The local authority data is calculated
8Teenage fertility measures are collected continuously, and collated at a quarterly periodicity. To
approximate the academic year the bespoke tabulations combined the number of occurrences from the 4th
quarter (October-December) in one calendar year with quarters 1-3 (January-September) in the following
calendar year, using the mid-year population estimates for females aged 15-17 to calculate the rates.
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using the home address of the offender as recorded by police, or the postcode of where the
offence was committed if no home address was recorded. The data is available for two age
groups: young people aged 10-17, and adults.
Participation in post-compulsory education rates were calculated using the cohort-
specific number of participants, obtained from the Department of Education (DoE)9 and
ONS mid-year population estimates. Inner-London local authorities are excluded from the
sample, as the DoE did not release this information prior to 2009. A further participation
measure for each area in each period is available through aggregating the individual re-
sponses of current full-time student status from the LFS, where the aggregation uses the
LFS supplied person weights.
The number of individuals in receipt of the EMA for each post-compulsory year and
for each area during the post national rollout period was obtained from the Young Peo-
ple’s Learning Agency (YPLA) and the DoE. For the pilot period, Chowdry et al. (2008)
kindly shared the take-up data from academic years 2000/01-2003/04 used in their study.
The remaining data was obtained after consulting the Hansard record of parliamentary
debates and in response to requests from individual pilot local authorities. The proportion
of households eligible for the EMA in each area was aggregated from the LFS using the
person-income weights provided. Using this information and the ONS mid-year popula-
tion estimates age-specific programme take-up rates, defined as the proportion of eligible
individuals participation in the programme, were calculated.
Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics of the area-level sample
Mean SD Mean SD
Educational Outcomes Non-Educational Outcomes
F/T education rate - 16 76.06 9.17 Conception rate 4.29 1.37
F/T education rate - 17 63.92 10.14 Maternity rate 2.33 0.97
Proportion F/T students - 16 76.49 18.02 % Abortions 47.80 9.74
Proportion F/T students - 17 64.63 21.22 First-time offenders : 10-17 1.43 0.67
First-time offenders : adult 0.53 0.15
EMA measures Demographics
EMA available 56.56 49.58 Male: female ratio 1.05 0.11
Pilot area 37.84 48.51 Ethnicity: white 87.62 14.58
Proportion take-up: 16 39.41 11.37 British 87.84 12.24
Proportion take-up: 17 32.17 10.29 Real Hourly Wage: female 16-25 6.02 1.49
Proportion eligible 81.10 7.74 Real Hourly Wage: male 16-25 6.34 1.52
Proportion eligible max payment 64.99 8.29 Unemployment rate: female 16-25 14.19 8.44
Unemployment rate: male 16-25 18.30 9.97
Table 3.2 displays descriptive statistics for the area-level sample. The full-time educa-
tion rate in the first post-compulsory year (students aged 16 at the start of the academic
9The DoE data is a snapshot of the number of students in each academic cohort enumerated in December
of each academic year.
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year) is 76% and decreases to 64% in the second year after mandatory schooling. These
administrative measures are comparable with the sample averages in the individual level
sample in Table 4.1. The alternative area measures of participation in post-compulsory
education, the proportion of full-time students which are calculated from the individual-
level LFS dataset, provide a good approximation to the administrative data, although the
data is less precise as evidenced by the larger standard deviations.
The fertility measures indicate that 4.3% of females under age 18 experience a preg-
nancy, 52% of which lead to a maternity. The proportion of first time entrants to the
criminal justice system is 1.43% (0.53%) for individuals aged 10-17 (adults). There is also
substantial between-area variation in the non-educational outcomes, see Figures B.2 and
B.3 in Appendix B.
3.4 Empirical Methodology
As no single dataset measures fertility, participation and crime outcomes as well as EMA
receipt, the analysis is comprised of two parts. Firstly an individual level analysis is
performed to analyse the impact of being eligible for EMA receipt. In this strategy it
is possible to evaluate the impact of the programme on post-compulsory participation in
education as well as the propensity for early fertility. In the second part an area-level
analysis facilitates the estimation of the impact of an increase in the post-compulsory
education participation rate on area-level underage fertility and crime rates.
3.4.1 Individual-level Analysis
To estimate the influence of the EMA programme on the probability that an individual is
a full-time student, a linear probability model is estimated, where the basic specification
follows a difference-in-differences approach:
yijt = β0 + β1EMAjt + β2EligibleHHit + β3EMAeligibleHHijt (3.1)
+ γ′Xit + δ′Zjt+ αj + ηt + ijt
where yijt is a dummy variable indicating whether individual i living in area j at time t is
currently enrolled as a full-time student; EMAjt is an indicator variable taking the value
1 if the EMA programme was available in area j at time t and 0 otherwise; EligibleHHit
indicates whether individual i at time t resides in a low income household (for periods prior
to EMA implementation this variable is determined using the income threshold applicable
to the area in the first year of the programme); the interaction term EMAeligibleHHijt
therefore takes on a value of 1 for individuals living in EMA eligible households in areas
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where the programme was available only; Xit and Zjt are vectors of individual and area-
level characteristics respectively; αj and ηt are respectively area and time dummies; ijt
is an idiosyncratic error term. The coefficient of interest is therefore β3, which should
be interpreted as the Intention to Treat (ITT) effect, as it describes the impact of being
eligible for the programme in an area and time period where the EMA was available
This basic specification is amended in order to investigate whether the programme had
a differential impact by household income level by replacing the single eligibility indicator
with two variables indicating whether the individual was eligible for the maximum weekly
payment or for less than the maximum payment, and similarly replacing the interaction
term:
yijt = β0 + β1EMAjt + β2MaxEligibleHHit + β3MinEligibleHHit (3.2)
+ β4MaxEMAeligibleHHijt + β5MinEMAeligibleHHijt
+ γ′Xit + δ′Zjt+ αj + ηt + ijt
where MaxEligibleHHit indicates whether household income falls below the lower EMA
threshold, and MinEligibleHHit takes a value of 1 if household income falls between
the upper and lower thresholds, and 0 otherwise. The associated interaction variables,
MaxEMAeligibleHHijt and MinEMAeligibleHHijt, therefore indicate whether an in-
dividual lives in the indicated household type when the programme is available. Thus in
this specification the coefficients of interest are β4 and β5, which again describe the ITT
effect for individuals eligible for the maximum and less than maximum weekly payments
respectively.
Equations (3.1) and (3.2) allow the assessment of the influence of the programme on
whether an individual is currently enrolled in full-time education. To investigate whether
the EMA, through its impact on post-compulsory participation in education, influenced
fertility behaviour is not straightforward, as the only observable measure of fertility is the
presence of a child in the household, which can only be detected with a lag10. Therefore,
to measure whether the programme exerted an influence on fertility, the estimation again
proceeds via a linear probability model, with the basic specification amended to:
yijt = β0 + β1EMAat16jt + β2EligibleHHit + β3EMAat16eligibleHHijt (3.3)
+ γ′Xit + δ′Zjt+ αj + ηt + ijt
where EMAat16jt takes a value of 1 if the EMA was avaliable in the area in which an
10A change to behaviour inducing an effect on fertility which occurs at time t is not observable in the
individual-level LFS data before t+ 9 months.
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individual resides when she was in her first post-compulsory academic year; as before
EligibleHHit indicates a low income household; EMAat16eligibleHHijt is the interac-
tion term, taking a value of 1 if the EMA was available to the individual in the year
after mandatory schooling and the individual resides in a low income household. This
specification therefore relies on two assumptions, first that the individual currently resides
in a household identical with regard to EMA eligibility as when she was 16 years of age,
second that the current household financial situation is the same as when she was 16 years
of age11. The coefficient of interest, β3, describes the impact of the programme for those
who were eligible to receive the EMA and therefore should again be interpreted as an
Intention to Treat parameter.
Analogous to equation (3.2), this replacing the single eligibility indicator with two
variables indicating eligibility by level of weekly EMA payment allows the investigation
of whether the programme had a differential impact by household income level. The
specification becomes:
yijt = β0 + β1EMAat16jt + β2MaxEligibleHHit + β3MinEligibleHHit (3.4)
+ β4MaxEMAat16eligibleHHijt + β5MinEMAat16eligibleHHijt
+ γ′Xit + δ′Zjt+ αj + ηt + ijt
so that the ITT effect are described by the coefficients on the relevant interaction terms,
β4 and β5.
3.4.2 Area-level Analysis
The area level analysis investigates the impact of the EMA programme on post-compulsory
education participation rates, first using variation in the availability of the EMA pro-
gramme, second considering area-level variation in the intensity of the programme. The
impact of changes in the post-compulsory participation rate, as induced by the EMA, on
teenage fertility and crime rates is then considered.
3.4.2.1 Programme Availability Effect
The analysis first investigates the overall impact of the introduction of the EMA. As the
programme implemented in the national rollout differed to that implemented during the
pilot period, in terms of generosity of the payment structure and income threshold criteria,
11The individual and associated household income are observed in both wave 1 and wave 5 of the LFS.
The data was therefore interrogated regarding the plausibility of these two assumptions, analysis using
observations from wave 5 only combined with residence information from wave 1 produced consistent
results.
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the introduction of the pilot programme is not directly comparable to the introduction of
the national rollout and therefore separate regressions are performed for pilot areas and
non-pilot areas:
yjt = β0 + β1EMAjt + g(TREND)t + δ
′Zjt + αj + jt (3.5)
where yjt measures the participation rate for area j at time t; EMAjt is an indicator
variable taking the value 1 if the EMA programme was available in area j at time t and 0
otherwise. As the EMA was introduced in areas contemporaneously, a polynomial function
of an aggregate time trend, g(TREND), is introduced to control for the national trend
in participation; Zjt is a vector of time-varying area-level characteristics; αj control for
time-invariant area characteristics; jt is an area-specific error term. The coefficient of
interest is β1 which is identified by a jump in the education participation rate at the point
of introduction, and cancellation, of the EMA programme in each area. This specification
assumes that all areas experience a common time trend, but this assumption can be
relaxed to allow for changing influences within an area over time12, by the addition of a
polynomial of region-specific time trends which captures local differences from the national
trend. Estimation proceeds though Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).
Specification (3.5) identifies the impact of the EMA on participation solely through the
introduction and cancellation of the programme, and therefore cannot determine whether
the influence of the programme changed over time, for instance as a result of the national
rollout of the programme. Hence an alternative specification is also considered to investi-
gate the durational effects of the programme. In this approach all areas and time periods
are pooled together and the single EMA binary indicator is replaced with a set of dummy
variables denoting how many periods13 the EMA was in place in a given area.
yjt = β0 +
M∑
k=1
βk(EMA for k periods)jt + δ
′Zjt + αj + ηt + jt (3.6)
As before the specification controls for time-varying area influences through a set of area
fixed effects, αj , and introduces a set of time dummies, ηt to flexibly account for aggregate
effects common to all areas. As with specification (3.5) a polynomial of region-specific time
trends can be included to account for local deviations from the aggregate time effects.
12Following Friedberg (1998), who used such a specification to investigate the impact of the introduction
of unilateral divorce on state-level divorce rates
13This approach follows Wolfers (2003), who extended the analysis of Friedberg (1998) by using such a
specification to investigated the durational effects associated with the introduction of unilateral divorce.
Each period is defined as two academic years, coinciding with the maximum duration of EMA receipt for
an eligible individual.
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3.4.2.2 Programme Intensity Effect
The latter specification allows the analysis of the influence of the programme beyond
just its introduction. The key difference between the programme implemented during
the pilot period and that implemented in the national rollout was the eligibility criteria.
Specifically the income threshold for the maximum payment was increased in order to
encourage higher programme take-up. Furthermore, as described in Section 3.2.2, as the
income thresholds for eligibility were kept in nominal terms further variation over areas
and time in the proportion of the population eligible for the programme is induced through
inflation. This area-level variation is exploited to measure of the intensity of eligibility on
participation rates. The basic specification follows the difference-in-difference approach
used in the individual level analysis:
yjt = β0 + β1EMAjt + β2propbelowjt + β3EMAbelowjt + δ
′Zjt + αj + ηt + jt (3.7)
where yjt measures the education participation rate in area j at time t; EMAjt is an in-
dicator variable taking the value 1 if the EMA programme was available in area j at time
t and 0 otherwise; propbelowjt is the proportion of households in area j at time t with
income level under the EMA eligibility threshold14; the interaction term EMAbelowjt
therefore takes on positive values in area/time cells where the EMA was available, 0 oth-
erwise; Zjt is a vector of time-varying area-level characteristics; αj and ηt are respectively
area and time dummies; ijt is an idiosyncratic error term. Region-specific time trends can
be introduced to control for changing influences within a region over time. The coefficient
of interest is this specification is β3, which describes the Intention to Treat (ITT) effect,
defined as the impact of the programme on the eligible population in an area during the
period when the programme was available.
Administrative data is available regarding the actual number of recipients of the EMA
payments by local authority and academic year. However, as the programme was volun-
tary, there may influences at the individual level that impact both the decision to remain
in education and whether they apply for the programme or not which are not observable at
the area level, implying that an OLS regression of the education participation rate on the
programme participation rate would be biased. Therefore a two stage least squares (2SLS)
approach is taken, whereby the actual take-up rate in an area, defined as the number of
recipients of the EMA as a proportion of the eligible population, is instrumented with
exogenous changes in the proportion eligible for EMA receipt. The two-step approach can
14As with the individual-level analysis, for periods prior to EMA implementation this variable is deter-
mined using the income threshold applicable to the area in the first year of the programme.
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be written as:
Takeupjt = α0 +α1EMAjt+α2propbelowjt+α3EMAbelowjt+δ
′Zjt+αj +ηt+jt (3.8)
EducRatejt = ξ0 + ξ1 ̂Takeupjt + φ′Zjt + τj + ρt + ejt (3.9)
where in the first stage, (3.8), the impact of changes in the eligible proportion is estimated,
and then included in the second stage equation (3.9). Therefore ξ1 describes the causal
effect of an increase in take-up of the EMA on post-compulsory participation.
3.4.2.3 Non-educational outcomes
There may be unobservable factors that affect not only the non-educational outcomes of
interest, fertility and crime rates, but also influence post-compulsory education rates. To
address this potential endogeneity, the estimation of the effect of participation on these
non-educational outcomes proceeds via 2SLS. In the first stage the impact of exogenous
changes in the proportion eligible for the EMA on the education participation rate is
estimated following specification (3.7). The second stage becomes:
yjt = ψ0 + ψ1 ̂EducRatejt + δ′Zjt + αj + ηt + jt (3.10)
where yjt measures the outcome rate of interest in area j at time t; Zjt, αj , ηt and jt
are defined as in (3.7). Thus ψ1 captures the effect of an increase in the post-compulsory
education participation rate on the outcomes of interest.
3.5 Results
Section 3.5.1 presents the results of the individual-level analysis, where the intention to
treat effect, defined as the average response among the would-be eligible population in
areas and periods where the EMA was available, on whether an individual reports cur-
rently being a full-time student, and motherhood is estimated. The area-level analysis
is presented in Section 3.5.2, presenting first the analysis of the impact of the availabil-
ity of the EMA programme and area-level intensity of eligibility for the programme on
post-compulsory participation in education. Finally the analysis explores the impact of
changes in area-level post-compulsory education rates induced by the EMA programme
on non-educational outcomes.
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3.5.1 Individual-level Analysis
Table 3.3 presents the results for individuals observed in the first year after compulsory
education. The upper panel reports the estimates for all individuals pooled together,
whereas the middle and bottom panels report the estimates for males and females respec-
tively. Columns (1)-(4) analyse the overall impact of being eligible for the EMA, whereas
columns (5)-(8) report separate estimates according to whether the individual is eligible
for the maximum weekly EMA payment or for the lower EMA payments. All specifica-
tions control for area and time fixed effects, columns (2)-(4) and (6)-(8) include individual
level controls (nationality, ethnicity, gender and parental education). Columns (3)-(4) and
(7)-(8) also include time-varying area controls (the gender ratio, gender-specific unemploy-
ment rates and real hourly wage (both for the 16-25 age group), area-level ethnicity and
nationality). Specifications (4) and (8) also include area-specific linear trends, and hence
produce the most conservative results.
The estimates in the upper panel reveal that an individual residing in a household with
income below the EMA threshold, in an area where the programme was available, has a 3.3
percentage point higher likelihood of currently being enrolled as a full-time student, with
a larger impact for individuals eligible for the maximum payments, although the difference
is not statistically significant. As the estimates measure the impact of eligibility for the
EMA programme rather than programme participation, they should be interpreted as the
Intention to Treat Effect (ITT). Examining the ITT effects separately by gender reveals
substantial gender heterogeneity, insofar with the impact for males is 4.9 percentage points,
whereas the corresponding estimate for females is smaller and not significantly different
from zero. Examining the impact of the programme by payment type reveals that the
impact of the programme is larger, 6.5 percentage points, for males from the lowest income
households.
Table 3.4 presents the analogous estimates for individuals in the second post-compulsory
academic year. The overall impact in the second year is larger than in year 1, with el-
igibility associated with a 5.7 percentage point increase in the probability of being in
full-time education, and again a slightly larger effect for individuals eligible for the maxi-
mum payment. In contrast to the year 1 findings presented in Table 3.3, the response in
the second post-compulsory reveals little gender heterogeneity in the overall impact of el-
igibility for the programme. For males there is no significant difference in the response by
income threshold, whereas the female ITT effect is driven almost entirely by the response
of individuals available for the maximum payment.
A comparison of the estimates over the two years indicates that for males the impact
of the programme was approximately equal in each year, whereas the programme elicited
a significant effect for females only in the second post-compulsory year. That the increase
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Table 3.3: Enrolled as full-time student: post-compulsory year 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Eligibile*EMA 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.033***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
MaxEligible*EMA 0.043*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.039***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
MinEligible*EMA 0.038** 0.032** 0.032** 0.032**
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
N 23,611 23,611 23,611 23,611 23,611 23,611 23,611 23,611
Males
Eligibile*EMA 0.059*** 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.049***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
MaxEligible*EMA 0.074*** 0.067*** 0.068*** 0.065***
(0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018)
MinEligible*EMA 0.058** 0.045** 0.044** 0.041*
(0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
N 12,060 12,060 12,060 12,060 12,060 12,060 12,060 12,060
Females
Eligibile*EMA 0.008 0.010 0.010 0.010
(0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015)
MaxEligible*EMA 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.011
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
MinEligible*EMA 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.012
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
N 11,551 11,551 11,551 11,551 11,551 11,551 11,551 11,551
Individual controls no yes yes yes no yes yes yes
Area controls no no yes yes no no yes yes
Area trends no no no yes no no no yes
Notes: Columns (1)-(4) display estimates of equation (3.1), whereas columns (5)-(8) presents the results from
equation(3.2), as described in Section 3.4.1. All specifications include area and time fixed effects. The vector of
individual controls comprizes nationality, ethnicity, gender and parental education; area controls include the gender
ratio, gender specific unemployment rates and real hourly wage, as well as area-level UK nationality and ethnic
population proportions. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
is larger for males in the first year of the allowance may reflect the lower staying-on rate
for males relative to females as indicated in Table 4.1. In contrast, eligibility for the
EMA appears to have had a delayed effect on the likelihood of current enrollment for
females, which is more likely driven by a reduction in dropout rather than new entrants
to post-compulsory education. That the estimates are largest for individuals eligible for
the maximum weekly payment suggests that the EMA was particularly successful at en-
couraging an increase in participation of individuals from lower income households.
Table 3.5 reports the results of the analysis on teenage fertility. The sample is restricted
to females only, observed in the second and third post-compulsory years (aged 17 or 18
at the beginning of the relevant academic year), as the measured outcome, whether an
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Table 3.4: Enrolled as full-time student: post-compulsory year 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Eligibile*EMA 0.067*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.057***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
MaxEligible*EMA 0.076*** 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.065***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
MinEligible*EMA 0.066*** 0.053*** 0.052*** 0.049***
(0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018)
N 22,025 22,025 22,025 22,025 22,025 22,025 22,025 22,025
Males
Eligibile*EMA 0.066*** 0.060*** 0.060*** 0.055***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
MaxEligible*EMA 0.067*** 0.060*** 0.060*** 0.055**
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
MinEligible*EMA 0.076*** 0.062*** 0.061** 0.058**
(0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026)
N 11,183 11,183 11,183 11,183 11,183 11,183 11,183 11,183
Females
Eligibile*EMA 0.061*** 0.059*** 0.059*** 0.052***
(0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019)
MaxEligible*EMA 0.082*** 0.079*** 0.079*** 0.071***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
MinEligible*EMA 0.038 0.032 0.032 0.027
(0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
N 10,842 10,842 10,842 10,842 10,842 10,842 10,842 10,842
Individual controls no yes yes yes no yes yes yes
Area controls no no yes yes no no yes yes
Area trends no no no yes no no no yes
Notes: see notes to Table 3.3
individual is a mother, is observable with a delay15. The results indicate that those residing
in households eligible for the EMA in areas where the EMA would have been available
in the individual’s first post-compulsory year are 0.9 percentage points less likely to be a
mother. This represents a decrease of approximately 19% relative to the sample mean,
with the reduction driven specifically by those individuals eligible for the higher EMA
payment. Surprisingly a positive estimate is found for individuals eligible for the lower
weekly EMA payment, although this estimate is not significantly different from zero.
15If the sample is restricted to individuals in the second post-compulsory year only the estimates are
consistent with those presented here, although the magnitudes become slightly smaller and lose precision
due to the smaller sample size.
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Table 3.5: Impact of the EMA programme on individual-level fertility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Eligibile*EMAat16 -0.010* -0.010* -0.009* -0.009*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
MaxEligible*EMAat16 -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.036***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
MinEligible*EMAat16 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.007
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
N 20,047 20,047 20,047 20,047 20,047 20,047 20,047 20,047
Individual controls no yes yes yes no yes yes yes
Area controls no no yes yes no no yes yes
Area trends no no no yes no no no yes
Notes: Columns (1)-(4) display estimates of equation (3.3), whereas columns (5)-(8) presents the results from
equation(3.4), as described in Section 3.4.1. All specifications include area and time fixed effects. The vector of
individual controls comprizes nationality, ethnicity, gender and parental education; area controls include gender
specific unemployment rates and real hourly wage, as well as area-level UK nationality and ethnic population
proportions. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
3.5.2 Area-level Analysis
The analysis now turns to the area-level analysis. The results explore first the effect of the
programme’s availability, and second the intensity of the programme on post-compulsory
education participation rates. Finally, the impact of exogenous variation in participation
induced by the EMA programme on non-educational outcomes is explored.
Table 3.6 presents impact of the availability of the EMA programme on area-level full-
time education participation rates. Panel A considers the impact of the introduction of
the EMA programme, where the analysis is performed separately for pilot and non-pilot
areas, as the programme implemented in pilot areas differed from that implemented in
non-pilot areas in terms of eligbility criteria (see Section 3.2.2). Panel B presents the
durational effects of the programme, where the estimation pools pilot and non-pilot areas
and thus features variation in the timing of the introduction and cancellation of the EMA
programme. Columns (1)-(3) refer to the first post-compulsory year, (4)-(6) to the second
post-compulsory year, and (7)-(9) to the overall impact on both the first and second post-
compulsory year. All specifications include a set of individual area fixed effects; Panel A
includes a quadratic polynomial in the aggregate time trend16, whereas Panel B controls
for aggregate time influences by including a set of year fixed effects. The second and
third columns within each set of results include a vector of area level controls (the male to
female ratio, the proportion of the population with British nationality, ethnic proportions,
male and female unemployment rates and real hourly wages for the 16-25 age group). The
third column also includes a set of region-specific linear time trends. All regressions are
16The appropriate form of the polynomial was determined using the Akaike Information Criterion. The
results are however also robust to using a linear or cubic polynomial.
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Table 3.6: Programme Availability Effect
Year 1 Participation Year 2 Participation Year 1&2 Participation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: Program Availability
Non-Pilot 3.930*** 3.392*** 3.449*** 2.731*** 2.487*** 2.565*** 2.869*** 2.288*** 2.372***
(0.264) (0.249) (0.246) (0.255) (0.266) (0.263) (0.233) (0.241) (0.239)
N 1432 1426 1426 1436 1430 1430 1433 1427 1427
Pilot areas 4.138*** 4.894*** 4.853*** 2.430*** 2.000*** 2.095*** 3.011*** 2.122*** 2.189***
(0.751) (0.703) (0.676) (0.602) (0.611) (0.567) (0.558) (0.568) (0.520)
N 753 751 751 753 751 751 753 751 751
Panel B: Program Duration
Period 1 0.486 0.808* 1.339*** -0.302 -0.066 0.400 0.040 0.308 0.804**
(0.460) (0.435) (0.423) (0.451) (0.437) (0.423) (0.409) (0.390) (0.374)
Period 2 2.897*** 2.211*** 2.719*** 1.521*** 1.431*** 1.886*** 2.153*** 1.795*** 2.276***
(0.502) (0.468) (0.450) (0.437) (0.420) (0.391) (0.421) (0.395) (0.368)
Period 3 4.425*** 4.013*** 4.394*** 3.566*** 3.613*** 3.957*** 3.954*** 3.794*** 4.155***
(0.695) (0.650) (0.619) (0.643) (0.621) (0.579) (0.600) (0.568) (0.526)
Period 4 7.779*** 6.753*** 6.231*** 6.523*** 6.188*** 5.731*** 7.101*** 6.461*** 5.973***
(0.963) (0.900) (0.844) (0.921) (0.890) (0.828) (0.842) (0.799) (0.734)
N 2,185 2,177 2,177 2,189 2,181 2,181 2,186 2,178 2,178
Area controls no yes yes no yes yes no yes yes
Region trends no no yes no no yes no no yes
Notes: Panel A reports estimation of equation (3.5), Panel B uses equation (3.6) both as described in Section 3.4.2.1.
All specifications include area fixed effects and a quadratic aggregate year trend, and are weighted according to area
population size. The vector of area controls includes the gender ratio, gender specific unemployment rates and real
hourly wage, as well as area-level UK nationality and ethnic population proportions. Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
weighted with the size of the age 16-17 population.
The results indicate that for the first year of post-compulsory education the introduc-
tion of the EMA is associated with a larger increase in the education rate in pilot areas
relative to non-pilot areas, 4.9 and 3.5 percentage points respectively, which may reflect
that pilot areas had lower initial post-compulsory education rates. In contrast to the indi-
vidual analysis results, the area analysis suggests that the impact of the EMA was lower
in the second year of the programme, estimated as 2.6 (2.1) percentage points for pilot
(non-pilot) areas, although the difference is not statistically significant. If the analysis is
restricted to the pilot period only, see Table B.2 in Appendix B, the estimates of the effect
of the introduction of the programme on pilot areas are consistent with those presented
for non-pilot areas in Table 3.6. Whereas the estimates in Panel A describe the average
impact for each year of the programme, the duration effect presented in Panel B illustrates
the effect of the EMA programme over consecutive cohorts. These latter indicate that the
impact of the EMA on post-compulsory education participation rates was negligible in
the first years of the policy, but increased with the duration of the programme. However
as the national rollout occurred in period 3 for pilot areas, whereas for non-pilot areas
the national rollout happened in period 1, it is not clear whether the increased impact
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of the EMA is driven by the longer availability of the programme or by the significant
changes to the eligibility criteria associated with the national rollout, which imply that
a greater proportion of individuals were eligible for the maximum payment. This latter
can be understood as an increase in the intensity of the programme. The area analysis
therefore turns to examining the effect of the intensity of the EMA within areas, using
the proportion of the population eligible for the EMA as the policy variable.
Table 3.7: Programme Intensity Effect
Year 1 Participation Year 2 Participation Year 1&2 Participation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Panel A: F/T Education
EMA eligibility 0.261*** 0.224*** 0.164*** 0.175*** 0.202*** 0.210*** 0.137*** 0.146*** 0.228*** 0.214*** 0.130*** 0.135***
(0.031) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
N 2,185 2,177 2,177 2,177 2,189 2,181 2,181 2,181 2,186 2,178 2,178 2,178
EMA Take-up 0.219*** 0.188*** 0.140*** 0.162*** 0.215*** 0.219*** 0.152*** 0.167*** 0.249*** 0.233*** 0.151*** 0.171***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.026) (0.029) (0.028) (0.032) (0.032) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.032)
N 2,159 2,151 2,151 2,151 2,165 2,157 2,157 2,157 2,027 2,021 2,021 2,021
Panel B: Proportion F/T students
EMA eligibility 0.154* 0.153* 0.103 0.063 0.193* 0.162 0.109 0.111 0.158** 0.148** 0.082 0.070
(0.083) (0.085) (0.087) (0.092) (0.104) (0.106) (0.116) (0.116) (0.065) (0.067) (0.072) (0.072)
N 2,475 2,462 2,462 2,462 2,479 2,464 2,464 2,464 2,487 2,471 2,471 2,471
EMA Take-up 0.139* 0.138* 0.093 0.061 0.222* 0.172 0.124 0.122 0.213** 0.183** 0.107 0.106
(0.077) (0.078) (0.083) (0.090) (0.123) (0.120) (0.142) (0.143) (0.084) (0.083) (0.093) (0.099)
N 2,446 2,433 2,433 2,433 2,452 2,437 2,437 2,437 2,312 2,300 2,300 2,300
Panel C: Proportion F/T male students
EMA eligibility 0.158 0.146 0.090 0.053 0.131 0.080 0.025 0.027 0.164* 0.141** 0.065 0.058
(0.133) (0.136) (0.140) (0.145) (0.152) (0.156) (0.169) (0.171) (0.096) (0.098) (0.103) (0.105)
N 2,417 2,405 2,405 2,405 2,394 2,383 2,383 2,383 2,479 2,464 2,464 2,464
EMA Take-up 0.142 0.130 0.071 0.049 0.153 0.082 0.029 0.030 0.246** 0.201* 0.117 0.132
(0.122) (0.125) (0.134) (0.142) (0.178) (0.173) (0.205) (0.208) (0.122) (0.120) (0.133) (0.142)
N 2,390 2,378 2,378 2,378 2,367 2,356 2,356 2,356 2,304 2,293 2,293 2,293
Panel D: Proportion F/T female students
EMA eligibility 0.153 0.140 0.119 0.096 0.225 0.216 0.156 0.152 0.181** 0.181* 0.141 0.121
(0.121) (0.126) (0.134) (0.141) (0.143) (0.146) (0.157) (0.159) (0.090) (0.093) (0.100) (0.101)
N 2,405 2,394 2,394 2,394 2,399 2,387 2,387 2,387 2,475 2,461 2,461 2,461
EMA Take-up 0.138 0.124 0.107 0.090 0.252 0.232 0.175 0.164 0.225* 0.209* 0.153 0.140
(0.111) (0.116) (0.127) (0.138) (0.167) (0.162) (0.189) (0.193) (0.116) (0.114) (0.128) (0.136)
N 2,376 2,365 2,365 2,365 2,372 2,360 2,360 2,360 2,302 2,291 2,291 2,291
Area controls no yes yes yes no yes yes yes no yes yes yes
Linear trends no no yes yes no no yes yes no no yes yes
Quadratic trends no no no yes no no no yes no no no yes
Notes: The table reports estimation of equations (3.7) and (3.9), for EMA eligibility and EMA Take-up respectively,
as described in Section 3.4.2.2. All specifications include area and year fixed effects, and are weighted according to
area population size. The vector of area controls includes the gender ratio, gender specific unemployment rates and
real hourly wage, as well as area-level UK nationality and ethnic population proportions. Robust standard errors
are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
The results of the analysis of the area-level programme intensity are displayed in Table
3.7. Analogous to the individual-level analysis this measures the Intention to Treat (ITT)
effect, as it considers the impact of changes in the proportion of individuals eligible for
the treatment rather than those who received the treatment. As there is both spatial
and temporal variation in eligibility, the specification mirrors that used in the individual
analysis. Administrative data is also available regarding the number of individuals in each
academic cohort who actually received the EMA in each area, allowing the calculation of
a measure of actual programme take-up (the proportion of eligible individuals in receipt of
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the EMA). However as there may be unobserved influences that impact both the decision
to apply for the EMA as well as the participation decision, a two-stage least squares
(2SLS) approach is taken whereby the actual take up rate is instrumented with exogenous
changes in the proportion eligible for the programme. The first specification in each set of
results includes just area and year fixed effects. The second specification adds the vector of
time-varying area level controls. The third and fourth specification add individual linear
and quadratic region-specific time trends respectively.
Considering the impact on the full-time education participation rate in Panel A, the
estimates are positive and significant and slightly decrease in magnitude when region-
specific time trends are included. In the first (second) post-compulsory year a one per-
centage point increase in the proportion of the population eligible for the EMA in areas
where programme was present is associated with a 0.18 (0.15) percentage point increase
in the age-specific education rate. The corresponding 2SLS estimates indicate that a one
percentage point increase in programme take-up, induced by exogenous changes in eligibil-
ity, is associated with a 0.16 (0.17) percentage point increase in the appropriate education
rate. That the OLS and 2SLS estimates are so similar is indicative that changes in actual
take-up of the EMA programme can largely be explained by changes in eligibility criteria
alone.
Panels B, C and D consider the proportion of full-time students, male students and fe-
male students. These measures are aggregated from the individual level Quarterly Labour
Force Surveys, and are therefore not as precise as the administrative measure used in panel
A. Nevertheless, the estimates for all students, panel B, are qualitatively consistent with
those obtained with the administrative data. Examining the impacts for male and female
students separately suggests that the changes in the eligibility criteria induced a larger
response amongst females. Although less precise, these latter measures are available for
all local authorities areas, whereas the administrative measure of the full-time education
rate does not include the 11 Inner-London local authorities. The LFS measures are how-
ever useful as they allow for the assessment of gender-heterogeneity in the impact of the
programme.
The programme intensity estimates presented in Table 3.7 become the first-stage es-
timates in the analysis of the influence of participation in post-compulsory education on
teenage fertility and crime. As these non-educational outcomes are rates defined over
the female population aged 15-17 for fertility measures and over the 10-17 youth popu-
lation for crime, the impact of the EMA on participation for both the first and second
post-compulsory years combined are considered as the first stage. Table 3.8 presents the
results for three different fertility measures: the under-age (under 18) conception rate,
maternity rate and the percentage of underage conceptions that led to abortion. The im-
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Table 3.8: Impact of the EMA programme on area level fertility
Conceptions Maternities % Led to Abortion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
F/T Education -0.033*** -0.047*** -0.030 -0.035 -0.065*** -0.075*** -0.070*** -0.073*** 0.302*** 0.337** 0.498* 0.509*
(0.012) (0.013) (0.024) (0.024) (0.010) (0.011) (0.020) (0.020) (0.122) (0.132) (0.263) (0.269)
N 2044 2040 2040 2040 2044 2040 2040 2040 2045 2041 2041 2041
Female Students -0.032 -0.062* -0.063 -0.064 -0.081* -0.095* -0.082 -0.083 0.400 0.428 0.502 0.518
(0.022) (0.035) (0.046) (0.047) (0.042) (0.049) (0.056) (0.058) (0.257) (0.270) (0.402) (0.518)
N 2325 2316 2316 2316 2325 2316 2316 2316 2326 2317 2317 2317
Area controls no yes yes yes no yes yes yes no yes yes yes
Linear trends no no yes yes no no yes yes no no yes yes
Quadratic trends no no no yes no no no yes no no no yes
Notes: The table reports estimation of equation (3.10) as described in Section 3.4.2.3. All specifications include
area and year fixed effects, and are weighted according to area population size. The vector of area controls includes
the gender ratio, gender specific unemployment rates and real hourly wage, as well as area-level UK nationality
and ethnic population proportions. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05,
***p < 0.01
pact of total participation on the teenage conception rate is negative in all specifications,
but does not reach statistical significance, whereas the impacts on the maternity rate and
the percentage of conceptions terminated are larger, and significantly different from zero.
The estimates indicate that a one percentage point increase in the full-time education
rate of individuals in the first and second years of post-compulsory schooling, induced by
changes in the proportion of the population eligible for the EMA programme, is associated
with a 0.07 percentage point decrease in the maternity rate, and a 0.51 percentage point
increase in the proportion of conceptions leading to an abortion. As the full-time edu-
cation participation rate does not discriminate between males and females, whereas the
fertility measures are defined over females only, it may be more illuminating to examine
the fertility response with respect to the proportion of female students only. Recall that
this measure is aggregated from the LFS, and the resulting estimates are therefore less
precise than those obtained with the administrative data. Nevertheless the estimates are
qualitatively consistent, and indicate that a one percentage point increase in the propor-
tion of females enrolled in full-time education is associated with a 0.06 (0.08) percentage
point decrease in the conception (maternity) rate and a 0.52 percentage point increase in
terminations. At the sample mean of eligibility these estimates translate to approximately
a 19% decrease in the under 18 maternity rate, driven by both a decrease in conceptions
(8%) and an increase in abortions (6%)17.
The final analysis considers the influence of an increase in post-compulsory education
on youth crime. The estimation follows the specification used in the fertility analysis, with
the results displayed in Table 3.9. The estimates consistently indicate that the increase
in participation is associated with a downward impact on the proportion of first-time
youth offenders. However the estimates are not statistically significant. The impact of an
17These back of the envelope calculations use the first-stage estimate in column 12 of Table 3.7 and the
proportion eligible for the EMA at the sample mean from Table 3.2
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Table 3.9: Impact of the EMA programme on area level offenders
Youth Offenders Adult Offenders
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
F/T Education -0.025 -0.027 -0.001 -0.019 -0.008* -0.004 0.010 0.005
(0.016) (0.019) (0.024) (0.021) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005)
N 1862 1854 1854 1854 1862 1854 1854 1854
F/T Students -0.054 -0.053 -0.010 -0.023 -0.019 -0.006 0.012 0.003
(0.095) (0.069) (0.036) (0.028) (0.033) (0.012) (0.018) (0.006)
N 2043 2027 2027 2027 2043 2027 2027 2027
Male Students -0.064 -0.081 -0.026 -0.054 -0.029 -0.010 0.034 0.007
(0.179) (0.213) (0.173) (0.153) (0.063) (0.029) (0.193) (0.022)
N 2037 2022 2022 2022 2037 2022 2022 2022
Female Students -0.025 -0.027 -0.002 -0.011 -0.009 -0.003 0.005 0.002
(0.034) (0.029) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003)
N 2032 2018 2018 2018 2032 2018 2018 2018
Area controls no yes yes yes no yes yes yes
Linear trends no no yes yes no no yes yes
Quadratic trends no no no yes no no no yes
Notes: See notes to Table 3.8
increase in the proportion of male students is estimated to be larger, consistent with a
hypothesis that youth offenders are disproportionately male, but the estimates still do not
achieve significance. As a robustness exercise the analysis is repeated for adult offenders,
the resulting estimates are not statistically different to zero, but in contrast to the youth
offending rates are also of a far smaller magnitude and not consistent in sign over the
specifications. Although suggestive, there are some caveats to this final analysis, as the
crime measure considered in the proportion of first-time entrants to the criminal justice
system, in other words, the number of new offenders known to the police in each area and
time period, rather than the incidence of crimes perpetrated. Additionally, as the rate is
defined over a wide age range, it incorporates young people within compulsory education
as well as those beyond the compulsory school-leaving age.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper has investigated the impact of the Education Maintenance Allowance (EMA)
on participation rates in post-compulsory education and non-educational outcomes. Con-
sistent with evaluations of the EMA pilots, the programme induced a substantial increase
in the staying-on rates, especially amongst individuals eligible for the maximum EMA pay-
ments. There is also evidence of substantial gender heterogeneity, in the first-compulsory
year the increase in EMA was particularly effective at increasing the participation rates
amongst males, whereas in the second post-compulsory year the impact was larger for
females. The analysis also considered the impact of post-compulsory participation on
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non-educational measures, teenage fertility and the proportion of first-time offenders. The
results indicate that the increase in participation induced by changes in EMA eligibility
is associated with a substantial decrease in the underage maternity rate, which is driven
by both a reduction in the conception rate as well as an increase in the proportion of
teenage conceptions that led to abortion. Weaker, but suggestive evidence is found that
the programme influenced youth crime.
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Marriage and Partnership
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Chapter 4
Marriage Market Consequences of
an Educational Reform
4.1 Introduction
Who to marry is one of the most important decisions a person undertakes, a decision
that influences not only the individual’s lifetime utility, but which also has important
intergenerational consequences through the potential impact on the outcomes of children.
Indeed, household formation can be understood as a key determinant of intergenerational
mobility and income inequality: Greenwood, Guner, Kocharkov, and Santos (2014) show
that the US Gini coefficient for household income would be significantly smaller if spouses
matched randomly rather than assortatively. The quality of a specific match depends on an
individual’s relative position in the marriage market, which in turn is affected by factors
such as family background and social standing, previous educational investments and
future economic opportunities. Although these are idiosyncratic influences, two noticeable
features emerge in the majority of marriages.
First, husbands are on average older than their wives. In all 218 countries for which
data exists we observe a positive marital age gap1. Over the last 40 years the marital age
gap has exhibited a downward trend in many countries, coinciding with strong increases
in the mean age at marriage, however this positive age gap has endured. Indeed, even in
countries with the highest standards of gender equality, such as the Scandinavian nations,
an age gap of about two years persists. The second noticeable feature is that in general
spouses have similar education levels. Schwartz and Mare (2005), with US data, show that
the degree of positive assortative matching in education between spouses has increased
since 1960, driven predominantly by increased homogamy in both tails of the marriage
1See Appendix C.1, Figure C.1
73
4.1. Introduction 4. Marriage Market Consequences of an Educational Reform
distribution: individuals with low educational attainment are more likely to have a low ed-
ucated spouse, and similarly college graduates are increasingly likely to marry each other.
Most striking is the decline in the likelihood that individuals with very low education
levels form a marriage with a more educated spouse.
These two stylised facts imply an overlooked consequence for cohort specific educa-
tional reforms. As individuals typically match with partners from different cohorts, both
spouses are not subject to the same institutional setting if a reform falls in between their
birth dates. In turn, standard matches with positive age gaps and equality in educa-
tion become infeasible. Who marries whom then depends on the relative importance of
preferences over a prospective partner’s age and homogamy in education. This may have
non-trivial consequences for reform evaluation, as direct benefits of the reform accruing
to the individual may be diminished at the household level.
In this paper we analyse a UK educational reform, affecting all cohorts of individuals
born after a specific threshold date of birth, which induced exogenous variation in the
probability that a person obtained an academic qualification. By inducing a permanent
shock to the qualifications distribution in affected cohorts, the reform induced a temporary
shock to the cross-cohort qualifications composition for those individuals born in the
neighbourhood of the threshold date. In absence of a preferred age gap there would
be no gender-imbalance between potential partners in the marriage market. However,
a prevailing age gap implies that women in the first cohorts affected by the reform are
proportionately more qualified relative to their potential marriage partners born prior
to the threshold. Therefore they will not be able to maintain both the typical spousal
age gap as well as the same degree of positive assortative matching on education. This
exogenous shock to the available choices of potential brides and grooms provides a unique
opportunity to study the marriage market response to a qualifications shock.
Our results indicate that women who increased their qualification status in response
to the reform also increased their probability of forming a marriage with a lower age gap,
in particular by marrying a husband who would have also been affected by the reform.
The observed decrease in the spousal age gap of 2.5 months is substantial compared to the
sample mean age difference at marriage, and the results also indicate that affected women
are not able to achieve the same degree of positive sorting on qualifications as before. We
find a corresponding but weaker effect for men, who tend to slightly increase the age gap.
Thus while treated women have to accept matches that deviate from the typical pattern
in one or the other way, facing the choice of marrying younger or less qualified males, men
obtain a better position at the marriage market as without changing the age gap men in
the last unaffected cohort would find that their prospective partners were more qualified,
and early treated male cohorts can increase assortative matching compared to men born
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just before the threshold, as their potential partners are from younger cohorts and thus
also subject to the increased schooling requirement.
The marital age gap and its roots have attracted some attention in the literature. The
economic explanation proposed by Bergstrom and Bagnoli (1993) postulates that males
and females differ fundamentally in terms of economic prospects. The male breadwinner
reveals his attractiveness in terms of income in later life, whereas the female’s desirability
is known from the start. Grooms with higher prospects have an incentive to postpone
marriage until their high attractiveness is revealed, in order to be accepted by highly
attractive brides. This difference in economic prospects produces the age gap. In contrast,
Dı´az-Gime´nez and Giolito (2013) advance a biological interpretation which ascribes the
age gaps to differences in life-time fecundity profiles between genders. As female fecundity
diminishes earlier than that of males, brides are inclined to accept marriage proposals at
a young age, while grooms take the liberty of waiting.
Assortative matching on education due to complementarities in marital output (Becker,
1973, 1974) has become a well-established phenomenon in the marriage literature. However
little is known regarding the relative strength of preferences over age and education in the
formation of marital matches. Mansour and McKinnish (2013) argue that highly educated
individuals meet similar-aged partners whilst in college and therefore ensuing marriages
involve small age differences between spouses, whereas marriages with substantial age
gaps are negatively selected as they are more likely to involve at least one spouse with
low educational attainment. Holmlund (2008) analyses the impact on assortative mating
and intergenerational mobility of a Swedish educational reform that not only increased
the duration of compulsory education but also postponed ability tracking, with findings
that indicate that although the reform led to sizeable increases in intergenerational income
and educational mobility the degree of positive sorting between spouses increased, with
assortative matching on education more important for women then men.
A substantial tranche of the demography literature has examined the effect of the
‘marriage squeeze’ on marital matches. The intuition is that sustained population growth
implies an increase in the size of cohorts over time, and therefore with a preferred age
gap between spouses there is a gender-imbalance in the marriage market due to an excess
supply of age-appropriate women in comparison to men. Bronson and Mazzocco (2012)
present evidence that birth cohort size is positively related with marriage rates but nega-
tively associated with the age difference between spouses. Bhaskar (2012) in a theoretical
model, shows that the spousal age gap does not respond to persistent population growth,
but is the margin of adjustment to accommodate marriage market gender imbalances in-
duced by transitory shocks to cohort size. Empirically, Bergstrom and Lam (1989) find
that changes in gender ratios due to substantial fluctuations in fertility rates in Sweden
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in the early 20th century were largely accommodated by movement in the age difference
between spouses. The 1958-1961 famine in China reduced cohort sizes substantially, how-
ever Brandt, Siow, and Vogel (2009) find that marriage rates were largely unaffected due
to adjustments in the marital age gap.
Our results add a new aspect to the large literature on the causal effects of education
that make use of compulsory school-leaving age reforms for identification. To our knowl-
edge this is the first paper to investigate the effect of such a reform on matching behaviour
in the marriage market along both the education and spousal age difference dimensions.
A number of analyses have used the UK educational reforms to estimate the impact of ed-
ucation on various adult outcomes such as earnings (see, inter alia, Harmon and Walker
(1995), Oreopoulos (2006) and Devereux and Hart (2010)), adult health and mortality
(Clark and Royer, 2013), life-time wealth and happiness (Oreopoulos, 2007) and crime
(Machin et al., 2011), as well as the intergenerational causal effect of parental educa-
tion on outcomes of their children, such as health (Doyle, Harmon, and Walker, 2005;
Lindeboom, Llena-Nozal, and van der Klaauw, 2009), or education (Galindo-Rueda, 2003;
Chevalier, 2004; Chevalier et al., 2004). Our findings suggest a reform that is cohort-based
and formally gender-neutral may have asymmetric impacts by gender via the marriage
market. This may in turn have important implications for long-term outcomes that are
more heavily dependent on the household environment rather than on the individual char-
acteristics alone.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 4.2 outlines the institu-
tional context, the data used in the analysis and our empirical methodology are described
in Section 4.3. We present and discuss our results in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Institutional Context
Compulsory schooling has been a feature of the education system in England and Wales
since the late nineteenth century. Children are required to start education no later than
the beginning of the academic year (September 1st - August 31st) after which they turn 5,
and are required to remain in education until they have reached the legislated minimum
school-leaving age. There are two tiers2 of school-age academic qualifications: the first
level of examinations is taken at the end of the academic year in which an individual turns
2Ordinary Levels (O’Levels), targeted towards academically inclined students and a pre-requisite for
participation in further education, were introduced in the 1950s as the main academic qualification achieved
at school. After the introduction of comprehensive schools the Certificate of Secondary Education (CSE)
qualification was introduced in 1965 to meet the needs of the less academically-able. Both these exams are
taken at age 16 and constitute the first tier of school qualifications. O’Levels and CSEs were replaced by
a single examination, the General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE), in 1988. The second tier
of qualifications are Advanced Levels (A’Levels), sat at age 18.
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16; for more academically able students a second tier of qualifications are sat after two
years of further study.
4.2.1 The reform
Since the introduction of the first minimum school-leaving age legislation in 1880 there
have been a number of increases to the age until which students are compelled to remain
in full-time education3. We focus on one of these increases, the Raising of School Leaving
Age (RoSLA), which raised the schooling requirement by one year, from age 15 to age
16. The intention to implement RoSLA was first announced by the UK Government in
1964 and enacted in September 1972, affecting the mandatory school-leaving age of all
individuals born after September 1st 1957.
Figure 4.1: RoSLA effect
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Notes: The graphs show the proportion of individuals a) participating in education after age 15 and b) with an
academic qualification by academic cohort of birth (Sept-Aug). The RoSLA affected individuals born after after
September 1st 1957.
The RoSLA reform impacted the school-leaving age of a substantial fraction of the
population. Figure 4.1(a) shows that the proportion of individuals leaving education after
age 15 increased approximately 25 percentage points in response to the new leaving age
requirement. Furthermore, in comparison to other legislative increases to the minimum
schooling requirement, RoSLA has the unique feature insofar that it raised compulsory
schooling precisely up to the age at which the first tier of academic examinations are
3The first compulsory leaving age of 10 years was introduced by the Education Act (1880), raised to
age 11 by the Elementary (School Attendance) Act (1893), increased again to age 14 in 1918 by the Fisher
Act. The Butler Act (1944), initially raised the minimum leaving age to 15, but made provision for a
subsequent rise in 1972 up to age 16. More recently the Education Act (2008) has introduced the Raising
of Participation Age (RPA), which from September 2015 requires all individuals in England and Wales to
remain in formal education or training until their 18th birthday.
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taken. Thus by compelling students to stay in school for an additional year, the RoSLA
reform induced an increase in the likelihood of them taking the examinations, and thereby
increasing the probability of achieving a qualification. Figure 4.1(b) indicates that the
introduction of the RoSLA increased the proportion of individuals obtaining an academic
qualification increased by just over 10 percentage points. Chevalier et al. (2004) show that
RoSLA’s impact on qualifications was limited to the first tier of academic qualifications
only, with no ripple-upward effects observed on higher qualifications.
To examine the robustness of our assertion that the marriage market responded to a
temporary gender-age-qualifications imbalance induced by the RoSLA we examine another
institutional rule in the English education system which induced exogenous variation in
the propensity to receive a qualification within a cohort rather than across cohorts.
4.2.2 The Easter Leaving Rule
The Education Act (1962) introduced the Easter Leaving Rule (ELR) in response to con-
cerns that if school-leaving eligibility is determined by the precise birth date alone, indi-
viduals born at the beginning of the academic year may not complete as much secondary
education as later-born individuals, and therefore may be disadvantaged in the labour
market due to the lower investment in human capital. The ELR imposed that persons
born between September 1st and January 31st should remain in education until the end of
the Spring term of the academic year in which they reached the compulsory school-leaving
age, whereas those born between February 1st and August 31st were required to stay in
school until the end of the Summer term.
Figure 4.2: ELR effect
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Notes: The graph displays the proportion of individuals holding
an academic qualification by month of birth within an academic
cohort. The vertical lines indicate the threshold of the Easter
Leaving Rule (February within each academic cohort).
78
4.2. Institutional Context 4. Marriage Market Consequences of an Educational Reform
For post-RoSLA cohorts, who are required to remain in school until 16, which is the
precise age at which the first-tier academic examinations are available, this implies that
individuals within the same cohort have different probabilities of obtaining a qualification,
as those born towards the beginning of the academic cohort could leave school before the
examination period, whereas persons born in the latter part of the year, through the
requirement to stay in school until the end of the Summer term, would have a higher
propensity of sitting the examination, and consequently obtaining a qualification. Figure
4.2 shows that individuals born immediately after the ELR threshold have up to a 5
percentage point higher propensity of holding a qualification in comparison to individuals
eligible to leave school prior to the examination period.
4.2.3 Why does the RoSLA induce a temporary imbalance in the mar-
riage market?
We argue that by being applied at the cohort level the reform induced a temporary shock
to the cross-cohort composition of qualifications by gender in the neighbourhood of the
RoSLA threshold date. With a prevailing age gap between spouses of more than one year
this implies that individuals form matches across academic cohorts. Specifically a typical
woman will match with a man from an older cohort. As the RoSLA introduced a single
threshold date applicable to all individuals regardless of gender, and matches tend to occur
across cohorts, this implies that each side of potential matches in the neighbourhood of the
threshold are differentially affected as there is a higher proportion of qualified individuals
in post-RoSLA compared to pre-RoSLA cohorts. To clarify the imbalance we assess the
potential age-qualifications matches in the vicinity of the threshold for each gender:
Women born in the RoSLA cohort:
In absence of the reform, women born in academic cohort 1957 or later would typically
match with men born in 1956 or earlier. By increasing the fraction of individuals holding
a qualification, the RoSLA increases the ratio of qualified women to qualified men thereby
creating a gender imbalance in the qualifications composition across cohorts. A woman
maintaining the typical age gap will face an increased likelihood of matching with a man
who has lower qualifications than herself. In contrast a woman maintaining the typical
sorting on qualifications will face an under-supply of appropriately qualified men in the
usual cohort, therefore the attractiveness of younger men from post-RoSLA cohorts in-
creases as they are proportionately more qualified than pre-RoSLA men such that they
may become more acceptable as a potential match.
Men born in the RoSLA cohort:
In absence of the reform, men born in academic cohort 1957 or later would typically match
with women born in 1958 or later. As both cohorts are subject to the increased education
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requirement of the RoSLA, there is no imbalance in the relative proportion of qualified
men to qualified women.
Bhaskar (2012) argues that the marital age gap is the margin of adjustment by which
the marriage market accommodates gender imbalances. The degree of adjustment will
depend on the relative preferences of individuals over the age and qualifications of their
partner. The larger the preference for qualifications, the greater the proportion of individ-
uals who marry outside of the typical partner-age cohort resulting in a large adjustment
in the age gap in the directly affected cohort. In contrast if age considerations are more
important, or if the adjustment is spread out over several cohorts, then the direct effect on
the age gap will be small, and the imbalance will be accommodated through qualification
differences between spouses.
4.3 Empirical strategy
We empirically investigate how the marriage market responded to the temporary gender
imbalance induced by the RoSLA and the prevailing age gap by examining outcomes
around the threshold of the reform using a regression discontinuity design. We use a
sample which encompasses the typical age gap either side of the discontinuity, therefore
the method essentially summarises marriage market behaviour across cohorts.
4.3.1 Estimation Method
The RoSLA reform introduced a threshold date of birth according to which the minimum
length of compulsory schooling was determined: individuals born prior to September 1957
were able to leave school at age 15, whereas those born after August 1957 were required
to remain in education until 16 years of age. The reform can therefore be considered
as a natural experiment, providing an exogenous source of variation to an individual’s
educational characteristics. As this variation was solely determined by an observable
characteristic, the individual’s time of birth, a regression discontinuity (RD) design is
particularly suited as an estimation method in our analysis, where we explore responses
to the RoSLA in the marriage market.
In essence the RD approach is based on the simple intuition that individuals born in
the neighbourhood of 1st Sept 1957 are identical apart from which side of the threshold
date they are born, and in absence of the RoSLA ‘treatment’ these individuals would
have similar outcomes. Although the underlying distribution of the running variable is
continuous, our dataset contains only discrete measures: month and year of birth. We
therefore adopt the RD estimation procedure proposed by Lee and Card (2008). Visual
depictions of the results are produced using local polynomial smooths, whereas the base
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specification for our analytical results is:
Yij = α0 +Djβ0 + P
l
jγ0 + (Dj × P lj)δ0 + aj + ij (4.1)
where Yij is the outcome for individual i born in month j; P
l
j is a vector of polynomial
functions in the running variable, xj , with (l = 1, 2, 3); D is an indicator of whether
the individual was subject to RoSLA which is interacted with the polynomial to allow
these to be different left and right of the discontinuity. We determine the appropriate
window width of observations around the discontinuity to use in the estimation following
the cross-validation procedure suggested by Ludwig and Miller (2007).4
4.3.2 Data
The Labour Force Survey (LFS) is the largest representative survey undertaken in the
UK, with around 11,000 private households interviewed each wave. The survey contains
detailed information on each individual within the household, such as their marital status,
ethnicity, date of birth (measured by month and year), education, nationality and country
of birth, as well as the relationships between each of the household members5. We pool
data from the 1975-2006 surveys, the latter being the last data for which date of birth
information is publicly available.
We define an individual’s academic birth cohort by whether the individual was born
between September 1st of year t and August 31st of year t+ 1. Thus the first individuals
subject to the RoSLA, aged 15 when they started the school year in September 1972, were
born in academic cohort 1957. The spousal age gap is calculated as the linear difference
between the husband’s and wife’s ages, measured in months, at the time of the survey.
As the RoSLA did not induce an impact on educational achievement beyond the first
tier of academic qualifications (Chevalier et al., 2004) we can, without loss of generality,
focus on the binary outcome of whether an individual has an academic qualification or
not. Respondents in the LFS are asked to record their qualifications according to their
equivalence in a categorisation of English qualifications. From this information we are
unable to ascertain whether individuals were educated in England and Wales. Therefore
to mitigate the inclusion of individuals not subject to the relevant schooling system, we
restrict the sample to those individuals born in the UK, but resident within England
or Wales at the time of survey. As with the spousal age gap, we construct the marital
4A full description of the estimation techniques is presented in the technical annex.
5Unfortunately the LFS does not measure parity of marriage and has no information regarding the
age at marriage. However this is only problematic for the analysis if spouses in higher parity marriages
have different preferences over age and qualifications of their partners than spouses in first marriages. By
imposing age restrictions to the sample we can mitigate the inclusion of higher parity marriages. This
robustness check is explored in Appendix C.
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qualification gap as the difference between the binary indicators of whether each spouse
has a qualification. This variable is therefore equal to 1 if the husband has a qualification
and the wife does not, is equal to 0 if both spouses have the same qualification status, and
-1 if the wife has a qualification and the husband does not.
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics
N Mean S.D. Min Max
Married Women
Qualifications 116,709 0.68 0.47 0 1
White 138,133 0.99 0.09 0 1
Age 143,108 33.74 7.57 20 50
Survey year 143,108 91.11 7.67 75 106
Age gap 143,108 24.89 37.28 -120 120
Diff. qualif. 115,089 -0.08 0.53 -1 1
Married Men
Qualifications 108,965 0.65 0.48 0 1
White 126,020 0.99 0.09 0 1
Age 128,853 34.55 7.29 20 50
Survey year 128,853 91.86 7.45 75 106
Age gap 128,853 18.66 37.02 -120 120
Diff. qualif. 107,966 -0.07 0.53 -1 1
Notes: The table shows descriptive statistics of key variables. Sample
restrictions: age gap is within 120 months to either side; own age is
between 20 and 50 years; individuals born within academic cohorts
1951-1962.
We create a sample of men and a sample of women in order to analyse responses
around the RoSLA threshold for each individual spouse, descriptive statistics are displayed
in Table 4.1. In each sample we retain only prime-age individuals (aged 20-50) within
academic cohorts of birth close to the RoSLA implementation (cohorts 1951-1962) and
exclude the small number of couples where the spousal age difference is above or below 10
years. After restrictions, for the age gap analysis we have 128,853 (143,108) dyads where
the man (woman) is born in relevant period. As detailed information regarding the level
of qualifications held by an individual has been measured in the LFS only since 1984 the
male and female samples used in the qualification gap analysis is reduced to 108,965 and
116,709 couples respectively.
4.4 Results
We maintain that in the presence of preferred age gaps between partners, the RoSLA
reform induced a temporary imbalance in the proportion of qualified individuals across
cohorts, and show evidence that this imbalance significantly impacted the composition of
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marital matches in the RoSLA-neighbourhood cohorts. We expect that qualified women
from the first RoSLA cohorts would more frequently marry unqualified men, or reduce the
marital age gap in comparison to their counterparts born prior to the RoSLA threshold as
their choices are constrained as a result of the imbalance, which implies they are unable to
maintain both the typical age gap and qualifications sorting. In contrast, we hypothesise
that RoSLA treated men marry similarly educated partners compared to pre-RoSLA men.
We examine the robustness of our assertion in two ways. First we examine another insti-
tutional rule in the English education system which induced exogenous variation in the
propensity to receive a qualification within rather than across a cohort, second we examine
between cohort thresholds in non-RoSLA years to confirm that our observed results are
unique to the RoSLA reform discontinuity.
We first verify the effect of the RoSLA reform on an individual’s qualification status,
before examining our main results of how the spousal age and qualification gaps respond
at the threshold. We then examine changes in match-types around the discontinuity to
assess the extent of substitution between partner age and qualifications.
4.4.1 Qualifications
Figure 4.3: RD on own academic qualification by month of birth
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Notes: The graphs show local polynomial smooths indicating the likelihood an individual has obtained an academic
qualification. The dots reflect means by each bin on the abscissa. The solid line is the local polynomial smooth
with the bandwidth and degree as shown using a rectangular kernel and the grid on the abscissa. The dashed lines
are 95% confidence intervals of the local polynomial.
Figure 4.3 shows the proportion of (a) married women and (b) married men who hold
academic qualifications by each respective spouse’s distance of birth, in months, to the
RoSLA threshold date which has been normalised to zero. The reform was associated with
a substantial increase in the likelihood of obtaining a qualification, the impact for married
women, 11.4 percentage points, slightly larger than that for married men, 10.2 percentage
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points6, which are comparable to the findings of Dickson and Smith (2011) who find an
impact of 9.5 percentage points in their estimation for working-age men.
4.4.2 Marital Age Gap
Figure 4.4 displays the marital age gap by each spouse’s distance of birth, in months, to
the RoSLA threshold date which has been normalised to zero. The estimates are produced
using the optimal bandwidth of 24 months, as indicated by the Ludwig and Miller (2007)
cross-validation procedure, and a quadratic polynomial of the running variable. The figure
confirms the basic hypothesis: for married women at the RoSLA threshold we see a clear
reduction in the age gap of approximately 2 months. In contrast for men there is a small,
but insignificant, increase in the age gap.
Figure 4.4: Marital age gap at RoSLA threshold
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Notes: The graphs show local polynomial smooths of marital age gaps in months (male-female). The dots reflect
mean age gaps by each bin on the abscissa. The solid line is the local polynomial smooth with bandwidth 24 and
degree 2 using a rectangular kernel and the grid on the abscissa. The dashed lines are 95% confidence intervals of
the local polynomial.
Table 4.2 displays the analytical results associated with Figure 4.4. For each gender we
first present the results of the estimation using our preferred bandwidth of 24 months, and
explore the robustness of these estimates to using half and double our preferred bandwidth,
and also for a linear, quadratic and cubic polynomial in the running variable over columns
1-3 respectively. In columns 4-6 we add a set of basic covariates (age and ethnicity) to
the base specifications. We report the Lee and Card (2008) G-statistic along with the
Akaike (AIC) information criterion to test the goodness of fit of the polynomial used.
The upper panel displays the estimates for women revealing that for a given bandwidth
the G-statistic does not clearly suggest a polynomial degree, but tends to favour a more
6The analytical results associated with Figure 4.3 are presented in Appendix C.1, Table C.1.
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complex polynomial. Conversely, the AIC generally indicates that the smallest (linear)
polynomial is appropriate. A second degree polynomial seems sensible as a compromise of
these different test results, noting that Gelman and Imbens (2014) find that RD estimators
for causal effects using higher-order polynomials can be misleading and suggest that, in
absence of conclusive evidence in favor of using a complex polynomial, a linear or quadratic
polynomial in the running variable yields more credible results. The G-statistic is even
less suggestive in the lower panel for married men, which clearly indicates that a linear
polynomial is preferred according to the AIC, however we note that there is no significant
difference in the coefficients obtained using either a first or second degree polynomial with
the optimal bandwidth.
The RD estimate for married women in our preferred specification (column (2) of the
upper panel), which uses the optimal bandwidth of 24 months and a 2nd-order polynomial,
indicates that the RoSLA induced a negative and statistically significant response on the
age gap of 2.5 months, 10% relative to the sample mean. With other bandwidth choices
the effect is somewhat amplified, a reduction of 3.9 (3.0) months for half (double) the
optimal bandwidth, both statistically significant7. Including basic controls does not alter
the results significantly, indicating there are no discontinuities in the covariates around the
threshold. In the lower panel, the estimates for married men using a 2nd degree polynomial
reveal a consistent but statistically insignificant response to RoSLA of 1.1 months over
all bandwidth choices. With a linear polynomial the magnitude of the estimates increase
somewhat and gain significance for non-optimal bandwidths, but remain significantly lower
in magnitude than the response for women.
As the LFS does not record the parity of marriage, a potential concern is that the
results would be biased if spouses in higher parity marriages have different sorting patterns
over qualifications and age than spouses in first marriages. We explore robustness to this
in two ways. First we mitigate the inclusion of higher parity marriages by applying upper
age bounds (40, 45 and 50) to individuals included in the LFS sample, see Table C.3 in
Appendix C.1, finding no significant differences in the estimates for males over the different
samples, and qualitatively similar results between the age-restricted samples and the main
analysis for female, with the magnitude of the response increasing as the upper age bound
decreases. Second, we perform a parallel analysis on a 1% sample from the census, where
we constrain the sample to include first marriages only, yielding results consistent with
those obtained from our LFS samples8, see Figure C.2 in Appendix C.1.
7We explore the sensitivity of the estimates to the choice of bandwidth further by performing the
analysis for all bandwidths between 12 and 60 months, with results suggesting that the estimates are
qualitatively robust and stable over a wide range of bandwidth choice. These results are available in the
Technical Annex.
8The Census Longitudinal Study (CLS) is comprised of linked census records from the 1971-2001 cen-
suses of individuals born on four specific days of the year, capturing approximately 1% of the population.
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Table 4.2: Change in marital age gap at RoSLA threshold
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Married Women
Optimal Bandwidth (24) -3.054∗∗∗ -2.537∗∗ -5.836∗∗∗ -2.882∗∗∗ -2.598∗∗ -5.757∗∗∗
(0.695) (0.825) (1.326) (0.683) (0.797) (1.300)
N 48,657 48,657 48,657 48,104 48,104 48,104
G-statistic (p-value) 0.022 0.016 0.089 0.018 0.011 0.059
AIC 491,926 491,929 491,922 486,128 486,132 486,125
1/2 x Optimal B. (12) -4.595∗∗∗ -3.898∗∗ -0.674 -4.544∗∗∗ -3.859∗∗ -0.692
(0.790) (1.057) (1.264) (0.772) (1.027) (1.191)
N 24,273 24,273 24,273 24,116 24,116 24,116
G-statistic (p-value) 0.493 0.451 0.619 0.374 0.325 0.463
AIC 245,358 245,361 245,360 243,639 243,642 243,641
2 x Optimal B. (48) -2.410∗∗∗ -2.989∗∗∗ -3.238∗∗∗ -2.305∗∗∗ -2.977∗∗∗ -3.056∗∗∗
(0.548) (0.711) (0.775) (0.546) (0.703) (0.754)
N 96,657 96,657 96,657 94,320 94,320 94,320
G-statistic (p-value) 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.010
AIC 975,294 975,297 975,299 951,731 951,733 951,736
Married Men
Optimal Bandwidth (24) 1.170 1.160 2.040∗ 1.216∗ 1.066 2.036∗
(0.594) (0.697) (0.855) (0.597) (0.710) (0.846)
N 44,466 44,466 44,466 44,239 44,239 44,239
G-statistic (p-value) 0.823 0.871 0.850 0.734 0.804 0.782
AIC 446,900 446,901 446,904 444,292 444,292 444,295
1/2 x Optimal B. (12) 2.087∗∗ 1.066 -1.302 2.019∗∗ 1.019 -0.978
(0.691) (0.817) (1.158) (0.695) (0.812) (1.125)
N 22,373 22,373 22,373 22,314 22,314 22,314
G-statistic (p-value) 0.814 0.826 0.872 0.695 0.732 0.744
AIC 224,543 224,545 224,547 223,791 223,793 223,795
2 x Optimal B. (48) 1.668∗∗∗ 1.083 1.485∗ 1.704∗∗∗ 1.145 1.416∗
(0.443) (0.646) (0.712) (0.445) (0.645) (0.712)
N 87,187 87,187 87,187 86,106 86,106 86,106
G-statistic (p-value) 0.456 0.430 0.449 0.462 0.433 0.451
AIC 876,672 876,675 876,677 865,532 865,535 865,536
Polyn. degree 1 2 3 1 2 3
Basic controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table shows estimates from local parametric estimation of equation (4.1) as described in
Section 4.3.1 using different bandwidths, over rows, and polynomial degrees 1 to 3 over columns. The
dependent variable is the spousal age gap measured in months (male-female). The bandwidth reflects the
number of values of the running variable (month of birth) on each side of the discontinuity. Standard
errors are robust and allow for random and identical specification errors. Below the estimates the p-value
of the Lee and Card (2008) G-statistic and the Akaike Information Criterion indicate goodness of the
polynomial fit. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
To preserve confidentiality the data released for analysis is restricted to academic year of birth for each
spouse only. Although the CLS sample is larger (214,325 dyads) than our LFS dataset, we retain the
LFS in our main analysis as the RDD framework is more credible with a fine discretisation of the running
variable (Lee and Lemieux, 2010).
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4.4.3 Marital Qualification Gap
Figure 4.5 displays the spousal qualifications gap around the RoSLA discontinuity9. As
described in Section 4.3.2 a qualifications gap equal to 1 involves a qualified husband and
unqualified wife, a gap of 0 indicates equally qualified spouses and a gap of -1 results
when the wife is qualified but her husband is not. For married women the response
occurs contemporaneous to the reform implementation, women affected by RoSLA clearly
increase their qualification relative to their husbands, reflected in the negative shift of the
spousal qualification gap. The magnitude of the difference declines over subsequent cohorts
before leveling off. We see that after leveling off the post-RoSLA qualifications difference
is greater than the pre-RoSLA difference, consistent with the increase in qualifications at
the RoSLA being larger for women as indicated by Figure 4.3. In contrast, the response
in the qualifications difference for married men happens in the immediate cohorts prior to
RoSLA, as their younger spouses are increasingly likely to be born after the threshold and
are therefore are proportionately more qualified. For men born after the RoSLA threshold
the qualifications difference is restored as their younger potential partners are also subject
to the increased schooling requirement ending the marriage market imbalance.
Figure 4.5: Marital qualifications gap at RoSLA threshold
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Notes: The graphs show local polynomial smooths of difference in qualifications between spouses (male-female).
The dots reflect mean qualifications difference by each bin on the abscissa. The solid line is the local polynomial
smooth with bandwidth 24 and degree 2 using a rectangular kernel and the grid on the abscissa. The dashed lines
are 95% confidence intervals of the local polynomial.
So far the results have shown that the marriage market adjusts along both the age
gap and the qualifications gap. For women passing the RoSLA threshold their chances
of matching with an equally qualified husband from an older cohort decreases. Corre-
spondingly, men born before the threshold find fewer equally qualified women in younger
9The analytical results associated with Figure 4.5 are presented in Appendix C.1, Table C.2.
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cohorts and passing the threshold relieves this constraint. In order to examine the degree
of substitution between the two dimensions we examine the proportion of match types at
the discontinuity.
4.4.4 Substitution between Age and Qualification
In order to reconcile our findings with regard to the responses of the marital age and
qualifications gaps we examine the degree of substitution between the two. We summarise
the marriage responses around the RoSLA threshold into binary variables indicating the
relative qualification level between spouses and whether an individual’s spouse is from the
pre- or post-RoSLA regime.
Figure 4.6: Spouse characteristics round Rosla
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Notes: Graphs (a) and (c) show local polynomial smooths of whether a spouse is from a pre- or post-RoSLA cohort;
graphs (b) and (d) display the proportion of marriages involving equally qualified partners. The dots reflect mean
qualifications difference by each bin on the abscissa. The solid line is the local polynomial smooth with bandwidth
24 and degree 2 using a rectangular kernel and the grid on the abscissa. The dashed lines are 95% confidence
intervals of the local polynomial.
Figure 4.6 considers the characteristics of partners around the discontinuity with re-
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gard to qualifications and age separately. For both genders at the threshold there is an
observable jump in the proportion of spouses from the post-RoSLA regime. For females
there is a slight decreases in assortative matching, conversely for males the proportion of
equally qualified spouses increases somewhat.
To examine the degree of substitution we combine the binary indicator of whether an
individual has a spouse from a pre- or post-RoSLA cohort with the indicators of the relative
qualification. The combination of these indicators yields a choice set of six options for
each spouse at the discontinuity: 1) a match with a pre-RoSLA spouse where the husband
is qualified but the wife is not, 2) a pre-RoSLA spouse where both spouses are equally
qualified, 3) a pre-RoSLA spouse where the wife only has an academic qualification, 4) a
post-RoSLA spouse where only the husband is qualified, 5) a post-RoSLA spouse where the
husband is not qualified and the wife has an academic qualification and 6) a post-RoSLA
spouse who is equally qualified.
Figure 4.7: Match types of married women
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Notes: The graphs show local polynomial smooths of match types with regard to spousal characteristics. The dots
reflect mean age gaps by each bin on the abscissa. The solid line is the local polynomial smooth with bandwidth 24
and degree 2 using a rectangular kernel and the grid on the abscissa. The dashed lines are 95% confidence intervals
of the local polynomial.
Figures 4.7 and 4.8 shows the marriage market matches respectively of women and
men around the RoSLA threshold. For both genders the predominant matchings occur
between spouses with equal qualifications ((b) and (e)), women with older (pre-RoSLA
men) and men with younger (post-RoSLA women).
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As shown in Section 4.4.1 at the discontinuity the proportion of women obtaining an
academic qualification increases, therefore unsurprisingly we observe that the match be-
tween a wife and a pre-RoSLA husband who is more or equally qualified clearly drops at
the discontinuity (Figure 4.7(a) and (b)), however the corresponding increase in matches
between wives and less qualified pre-RoSLA husbands is not large enough to fully compen-
sate the decrease, indicating that adjustment on the qualification dimension alone does not
adequately explain the observed sorting patterns. We see small but significant increases
in the proportion of women matching with younger (post-RoSLA) men with equal or less
qualifications than themselves, which outweigh the smaller decrease in the proportion of
matches involving a more qualified post-RoSLA husband.
Figure 4.8: Match types of married men
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Notes: The graphs show local polynomial smooths of match types with regard to spousal characteristics. The dots
reflect mean age gaps by each bin on the abscissa. The solid line is the local polynomial smooth with bandwidth 24
and degree 2 using a rectangular kernel and the grid on the abscissa. The dashed lines are 95% confidence intervals
of the local polynomial.
The response for men at the discontinuity, Figure 4.8, is similar to that observed for
women. The most pervasive match type is with a post-RoSLA equally qualified spouse
(Figure 4.8(e)), which clearly increases at the threshold. As the proportion of men with
an academic qualification rises at the threshold, this increase is driven by an increase
in matches where both spouses hold an academic qualification. There is also a marked
increase in the proportion of matches involving husbands who are more qualified than
their wives, which is consistent with Fisman, Iyengar, Kamenica, and Simonson (2006),
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who find in a speed-dating experiment that men prefer women with a level intelligence
that does not exceed their own.
Table 4.3: Change in match types around the discontinuity
Women Men
Husband’s qualification
relative to wife’s More Equal Less More Equal Less
Pre-RoSLA Spouse -0.033∗∗∗ -0.053∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004)
N 48657 48657 48657 44466 44466 44466
Post-RoSLA Spouse -0.009 0.033∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗ -0.039∗∗
(0.006) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006) (0.018) (0.018)
N 48657 48657 48657 44466 44466 44466
Notes: The table shows estimates from local parametric estimation of equation (4.1) as described in
Section 4.3.1 using the preferred specification (bandwidth of 24 months and a quadratic polynomial
in the running variable. The dependent variable is the relative qualification level of the spouse, over
columns, estimated separately for pre-and post-RoSLA cohorts, over rows. Standard errors are robust
and allow for random and identical specification errors. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
The analytical results associated with Figures 4.7 and 4.8 are displayed in Table 4.3.
The upper left quadrant characterises the matches of women with older spouses, who are
not subject to the RoSLA and in absence of the reform would constitute the typical partner
for a woman born in academic year 1957. At the discontinuity the proportion of women
holding a qualification increases relative to pre-RoSLA men, and therefore the proportion
of matches where the husband is more or equally qualified decreases mechanically. The es-
timates suggest that 56% (0.048/(0.033+0.053)) choose to retain the positive age gap with
a less qualified husband, whereas 38% (0.033/(0.033+0.053)) sacrifice the age gap in order
to maintain homogamy in education. We also observe that 14% (0.012/(0.033+0.053)) of
women at the threshold retain neither the preferred age nor qualifications match, which
may reflect general equilibrium effects or other unobserved factors which gain importance
if a husband of the preferred age-qualification type is not available. The corresponding
estimates for men are presented in the right hand panel of Table 4.3, where the lower quad-
rant would in absence of the reform represent the typical matches for early reform-treated
men. At the threshold the proportion of men with qualifications increases restoring the
typical gender-qualifications composition and the proportion of matches where the hus-
band is less qualified decreases mechanically. The degree of homogamy increases, as both
potential partners are subject to the increased schooling requirement. Overall the propor-
tion of matches with older women decreases, but for the share of marriages involving a
more qualified husband.
This latter analysis indicates that women care more about the age of their spouse
than his level of qualifications. For men the relative importance seems balanced as the
increase in the preferred match by RoSLA-affected men originate in equal shares from
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substituting matches with older pre-RoSLA women and younger women with higher qual-
ifications. This finding contrasts with Belot and Francesconi (2013) who examine partner
choices in a speed-dating context, finding that women and men put comparable weights
on physical attributes, such as age, and that education of potential partners has only mi-
nor importance in shaping mate selection, albeit given greater worth by males. However
these dissimilarities may be driven by the differences in partner selection in the dating as
opposed to the marriage market.
4.4.5 Robustness
To assess the validity of our argument, that the response is induced by an imbalance in
age-qualification types across cohorts, we examine another feature of the UK educational
system, the Easter Leaving Rule (ELR), which increased the probability of qualifications
within an academic cohort, but not across cohorts. We then verify that our analysis
is unique to the RoSLA threshold rather reflecting typical between cohort effects. We
repeat the analysis with a placebo discontinuity, examining the threshold four years earlier
(1952/1953) where there is no cross-cohort gender imbalance in qualification as both pre-
and post-threshold cohorts were subject to the pre-RoSLA schooling regime. Furthermore,
we apply a difference-in-difference approach in the context of the regression discontinuity
design (RD-DID), using the placebo cohorts to form counterfactual observations.
4.4.5.1 A within-cohort increase in qualifications
Using the exogenous source of variation in qualifications induced by the ELR, which is in-
dependent of variation in the duration of schooling, Anderberg and Zhu (2014), analysing
outcomes of married women, find that the ELR induced an unambiguous increase in the
probability of obtaining an academic qualification; furthermore that women born after the
ELR threshold are more likely to have qualified husbands relative to women born earlier
in the academic year. In order to examine the qualification effect independent of the age
effect for both spouses we examine the outcomes for individuals from post-RoSLA cohorts
(1959-1966) only, such that with the prevailing age gap both partners would be subject
to the RoSLA treatment and therefore there should be no imbalance in age-qualifications
types. Figure 4.9 displays the marital age gap by each spouse’s distance of birth, in
months, to the ELR January-February threshold, normalised to 0. The graph confirms
that the within cohort variation in qualifications induced by the ELR does not result in a
discontinuity in the age gap of spouses around the January-February threshold, thereby
supporting our assertion that qualifications do not exert an impact on the marital age gap
in absence of cross-cohort variation in qualifications.
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Figure 4.9: Placebo test of education reform w/o scarcity of types
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Notes: The graphs show local polynomial smooths of age gaps in months (husband-wife). The running variable is
calendar month of birth. The dots reflect means by each bin on the abscissa. The solid line is the local polynomial
smooth with bandwidth 24 and degree 1 using a rectangular kernel and the grid on the abscissa. The dashed lines
are 95% confidence intervals of the local polynomial.
4.4.5.2 Robustness to inherent between-cohort differences
When using the regression discontinuity design approach the crucial identifying assump-
tion is that individuals in the neighbourhood of the discontinuity are identical in char-
acteristics. At the limit the comparison is between individuals born at the end of one
academic cohort and the beginning of the next, and there may be an inherent degree of
marital sorting across cohort thresholds that occurs in all years. To verify that our results
are unique to the RoSLA threshold we repeat the analysis using a placebo year threshold,
four years prior to the actual reform implementation. Figure 4.10 displays the marital
age and qualifications gap by each spouse’s distance of birth, in months, to the thresh-
old (September 1953). As with the main results presented in Sections 4.4.2 and 4.4.3
the estimates are produced using the optimal bandwidth of 24 months and a quadratic
polynomial of the running variable. The figures indicate no discontinuities in the qualifi-
cations difference between spouses, however there is evidence that the age gap adjusts at
the threshold, although the difference at the threshold is not statistically significant.
In order to account for any inherent between cohort differences at the August-September
threshold in non-reform years we use a difference-in-difference procedure similar to that
proposed by Danzer and Lavy (2013), where the placebo cohorts above are used to form
the counterfactual observations. We estimate the following specification:
Yij = α0 + β0Afterij + β1Rosla
∗Afterij +ψPeriod+ γ0P lj + δ0(Ti ×P lj) + aj + ij (4.2)
where Yij is the outcome of interest for individual i born at a distance of j from the relevant
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Figure 4.10: Placebo Analysis
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Notes: Graphs (a) and (b) show local polynomial smooths of the marital age and qualifications gap by female
month of birth relative to the RoSLA threshold. Graphs (c) and (d) display the analogous plots for males. The
dots reflect mean qualifications difference by each bin on the abscissa. The solid line is the local polynomial smooth
with bandwidth 24 and degree 2 using a rectangular kernel and the grid on the abscissa. The dashed lines are 95%
confidence intervals of the local polynomial.
threshold; After is an indicator variable denoting the individual is born after the relevant
discontinuity; Rosla∗After is a dummy equal to 1 if the observation is after the threshold
in the period around the RoSLA discontinuity. Therefore the RD-estimate is described by
β1. As in the base specification, equation (4.1), γ and δ capture the polynomial smooth
in the running variable, a period dummy is introduced for each window of observations.
Table 4.4 compares the results using the regression discontinuity around the RoSLA
those produced in the difference-in-difference approach. Considering the marital age gap,
the comparison reveals that there are no significant disparities between the estimates
produced by either procedure, whereas with the qualifications gap the effect of the RoSLA
reform is slightly muted but remains significantly different from zero. Table 4.5 applies the
RD-DiD to examine the substitution between marital age and qualifications gaps around
94
4.5. Conclusion 4. Marriage Market Consequences of an Educational Reform
Table 4.4: Difference-in-Difference: Age and Qualifications
Women Men
Age Gap Quals Gap Age Gap Quals Gap
RoSLA RD -2.534∗∗ -0.123∗∗∗ 1.159 0.117∗∗∗
(0.825) (0.019) (0.698) (0.025)
N 48,668 39,775 44,475 38,050
RD-DiD -2.881∗∗∗ -0.100∗∗∗ 0.792 0.084∗∗∗
(0.805) (0.015) (0.504) (0.018)
N 104,966 80,099 95,941 76,936
Notes: The upper panel shows estimates from local parametric estimation of equation
(4.1) as described in Section 4.3.1 around the RoSLA threshold, using the preferred
specification (bandwidth of 24 months and a quadratic polynomial in the running vari-
able). The lower panel displays estimates from the regression discontinuity difference-
in-difference procedure as described by equation 4.2 in Section 4.4.5.2. Standard errors
are robust and allow for random and identical specification errors. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗
p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
the RoSLA threshold. The results are qualitatively similar to those presented in Table
4.3. Overall, the evidence presented in Tables 4.4 and 4.3 indicate that our main results
remain robust after controlling for possible underlying between-cohort effects.
Table 4.5: Change in match types around the discontinuity
Women Men
Husband’s qualification
relative to wife’s More Equal Less More Equal Less
Pre-RoSLA Spouse -0.023∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.004 -0.034∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003)
N 104,966 104,966 104,966 95,941 95,941 95,941
Post-RoSLA Spouse -0.007 0.027∗∗∗ 0.006 0.012∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.018) (0.012)
N 104,966 104,966 104,966 95,941 95,941 95,941
Notes: The table shows estimates from the regression discontinuity difference-in-difference specification,
equation 4.2 in Section 4.4.5.2, using the preferred specification (bandwidth of 24 months and a quadratic
polynomial in the running variable. The dependent variable is the relative qualification level of the
spouse, over columns, estimated separately for pre-and post-RoSLA cohorts, over rows. Standard errors
are robust and allow for random and identical specification errors. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
4.5 Conclusion
In this paper we have examined two pervasive features of the majority of marriages:
husbands are on average older than their wives, and spouses tend to have the same level
of education. We have investigated the impact of an educational reform, the Raising of
School Leaving Age (RoSLA) implemented in England and Wales in September 1972,
which induced a transitory imbalance in the cross-cohort qualifications composition, in
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order to elicit the relative strengths of preferences between age and qualifications.
We find that the reform induced a decrease in the spousal age gap of women who were
induced into obtaining a qualification, the estimated reduction of 2.5 months is substantial
compared to an average age gap of 24.8 months. Furthermore, affected women are not able
to achieve the same degree of positive sorting on qualifications and are forced to accept
atypical matches. In particular, affected women often choose lower qualified husbands with
a preferred age gap and in fewer cases younger husbands from treated cohorts. We find a
corresponding but reversed effect for affected men, who are able to return to the prevailing
sorting patterns as their potential partners in the ideal age are from younger cohorts and
would therefore also be subject to the increased schooling requirement. In contrast, men
born just before the threshold face the transitory imbalance across cohorts. As with
women born after the RoSLA threshold, these men cannot achieve the typical match
characteristics as women in their ideal age range are already treated. In consequence,
men born just before the threshold who have to deviate from the typical match choose in
equal shares women from older cohorts or more qualified women with the preferred age
gap.
Our results have potential implications for analyses that use changes to compulsory
school leaving age legislation to elicit causal effects of education. Any cohort specific re-
form that is beneficial individually receives gender heterogeneity via the marriage market.
Treated women are disadvantaged via the marriage market because of the positive age gap
and their tendency to marry men from not yet affected cohorts. In an RD setting these
women are compared to those just before the threshold who can have the typical match.
Treated men, on the other hand, can achieve the typical match on the marriage market
as their potential younger partners are already treated and they benefit from the reform
at the same time. Compared to men born just before the threshold they are advantaged
both by the reform and via the marriage market. Therefore, any observed gender hetero-
geneity in reform effects may be driven through the marriage channel rather than by the
change in education. Moreover, this is especially important for long-term outcomes that
are more heavily dependent on the household environment rather than on the individual
characteristics alone.
One important caveat to our analysis is that by estimating the effects through a re-
gression discontinuity design, our estimates are applicable only to those individuals in the
neighbourhood of the reform’s implementation. In reality the full impact of the reform
will be smoothed over a number of cohorts. To understand the full dynamic impact on
matching behaviour would entail looking at the reform in a general equilibrium, which is
beyond the scope of this paper, but a promising avenue for future research.
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Chapter 5
Unemployment and Domestic
Violence: Theory and Evidence
5.1 Introduction
During each global recession of the past decades there have been recurrent suggestions
in the media that domestic violence increases with unemployment. In 1993, for example,
the British daily newspaper The Independent cited a senior police officer as saying of the
increase in domestic violence:
“With the problems in the country and unemployment being as high as it is
and the associated financial problems, the pressures within family life are far
greater. That must exacerbate the problems and, sadly, the police service is
now picking up the pieces of that increase.” (Andrew May, Assistant Chief
Constable South Wales, The Independent, 9 March 1993)
In a 2008 interview for The Guardian, the Attorney General for England and Wales
argued that domestic violence will spread as the recession deepens:
“When families go through difficulties, if someone loses their job, or they have
financial problems, it can escalate stress, and lead to alcohol or drug abuse.
Quite often violence can flow from that.” (Baroness Scotland of Asthal, The
Guardian, 20 December 2008)
And in 2012, the executive director of a Washington-based law enforcement think-tank
expressed his concerns about rising domestic violence rates in a USA Today article:
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“You are dealing with households in which people have lost jobs or are in
fear of losing their jobs. That is an added stress that can push people to the
breaking point.” (Chuck Wexler, USA Today, 29 April 2012)
All these accounts are based on the same underlying logic and suggest that high un-
employment may provide the “trigger point” for violent situations in the home. Yet, from
a research perspective, it is far from clear whether unemployment is the overwhelming de-
terminant of domestic violence that many commentators a priori expect it to be.1 Indeed,
a basic intra-household bargaining model would suggest that what really matters is the
gender-profile of unemployment: an increase in male unemployment and/or a decrease in
female unemployment should improve females’ relative bargaining power, thereby reduc-
ing violence against women in much the same way as a decrease in the gender wage gap
(Aizer, 2010).2
However, recent empirical evidence also points to factors such as emotional cues (Card
and Dahl, 2011) and alcohol (Angelucci, 2008) as potential triggers of partner abuse. Such
findings cast doubts on a theory that portrays partner abuse as intentional and rational
acts that occur as part of Pareto efficient bargained outcomes. Nevertheless, even in
settings where abuse is not an intentionally chosen action, as long as potential abusers
have some influence over the likelihood of violent conflicts one would expect the economic
logic of the bargaining power argument to carry over.
To verify this, we first present a novel model of partner abuse with gender-specific
unemployment risk and where marriage allows couples to partially diversify income risk
through consumption sharing. The model, which has parallels to the behavioural frame-
work provided by Card and Dahl (2011), has the innovative feature that a female does not
know her husband’s “type” with regard to his predisposition to violence. For a given cou-
ple, the male partner may or may not have a violent predisposition, and his spouse infers
his true nature from his behaviour. In equilibrium, a male with a violent predisposition
can either reveal or conceal his type. When a male with a violent predisposition faces
a high unemployment risk, he has an incentive to conceal his true nature by mimicking
the behaviour of non-violent men. This follows since his spouse, given his low expected
future earnings, would have a strong incentive to leave him if she were to learn his violent
nature. As a consequence, higher male unemployment is associated with a lower risk of
violence. Conversely, when a female faces a high unemployment risk, her low expected
future earnings would make her less inclined to leave her partner even if she were to learn
1Specifically, we focus on violence against women perpetrated by their partners. While the term “do-
mestic violence” generally also includes violence between other individuals within households, we will refer
to partner violence and domestic violence interchangeably.
2The bargaining model provided by Aizer (2010) can be readily extended to include unemployment risk
to derive this empirical prediction. Such an extension is available in Appendix D.4.
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that he has a violent nature. Anticipating this, a male with a violent predisposition has
weakened incentives to conceal his true nature, thus making higher female unemployment
associated with a higher risk of violence. We therefore argue that, at a general level, a
robust prediction from economic theory is that a high relative male unemployment rate
should strengthen the relative economic position of females and lower partner violence
against them.
Our empirical analysis combines high-quality individual-level data on intimate partner
violence from the British Crime Survey (BCS) with local labour market data at the Police
Force Area (PFA) level from the UK’s Annual Population Survey (APS). Our basic em-
pirical strategy exploits the substantial variation in the change in unemployment across
PFAs, gender, and age-groups associated with the onset of the late-2000s recession. Our
main specification links a woman’s risk of being abused to the unemployment rates for
females and males in her local area and age group. We first use basic probit regressions to
estimate the effects of total and gender-specific unemployment rates on both physical and
non-physical abuse. The structure of our data allows us to control for observable socioeco-
nomic characteristics at the individual level as well as observable economic, institutional
and demographic variables at the PFA level. In addition, we control for unobservable time-
invariant area level characteristics and national trends in the incidence of abuse through
the inclusion of area and time fixed effects. Finally, as our basic regressions suggest that
unemployment matters for the incidence of abuse primarily because of the difference in
unemployment rates by gender within areas and age groups, we instrument for the unem-
ployment gender gap by exploiting differential trends in unemployment by industry and
variation in initial local industry structure.
We find no evidence to support the common perception that domestic violence increases
with the overall unemployment rate. This result parallels findings in previous studies
suggesting near zero effects of total unemployment on domestic violence (Aizer, 2010;
Iyengar, 2009). However, when we model the incidence of domestic violence as a function
of gender-specific unemployment rates, as suggested by economic theory, we find that male
and female unemployment have opposite-signed effects on domestic violence: while female
unemployment increases the risk of domestic abuse, unemployment among males reduces
it. The effects are also quantitatively important: the estimates imply that a 3.7 percentage
point increase in male unemployment, as observed in England and Wales over the sample
period, 2004 to 2011, causes a decline in the incidence of domestic abuse by up to 12%.
Conversely, the 3.0 percentage point increase in female unemployment observed over the
same period causes an increase in the incidence of domestic abuse by up to 10%. Thus,
our results provide strong support for the predictions arising from the theory. We perform
a battery of robustness checks on our data and find that our results are maintained across
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various alternative specifications. We further note that the relationship between gender-
specific unemployment and partner abuse is unique to this type of crime: for the same
group of respondents we do not find the same relationship to the personal experience of
theft and general violence.
The paper contributes to a small but growing literature in economics on domestic
violence. These studies can be divided into three broad categories. The first examines
the relationship between the relative economic status of women and their exposure to
domestic violence. Aizer (2010) specifies and tests a simple model where (some) males
have preferences for violence and partners bargain over the level of abuse and the allocation
of consumption in the household.3 The key prediction of the model is that increasing a
woman’s relative wage increases her bargaining power and monotonically decreases the
level of violence by improving her outside option. Consistent with this prediction, Aizer
(2010) presents robust evidence that decreases in the gender wage gap reduce intimate
partner violence against women.
The second type of study investigates the effects of public policy on domestic violence.
Iyengar (2009) finds that mandatory arrest laws have the perverse effect of increasing inti-
mate partner homicides. She suggests two potential channels for this: decreased reporting
by victims and increased reprisal by abusers. Aizer and Dal Bo´ (2009) find that no-drop
policies, which compel prosecutors to continue with prosecution even if a domestic violence
victim expresses a desire to drop the charges against the abuser, result in an increase in
reporting. Additionally, they find that no-drop policies also result in a decrease in the
number of men murdered by intimates suggesting that some women in violent relation-
ships move away from an extreme type of commitment device, i.e., murdering the abuser,
when a less costly one, i.e., prosecuting the abuser, is offered.
The third type of study focuses more closely on male motives for violence. Card and
Dahl (2011) argue that intimate partner violence represents expressive behaviour that is
triggered by payoff-irrelevant emotional shocks. They test this hypothesis using data on
police reports of family violence on Sundays during the professional football season in the
US. Their result suggests that upset losses by the home team (i.e., losses in games that
the home team was predicted to win) lead to a significant increase in police reports of at-
home male-on-female intimate partner violence. Bloch and Rao (2002) argue that some
males use violence to signal their dissatisfaction with their marriage and to extract more
transfers from the wife’s family. They test their model using data from three villages
in India. Pollak (2004) presents a model in which partners’ behaviour with respect to
domestic violence is transmitted from parents to children.
3Earlier studies that have also employed a household bargaining approach to analyse domestic violence
include Tauchen, Witte and Long (1991) and Farmer and Tiefenthaler (1997).
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The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 5.2 establishes the theo-
retical prediction, linking gender-specific unemployment risks to the incidence of domestic
violence against women. Section 5.3 describes the data that we use. Section 5.4 outlines
the methodology we employ to test the main ideas behind the model and presents the
results. Section 5.5 concludes.
5.2 Theory
The main empirical hypothesis that we will take to the data is that the gender-profile
of unemployment should matter for the incidence of domestic abuse. In order to verify
the generality of this prediction—which follows naturally from a standard intra-household
bargaining model—we present a novel theory of domestic violence in which abuse is not
an intentionally chosen action and where asymmetric information occurs. Indeed, our
model is the first economic theory to examine domestic violence in a setting where wives
do not have perfect information about their husbands’ types. The model is based on
the premise that marriage is a non-market institution that can provide some degree of
insurance against income risk. A key feature of our framework is that a male may or
may not have a violent predisposition and that his female partner infers his type from
his behaviour. In equilibrium, a male with a violent predisposition can either reveal or
conceal his type, and his incentives for doing so depend on each partners’ future earnings
prospects as determined by their idiosyncratic unemployment risks and potential wages.
5.2.1 A Signaling Model with Forward-Looking Males
We consider a dynamic game of incomplete information involving two intimate partners:
a husband (h) and a wife (w). The precise timing of the game is as follows:
1. Nature draws a type for the husband from a set of two possible types θ ∈ {N,V }.
Type V has a violent predisposition, while type N has an aversion towards violence.
The probability that θ = V is denoted φ ∈ (0, 1).
2. The husband learns his type θ and chooses a behavioural effort from a binary set,
 ∈ {0, 1}, which, along with his type, determines the probability that future conflict-
ual interactions with his spouse escalate into violence. The probability of violence
occurring is denoted by κ (θ, ) ∈ [0, 1]. We assume that the behavioural effort
 = 1 reduces the risk of violence and that a husband of type N is less prone to
violence than a husband of type V . Hence κ (θ, 1) < κ (θ, 0) for each θ ∈ {N,V }
and κ (N, ) < κ (V, ) for each  ∈ {0, 1}. Making the effort  = 1 costs the hus-
band ξ (measured in utility units). Effort  = 1 can therefore be interpreted as a
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costly action for the husband that reduces the likelihood of him “losing control” in a
marital conflict situation. For example, he may voluntarily avoid criminogenic risk
factors, such as excessive consumption of alcohol, or he may deliberately reduce his
exposure to emotional cues (Card and Dahl, 2011).
3. The wife observes the husband’s action  (but not his type θ) and updates her
beliefs about his type to φˆ(). Given her updated beliefs, she then decides whether
to remain married or whether to get divorced, a decision we denote by χ = {m, d}.
If the wife decides to terminate the relationship, each partner i suffers a divorce cost
αi > 0 (which may be emotional).
4. Nature decides on employment outcomes. Each partner i (i = h,w) is employed or
unemployed with probabilities 1 − pii and pii, respectively. If employed, partner i
earns income yi = ωi. If unemployed, each individual has an income of yi = b, which
can be interpreted as an unemployment benefit.4 We assume that b < ωi for each
partner i. If still married, each spouse obtains a monetary payoff that depends on
total household income (yi + yj). Formally, the monetary payoff of partner i is
umi = λ
m + v(yi + yj), (5.1)
where λm is a constant and where v(·) is an increasing, strictly concave and contin-
uously differentiable function. If divorced, each partner’s monetary payoff depends
simply on his or her own income,
udi = λ
d + v(yi), (5.2)
where λd is a constant which satisfies λd > λm. Note that our assumptions on
relative payoffs are consistent with a fairly broad class of non-cooperative models of
intra-household public good provision, the equilibria of which feature “local income
pooling” but also inefficiency to due to “free-riding” (Warr, 1983; Bergstrom et al.,
1986; Browning et al., 2010).5
4The benefit income could be gender-specific, but we ignore this for notational simplicity.
5To see this, consider the simplest possible public good game in which the preferences of each individual
i are represented by the utility function ui(xi, G) = ln(xi) + ln(G), where G is the amount of a “household
good”, which is a pure public good to married spouses. Private consumption by individual i is denoted
by xi. A married couple’s total expenditure on the public good is the sum of individual contributions.
These are given by gi, and so xi = yi − gi and G = gh + gw. Each married individual chooses their
contribution to the public good to maximise their utility, taking the contribution of their partner as given.
Thus, individual i chooses gi to maximise ln(yi− gi) + ln(gh + gw). It is straightforward to show that both
spouses will contribute to the household good for income shares satisfying yh/(yh + yw) ∈ (1/3, 2/3). In
this case, x∗i = G
∗ = (yh + yw)/3, i.e., there is “local income pooling” with household demands for all
goods only depending on aggregate household income and not on individual incomes. Thus, the indirect
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5. If still married, the couple encounters a conflict situation (e.g., heated disagree-
ments) which escalates to violence with probability κ(θ, ). The wife suffers additive
disutility δw > 0 if violence occurs. The husband’s disutility from violence is type-
dependent, δN > 0 for a husband of type N and δV = 0 for a husband of type
V .
We solve the model for a pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Throughout,
(′, ′′) denotes that a husband of type V chooses ′ and a husband of type N chooses ′′.
Similarly, (χ′, χ′′) indicates that the wife plays χ′ following  = 0 and χ′′ following  = 1.
5.2.2 Equilibrium
The wife rationally chooses whether or not to continue the marriage. Her expected payoff
from getting divorced is given by:
D(piw) = E[u
d
w|piw]− αw, (5.3)
where
E[udw|piw] = λd + (1− piw)v(ωw) + piwv(b). (5.4)
The expected value to the wife of remaining married depends not only on the wife’s
own unemployment risk, but also on the husband’s unemployment probability and the
perceived risk of domestic violence. Formally, the wife’s expected payoff from remaining
married is given by:
M(pih, piw, , φˆ()) = E[u
m
w |(pih, piw)]− δw
[
(1− φˆ())κ(N, ) + φˆ()κ(V, )
]
, (5.5)
where
E[umw |(pih, piw)] =λm + (1− pih)(1− piw)v(ωw + ωh)) + pihpiwv(2b)
+ pih(1− piw)v(ωw + b) + piw(1− pih)v(b+ ωh).
(5.6)
Note that the wife’s expected utility from remaining married is decreasing in her perceived
probability that the husband has a violent predisposition, φˆ(). The wife continues the
partnership if and only if her expected value of remaining married exceeds the expected
utility function of individual i can be written as umi (x
∗
i , G
∗) = λm + v(yh + yw), where λm = −2 ln(3)
and v(·) = 2 ln(·). A divorced individual chooses gi to maximise ln(yi − gi) + ln(gi), and so the indirect
utility function of a divorced individual can be written as udi (x
∗
i , g
∗
i ) = λ
d + v(yi), where λ
d = −2 ln(2)
and v(·) = 2 ln(·). Notice that this simple example implies our assumption that λd > λm, which follows
from the fact that married spouses “crowd out” each other’s contributions to the public good, i.e., that
their contributions are strategic substitutes.
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value of getting divorced. The key assumptions of the model are as follows (for expositional
convenience, we suppress the arguments of the functions):
A 1. M < D when piw = 0, pih = 1,  = 0 and φˆ = 1.
A 2. M > D when piw = 1, pih = 0,  = 0 and φˆ = 1.
A 3. For any (pih, piw) ∈ [0, 1]2 and  ∈ {0, 1}, M > D when φˆ = φ.
The first two assumptions imply that the wife’s tolerance of violence depends on her
earnings prospects. To be more precise, suppose the wife observes the husband choosing
 = 0. Assumption A1 (“not-take-it-if-employed”) then says that if the wife will be
employed with certainty and the husband will be unemployed with certainty, and she knows
that the husband has a violent predisposition, then she will choose to divorce the husband.
This may be interpreted as implying that economically independent women leave their
abusive partners. On the other hand, assumption A2 (“accept-it-if-unemployed”) implies
that if the wife will be unemployed with certainty and the husband will be employed with
certainty, and she knows that he has a violent predisposition, then she will not leave him.
This captures the idea that women who are economically dependent on their abusers may
be unable to leave them. Finally, assumption A3 (“stay-if-no-new-info”) says that if the
wife retains her prior beliefs, then she will continue the relationship irrespective of their
unemployment probabilities and the husband’s action. It is therefore consistent with wife
accepting to be in a partnership with the husband in the first place.
In addition, we make the following two-part assumption:
A 4. (i) [κ(N, 0)− κ(N, 1)]δN > ξ, and (ii) αh > κ(N, 0)δN .
Part (i) implies that a husband with an aversion towards violence values the reduction
in violence associated with making the effort  = 1 more than its cost. Part (ii) is a
sufficient condition to ensure that continued marriage is preferable to divorce for each
type of husband θ ∈ {N,V } at any effort level  ∈ {0, 1}. Thus, the husband has no
incentive to choose his behavioural effort in a way that triggers a divorce.
Next we define pˆiw (pih) as the unemployment probability for the wife at which she,
conditional on having observed the husband choosing  = 0 and knowing that the hus-
band has a violent predisposition, is indifferent between continued marriage and divorce.
Formally, pˆiw(pih) is implicitly defined through:
M(pih, pˆiw(pih), 0, 1) = D(pˆiw(pih)). (5.7)
Equation (5.7) may fail to have a solution in the unit interval. However, the following
lemma tells us that it will do so for some values of pih.
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Lemma 1. There exist two values, pi′h and pi
′′
h, satisfying 0 ≤ pi′h < pi′′h ≤ 1 such that
(5.7) has a solution pˆiw(pih) ∈ [0, 1] for every pih ∈ [pi′h, pi
′′
h]. Moreover, pˆiw(pih) is differen-
tiable at any pih ∈ (pi′h, pi
′′
h) with ∂pˆiw(pih)/∂pih > 0. In addition, ∂pˆiw (pih) /∂ωw > 0 and
∂pˆiw (pih) /∂ωh < 0.
Proof. See Appendix D.1
Figure 5.1 illustrates a case where pi′ > 0 and pi′′h < 1. The locus pˆiw(pih) partitions the
set of possible unemployment risk profiles, (pih, piw) ∈ [0, 1]2, into two non-empty subsets
or “regimes”:
R0 ≡
{
(pih, piw) |pih ≥ pi′′h
} ∪ {(pih, piw) |piw 6 pˆiw (pih)} , (5.8)
R1 ≡
{
(pih, piw) |pih < pi′h
} ∪ {(pih, piw) |piw > pˆiw (pih)} . (5.9)
An increase in the husband’s wage ωh expands regime R1 by shifting the locus pˆiw(pih)
downwards. In contrast, an increase in the wife’s wage ωw expands regime R0 by shifting
the locus upwards.
The following proposition shows that the nature of the game’s equilibrium depends on
which regime the couple’s unemployment risk profile (pih, piw) falls within. Since signaling
games are prone to equilibrium multiplicity, we focus on pure strategy equilibria that
satisfy the commonly used Cho-Kreps “intuitive criterion” (Cho and Kreps, 1987).
Proposition 1. In each regime there is a unique pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium
that satisfies the “intuitive criterion”
(a) If (pih, piw) ∈ R0, then
[(′, ′′) = (1, 1), (χ′, χ′′) = (d,m), φˆ(0) = 1, φˆ(1) = φ]
is a “pooling” equilibrium.
(b) If (pih, piw) ∈ R1, then
[(′, ′′) = (0, 1), (χ′, χ′′) = (m,m), φˆ(0) = 1, φˆ(1) = 0]
is a “separating” equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix D.1
To see that this describes a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, consider each regime in
turn, starting with R0. Here a pooling equilibrium occurs where both types of husbands
make the costly effort that reduces the risk of violence. A husband without a violent
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Figure 5.1: Critical locus pˆiw(pih) separating regime R1 and regime R0
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predisposition makes the effort since he values the reduction in the risk of violence that
it generates more than the cost. A husband with a violent predisposition on the contrary
makes the effort in order not to reveal his type as doing so would trigger a divorce. Central
to the equilibrium are the wife’s out-of-equilibrium beliefs and associated action: upon
observing  = 0, the wife would conclude that the husband has a violent predisposition
and would choose divorce.
Consider then regime R1. In this case the husband knows that the wife is economically
vulnerable and would not leave him even if she were to believe that he has a violent
predisposition. A husband with a violent predisposition therefore has no incentives to
make the costly effort that would reduce the risk of violence. A husband without a violent
predisposition again values the reduction in the risk of violence more than the cost of
making the effort. The wife’s belief updating follows Bayes’ rule and her continuing of
the partnership with either type of husband is rational given her relatively weak earnings
prospects.
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5.2.3 Empirical Prediction
The above results form the basis of our empirical predictions: men with a violent predis-
position may strategically mimic the behaviour of non-violent men, thus concealing their
type, when facing relatively weak earnings prospects (Regime R0) in the form of relatively
high unemployment risk and relatively low wages. In contrast, when men face relatively
strong earnings prospects (Regime R1) they will be less inclined to conceal any violent
predisposition they may have. Noting that the difference in the equilibrium probability of
violence between Regime R1 and R0 is φ [κ (V, 0)− κ (V, 1)] > 0 we arrive at the following
central empirical prediction:
Prediction 1.
• A higher risk of male unemployment and lower wages for men are associated with a
lower risk of domestic violence.
• A higher risk of female unemployment and lower wages for women are associated
with a higher risk of domestic violence.
Thus, we will build our empirical approach on the theoretical prediction that a woman’s
risk of being abused depends on gender-specific unemployment risks. In particular, in the
empirical analysis we relate a woman’s risk of experiencing domestic abuse to the local
unemployment rates for males and females in her own age group.6
5.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
5.3.1 Domestic Abuse Data from the British Crime Survey
We use data on the incidence of domestic abuse from the British Crime Survey (BCS).
The BCS is a nationally representative repeated cross-sectional survey of people aged 16
and over, living in England and Wales, which asks the respondents about their attitudes
towards and experiences of crime. The BCS employs two different methods of data col-
lection with respect to domestic abuse. The first method, available from the survey’s
inception in 1981, is based on face-to-face interviews. However, the unwillingness of re-
spondents to reveal instances of abuse to interviewers implies that this method significantly
underestimates the true extent of domestic violence. To overcome such non-disclosure, a
6On a related note, Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001) find a negative association between female
unemployment and state level rape rates which they suggest may be attributable to an increased number
of encounters with potential perpetrators if an individual is working away from home. Rape perpetrated
by a non-partner is, however, by definition not an outcome decided within a relationship, and therefore is
not applicable to our theoretical framework.
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Table 5.1: Demographic Characteristics of the BCS Sample
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Age 38.93 11.67 Qual: Degree or above 0.236 0.425
Ethnicity: White 0.928 0.258 Qual: High Ed < Degree 0.137 0.344
Ethnicity: Asian 0.028 0.165 Qual: A level 0.150 0.357
Ethnicity: Black 0.023 0.150 Qual: GCSE grades A-C 0.237 0.426
Ethnicity: Other 0.021 0.143 Qual: Other 0.096 0.295
Religion: None 0.216 0.412 Qual: None 0.143 0.350
Religion: Christian 0.740 0.439 Single 0.355 0.479
Religion: Muslim 0.017 0.128 Married 0.455 0.498
Religion: Hindu 0.009 0.092 Separated 0.046 0.209
Religion: Sikh 0.004 0.060 Divorced 0.125 0.331
Religion: Jewish 0.003 0.057 Widowed 0.019 0.136
Religion: Buddhist 0.005 0.069 Cohabiting 0.120 0.325
Religion: Other 0.008 0.087 Long-standing illness 0.179 0.383
Number of children 0.493 0.896 Poor health 0.031 0.174
Children below 5 years 0.110 0.313
Obs. 86,898
self-completion module on interpersonal violence (IPV), which the respondents complete
in private by answering questions on a laptop, was introduced.7 We use BCS data for the
survey years 2004/05 to 2010/11, covering interviews conducted between April 2004 and
March 2011, and base our analysis on data on domestic violence from the self-completion
IPV module.8
The BCS data has several key strengths as a source of data on domestic abuse. The
IPV module in particular is unique in an international context, insofar that through self-
completion the respondent does not need to provide answers directly to an interviewer.
Furthermore, to reassure the respondent of privacy, the BCS randomly selects only one
person per household who is exposed to the survey only once, implying that other house-
hold members including any partner will not know what questions the respondent has
faced. In contrast the corresponding US survey, the National Crime Victimization Survey,
administers the same set of questions to all household members every six months over a
three year period, implying that the content of the questionnaire is common knowledge
within the household.
Over our sample period, only 11 percent of those who report, in the IPV module,
having been subjected to physical abuse by a partner also report being exposed to intra-
7The IPV module was first introduced in 1996. In 2001 it was used for a second time and the use of
laptops was introduced. Since the 2004/05 survey the IPV module has been included on an annual basis,
with a comparable set of questions.
8In the 2010-11 BCS survey, half of the sample were, in a trial, asked the same abuse questions, but in
a simplified sequential format. For consistency we include in our sample only those respondents who were
asked the abuse questions in the format consistent with the previous years’ surveys.
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Table 5.2: Categories of Domestic Abuse
behaviour Physical Non-Physical
Abuse Abuse
Prevented from fair share of household money x
Stopped from seeing friends and relatives x
Repeatedly belittled you x
Frightened you, by threatening to hurt you x
Pushed you, held you down or slapped you x
Kicked, bit, or hit you x
Choked or tried to strangle you x
Threatened you with a weapon x
Threatened to kill you x
Used a weapon against you x
Used other force against you x
household abuse in the general interviewer-based part of the BCS survey. Similarly, only
48 and 50 percent report having mentioned the abuse to a medical staff and to the police
respectively. Hence compared to alternative data from interviewer-based surveys, or data
derived from police reports or hospital episodes statistics, the BCS IPV data is likely to
provide substantially more comprehensive data on the incidence of domestic abuse. Fur-
thermore, while police reports and hospital episode data can be used to measure incidence
of (severe) domestic violence, such data generally cannot distinguish between multiple vic-
tims versus multiple events for the same victim. Finally, using micro-level data, obviously,
allows us to control for individual level characteristics.
The BCS IPV module is answered by respondents aged 16 to 59, and we focus our anal-
ysis on intimate partner violence experienced by women.9 Table 5.1 presents descriptive
statistics of our sample.
In the IPV module respondents are presented with a list of behaviours that constitute
domestic abuse and are asked to indicate which, if any, they have experienced in the 12
months prior to the interview. Table 5.2 presents this list of behaviours from which we,
following the Home Office classification, construct two binary indicators of abuse. The
first, physical abuse, is a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent had any
type of physical force used against them by a current or former intimate partner. The
second, non-physical abuse, indicates whether the respondent was threatened, exposed to
controlling behaviours or deprived of the means needed for independence by a current or
former partner.
In our sample, 3.0% of women report episodes of physical abuse in the past 12 months
9While the IPV module is also completed by male respondents, abuse against men is less common,
generally less violent, and with no apparent connection to labour market conditions.
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Figure 5.2: Incidence of Physical Abuse by Demographic Characteristics
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and 4.4% declare having experienced non-physical abuse.10 Figure 5.2 illustrates the
extent to which the incidence of physical abuse in particular varies with the demographic
characteristics of the respondents. In general, exposure to physical abuse declines with age
and with academic qualifications acquired after compulsory education. It varies relatively
little with religion and ethnicity, but increases with the number of children.11 With respect
to marital status, it should be noted that this refers to the respondent’s formal status at
the time of the interview, which is hence observed after the 12 month period to which
the abuse questions refer. The high reported rate of abuse among separated and divorce
women therefore suggests a “reverse causality”. The high rate of incidence among singles
also emphasises the fact that “intimate partners” include current and past boyfriends.12
Due to the highly endogenous nature of the respondent’s current marital status we do
not make use of this information except as a final sensitivity check on our estimates.13
Figure 5.3 shows the trends in physical and non-physical abuse which, if anything, suggests
10The fraction of women reporting at least one of the two types of abuse was 5.7%.
11The relationship between physical violence and ethnicity is somewhat unexpected given the data from
the US where blacks are typically found to have a higher incidence (Aizer, 2010).
12For respondents who are not currently married we also use a cohabitation dummy to indicate that
the respondent is currently living with a partner. The incidence of abuse among currently cohabiting
respondents is about double that of currently married respondents.
13The same applies to any information we have on the individual’s current employment status. Hence
we make no use of such information.
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Figure 5.3: Trends in Domestic Abuse in England and Wales
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that the overall level of abuse is lower towards the end of our sample period than at the
beginning. A corresponding decline has been observed over the same period in the most
extreme form of violence against women: the rate of female homicide where the prime
suspect is an intimate partner decreased by 6.3 percent between 2003-07 and 2007-11
(Smith et al., 2012).
5.3.2 Labour Market Data from the Annual Population Survey
We merge our individual-level data from the BCS with labour market data from the Annual
Population Survey (APS). The APS combines the UK Labour Force Survey (LFS) with
the English, Welsh and Scottish LFS boosts. Datasets are released quarterly, with each
dataset containing 12 months of data. This means that we can, for each respondent in
the BCS, using the known interview date, match the 12 month period to which the IPV
questions refer to a closely corresponding 12 month period of labour market data.14 Each
respondent is matched to local labour market conditions corresponding to the Police Force
Area (PFA) of residence, of which there are 42 in our data.15
14For instance, any respondent interviewed in the first three months of 2005 is matched to the labour
market data for the calendar year 2004, whereas a BCS respondent interviewed between April and June
in 2005 is matched to labour market data for the period April 2004 to March 2005 etc.
15There are 43 PFAs in England and Wales. However, the City of London PFA is a small police force
which covers the “Square Mile” of the City of London. As this is a small area enclosed in the many times
larger Metropolitan PFA we merge the two. This leaves us with 42 PFAs. They are Avon and Somerset,
Bedfordshire, Cambridgeshire, Cheshire, Cleveland, Cumbria, Derbyshire, Devon and Cornwall, Dorset,
Durham, Essex, Gloucestershire, Greater Manchester, Hampshire, Hertfordshire, Humberside, Kent, Lan-
cashire, Leicestershire, Lincolnshire, City of London and Metropolitan Police District, Merseyside, Nor-
folk, Northamptonshire, Northumbria, North Yorkshire, Nottinghamshire, South Yorkshire, Staffordshire,
Suffolk, Surrey, Sussex, Thames Valley, Warwickshire, West Mercia, West Midlands, West Yorkshire, Wilt-
shire, Dyfed-Powys, Gwent, North Wales and South Wales. The APS data is available in a finer geography,
and is hence aggregated up to the PFA level.
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Table 5.3: Summary Statistics for Local Unemployment Rates
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total unemployment 0.060 0.020 0.022 0.129
Unemployment by gender
Male 0.064 0.023 0.022 0.149
Female 0.054 0.018 0.014 0.103
Unemployment by age group
aged 16-24 0.150 0.045 0.029 0.283
aged 25-34 0.055 0.021 0.009 0.136
aged 35-49 0.039 0.016 0.010 0.104
aged 50-64 0.035 0.014 0.004 0.086
Notes: The table provides averages over the time-interval January 2003-December 2010 based
on data from the APS which is provided in overlapping 12 month periods: January-December,
April-March, July-June, October-September. Reported standard deviations and minimum
and maximum values are over 1,218 PFA-period observations.
Our theory developed in the previous section stresses the role of male and female
unemployment risk for the incidence of domestic violence. In the empirical analysis we
will relate the incidence of domestic violence to the observed unemployment rates for the
respondent’s female and male peers, as defined by age group and geographical area. Hence
we effectively interpret the observed unemployment rate not only as a measure of the direct
incidence of unemployment, but also more broadly as an indicator for the perceived risk of
unemployment. This interpretation is supported by the literature that documents workers’
subjective unemployment expectations and relates it to the current level of unemployment.
For instance for the US, Schmidt (1999) shows how workers’ average beliefs about the
likelihood of job loss in the next 12 months closely tracked the unemployment rate over
the period 1977-96. The limited data that is available on unemployment expectations in
the UK equally supports the notion that individual expectations of future unemployment
risk are positively associated with the current unemployment rate. The British Social
Attitudes (BSA) survey has, in selected years, asked respondents: (i) how “secure” they
feel in their jobs, and (ii) whether they expect to see a change in the number of employees
in their workplace. Both variables saw changes with the onset of the latest recession. In
2005, 78 percent of respondents reported feeling secure in their jobs; in 2009-2010, this
figure had dropped to 73 percent. Similarly, while 16 percent of respondents reported
expecting a reduction in the number of employees in the workplace in 2006-2007, this
number had increased to 26 percent in 2009-2010.16
Table 5.3 presents basic descriptive statistics for local unemployment rates, broken
16Using data from the Skills Surveys, Campbell et al. (2007) document a similar fall in the average
individual expectations of job loss between 1997 and 2001, a period of declining unemployment.
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Figure 5.4: Gender-Specific Unemployment Rates and the Female-Male Unemployment
Gap by Age Group in England and Wales, 2003 to 2011
−
.
07
−
.
06
−
.
05
−
.
04
−
.
03
.
1
.
15
.
2
.
25
2003 2005 2007 2009 2011
Aged 16−24
−
.
02
−
.
01
5−
.
01
−
.
00
5
0
.
00
5
.
04
.
05
.
06
.
07
.
08
.
09
2003 2005 2007 2009 2011
Aged 25−34
−
.
01
−
.
00
5
0
.
00
5
.
03
.
04
.
05
.
06
2003 2005 2007 2009 2011
Aged 35−49
−
.
02
5−
.
02
−
.
01
5−
.
01
−
.
00
5
.
02
.
03
.
04
.
05
.
06
2003 2005 2007 2009 2011
Aged 50−64
Females Males F−M gap
down by gender and age group.17 Figure 5.4 shows that the increase in the rate of un-
employment (left-hand scale) associated with the latest recession was far from uniform
across gender and age groups. In particular, the impact of the recession is reflected more
strongly in male than in female unemployment. As a consequence, we observe a widening
of the female-male unemployment gap (right-hand scale) in the latter part of the sample
period. In addition to local unemployment, we also use the APS to construct measures of
mean hourly real wages.
Figure 5.5 contrasts the change over the sample period from 2004/05 to 2010/11 in
the incidence of physical abuse with corresponding changes in male and female unemploy-
ment rates across the 42 PFAs. The figure highlights substantial spatial variation in the
change in unemployment over the sample period. Moreover, the local changes in female
unemployment are not obviously correlated with the corresponding local changes in male
unemployment.18 Inspection of the figure further suggests that several PFAs in which men
were relatively more affected by unemployment increases (e.g., the North-East) saw rela-
tive decreases in the incidence of physical abuse. Indeed, if anything, the figure suggests a
more positive association between relative increases in female unemployment and relative
increases in abuse.
17The age grouping used in our analysis follows that conventionally used by the Office for National
Statistics.
18Indeed, relevant to our identification strategy, less than forty percent of the variation in the gender
unemployment gap is explained by area, period, and age group effects. This figure increases to just under
fifty percent when age-group-period and age-group-area fixed effects are introduced.
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Figure 5.5: Change in Female and Male Unemployment, in the Female-Male Unemploy-
ment Gap, and in Incidence of Physical Abuse across Police Force Areas in England and
Wales, 2004 to 2011
(a) Female unemployment (b) Male unemployment
(c) Unemployment gap (F-M) (d) Physical abuse
5.4 Empirical Specification and Results
5.4.1 Baseline Specification
This section presents our main analysis where we relate a female respondent’s experience
of domestic violence to the local level of unemployment. We focus in particular on the
rates of female and male unemployment within the respondent’s own age-group as these
are likely to be the most relevant for the respondent’s own unemployment risk as well
as that of her (potential) partners. As the APS data is released quarterly, with each
dataset containing 12 months of data, we define a “period” variable, denoted t, where a
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given period contains the particular APS release and BCS data from the following three
months. Constructed in this way, our data stretches over 28 periods.19
As the outcome variables in our analysis are binary indicators of abuse, we estimate
probit models. In particular, the basic model for the latent propensity for abuse against
individual i in PFA j in period t and within age group g is given by
y∗ijtg = βXijtg + γ
fUNEMPLfjtg + γ
mUNEMPLmjtg + λt + αj + εijtg (5.10)
where Xijtg includes demographic controls at the individual level, UNEMPL
f
jtg and
UNEMPLmjtg are the female and male unemployment rate in i’s own age-group in police-
force area j during period t, and εijtg is a normally distributed random term.
20 The
parameters λt and αj are fixed effects for time-periods and police force areas respectively,
and thus control for the aggregate trend in the outcome variable and for factors affecting
abuse that vary across areas but are fixed over time. Thus, our basic model identifies
the impact of gender-specific unemployment on domestic abuse from variation in trends
across PFAs.
5.4.2 Baseline Results
Our basic results for the probability of being a victim of physical abuse are provided in
Table 5.4.21 Specification (1) gives the average marginal effect of the total unemployment
rate within the own age group on the incidence of physical abuse. The estimated model
includes a set of individual-level demographic controls: age measured in years and dummy
variables indicating ethnicity, qualification level, and religious denomination, along with
number of children and a dummy for the presence of at least one child under the age of
five in the household. It further includes area- and time fixed-effects. The marginal effect
is small and insignificant.22 This result parallels findings in previous studies (Aizer, 2010;
Iyengar, 2009) suggesting near zero effects of total unemployment on domestic violence.
Specification (2) reports the estimated average marginal effect of each gender-specific
unemployment rate within the own age group. The marginal effect of female unemploy-
ment in the own age group is positive and statistically significant. The magnitude of the
coefficient suggests that a 1 percentage point increase in the own-age female unemploy-
ment rate causes an increase in the likelihood of the respondent being a victim of physical
abuse by 0.097 percentage points or little over 3% of the sample mean. We also see that
19See footnote 14 for further details.
20In Section 4.3 we further include area-level controls.
21Estimates from linear probability models are very similar.
22A (non-reported) regression on aggregate unemployment - across genders and age groups - is also not
significant, but also has less precision due to low local variation from the national trend.
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Table 5.4: Impact of Unemployment on Physical Abuse - Main Specification
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Unemployment -0.026 0.008
in own-age group (0.018) (0.019)
Female unemployment 0.097** 0.093** 0.102** 0.094** 0.083** 0.102** 0.091**
in own-age group (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.029) (0.028) (0.035)
Male unemployment -0.090** -0.097** -0.081** -0.089** -0.094** -0.067* -0.084*
in own-age group (0.021) (0.022) (0.027) (0.021) (0.029) (0.029) (0.037)
Female unemployment -0.013
in other age groups (0.065)
Male unemployment -0.047
in other age groups (0.055)
Female real wage 0.005
in own-age group (0.009)
Male real wage -0.001
in own-age group (0.006)
Female-Male UE 0.094**
gap in own age group (0.022)
Area and time fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Linear age-in-years control yes yes yes yes yes no no no yes
Age group fixed effects no no no no no yes yes yes no
Age group * Period FEs no no no no no no yes yes no
Age group * Areas FEs no no no no no no no yes no
Other demographic controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Area-specific linear trends no no no no yes no no no no
Obs. 86,731
Notes: Standard errors clustered on police force area and age group in parentheses. “Other demographic controls”
include dummies for ethnicity category, qualification level and religious denomination, number of children, and a
dummy to indicate the presence of at least one child under the age of five in the household. ** Significant at 1%.
* Significant at 5%.
the estimated average marginal effect of male unemployment is negative and statistically
significant. The magnitude of the coefficient indicates that a 1 percentage point increase
in male unemployment in the respondent’s own age group causes a decline in the risk of
physical abuse by 0.090 percentage points – again about 3% of the sample mean.
Controls for female and male unemployment within age groups other than the own are
added in specification (3). We find that male and female unemployment within the own age
group still have opposite-signed effects on the risk of physical abuse while unemployment
in age groups other than the own appears to have little impact. Our theory suggests
that potential wages of men and women might also matter for the incidence of abuse.
Therefore, we add measures of local female and male mean hourly real wage rates within
the own age group in specification (4). Controlling for wage-effects in this way leaves the
marginal effects for male and female unemployment largely unchanged. The estimated
wage effects are small and insignificant.23 Specification (5) shows that our estimates are
23In fact, the coefficient have the “wrong” signs. In order to look further into this we obtained alternative
measures of local wages from the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) which is based on a one
per cent sample of individuals from National Insurance records. Using this alternative data source, the
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robust to the introduction of area-specific linear time trends.
Specifications (1) - (5) use the respondent’s age-in-years as a control variable. This
has the advantage of allowing us to use the exact information on the respondent’s age. In
contrast, our labour market variables are measured at the age group level. The next three
specifications verify that our results are robust to alternate age controls. In specification
(6), we replace the age-in-years variable with dummy variables indicating the respondent’s
age group, thus allowing for age group fixed effects along with the area and period fixed
effects. In specification (7), we interact the age group dummies with the period dummies,
thus allowing each age group to have a separate non-linear trend. In specification (8), we
further interact the age group dummies with the area dummies, thus allowing each PFA to
be associated with a separate fixed effect for each age group. Specification (8) is particu-
larly restrictive as the fixed effects net out any changes in the unemployment rates across
age groups over time as well as differences between age groups across areas. However,
the point estimates remain of a similar magnitude to those in our preferred specification
(2), although they lose some precision. This indicates that across all specifications our
identification is primarily driven by age-area-time differences in unemployment rates.
An evident feature of the results in Table 5.4 is that the estimated effects of female
and male unemployment are of very similar absolute magnitude, but of opposite sign.
This suggests that what matters for the incidence of abuse is not the overall level of
unemployment but rather the unemployment gender gap. Hence, in specification (9), we
report the estimated marginal effect of the linear difference between the female and male
unemployment rates within the own age group and of the total unemployment rate in
the own age group. The estimated effect of the unemployment gender gap is noticeably
strong whereas the estimated effect of the overall unemployment rate is not statistically
significant. Specification (9) will also serve as the benchmark regression for our IV analysis
below where we will also focus on the gender unemployment gap.24
Table 5.5 presents corresponding results for non-physical abuse. The estimated marginal
effects for this alternative outcome variable are strikingly similar to those for physical
abuse.
Table 5.6 breaks the estimated effect of the gender unemployment gap down by popula-
coefficient on wages have the expected sign, but remain statistically insignificant.
24As for our non-reported demographic control variables two factors stand out. Women with academic
qualifications at A-level or above are less at risk of abuse. In contrast, there is a strong and significant
positive correlation between the number of children and the incidence of abuse. To the extent that children
reduce their mother’s earnings capacity, this result is in line with our theoretical prediction. More generally,
in our model any increase in the gains from marriage over divorce for the wife – obtaining from children
or any other source – will be exploited by an abusive husband and make violence more likely. However,
it is also possible that children are a cause of extra stress within a partnership, and that this provides a
trigger for more violence. Appendix D.3 presents expanded versions of Tables 5.4 and 5.5 which include
the coefficients on the demographic control variables.
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Table 5.5: Impact of Unemployment on Non-Physical Abuse - Main Specification
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Unemployment -0.012 0.021
in own-age group (0.023) (0.024)
Female unemployment 0.102** 0.108** 0.110** 0.104** 0.078* 0.093* 0.087
in own-age group (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037) (0.040) (0.042) (0.048)
Male unemployment -0.081** -0.074* -0.061 -0.085** -0.090* -0.066 -0.077
in own-age group (0.030) (0.032) (0.037) (0.031) (0.039) (0.039) (0.048)
Female unemployment 0.031
in other age groups (0.080)
Male unemployment 0.035
in other age groups (0.068)
Female real wage -0.002
in own-age group (0.010)
Male real wage 0.008
in own-age group (0.007)
Female-Male UE 0.093**
gap in own age group (0.032)
Area and time fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Linear age-in-years control yes yes yes yes yes no no no yes
Age group fixed effects no no no no no yes yes yes no
Age group * Period FEs no no no no no no yes yes no
Age group * Areas FEs no no no no no no no yes no
Other demographic controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Area-specific linear trends no no no no yes no no no no
Obs. 86,731
Notes: See notes to Table 5.4
tion subgroup in three dimensions. The top panel shows that the relationship is apparent
for all bar the eldest age group. That nothing is found in the oldest age group is not
entirely surprising given the low incidence of domestic violence reported in this age group.
The lower left panel in Table 5.6 splits the respondents into those with “high” educa-
tional attainment (A-level or above) versus those with “low” attainment (GCSE level or
below).25 One may argue that individuals’ with lower qualifications are more at risk of
unemployment and that, as a consequence, they may be more affected by gender unem-
ployment gap in terms of the incidence of abuse.26 While the point estimate is higher for
low qualified women, the difference in the estimated effects is not statistically significant.
One may similarly argue that female unemployment is less relevant when the labour
force participation (LFP) rate is relatively low. To consider this, we calculate the average
female LFP over the sample period for each PFA-age group cell and partition the cells
into those with above versus below median female LFP rate. Estimates by subgroup are
reported in the lower right panel of Table 5.6. Again, while not statistically significantly
25The “high” qualifications are effectively those that require undertaking post-compulsory education.
26However, noting that the earnings drop associated with unemployment tends to be larger among
individuals with higher qualifications, the effect could in principle go in the either direction.
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Table 5.6: Impact of Unemployment Gender Gap on Abuse by Population Subgroup
Age Group
16-24 25-34 35-49 50-59
0.082** 0.122** 0.128* -0.047
(0.030) (0.044) (0.063) (0.096)
Own Qualification Female LFP in Cell
“Low” “High” “Low” “High”
0.114* 0.089** 0.075** 0.137**
(0.053) (0.024) (0.025) (0.045)
Obs. 86,731
Notes: The table reports average marginal effects from three probit
estimations of the impact of the unemployment gender gap on physical
abuse, with the same set of controls as in specification (2) in Table 4.
** Significant at 1%. * Significant at 5%.
different, the point estimates suggest that the effect of the gender unemployment gap on
the incidence abuse is, if anything, stronger when the female LFP is higher.
The observed relationship between the gender-profile of unemployment and intimate
partner violence can be expected to be particular to this outcome and not hold for general
victim experience of crime. To verify this we replace our main outcome variables with
other reported crime outcomes. The BCS respondents are asked whether, over the past
12 months, they have experienced theft from their person or been a victim of a violent
assault.27 The results of this analysis are displayed in Table 5.7. For both theft and
violence we find, in line with the literature (Raphael and Winter-Ebmer, 2001; O¨ster and
Agell, 2008), that the probability of reporting having been a victim of crime increases
with total unemployment. Moreover, unlike domestic abuse where there can be expected
to be a direct power relationship between the perpetrator and the victim, these outcomes
if anything increase with both the male and the female rate of unemployment.
To summarise, consistent with the literature, we find no evidence to support the view
that total unemployment increases domestic abuse. Instead, our results suggest that
27In both outcomes the victim is present at the time of the crime, so gender is readily identifiable. In
the case of theft, as this crime is mainly an opportunist event, the gender of either victim or perpetrator
should however play only a minor role. Considering violence, one might expect that in cases of affray the
victim and assailant often share the same gender. The exact questions answered by the respondents were:
“Was anything you were carrying stolen out of your hands or from your pockets or from a bag or case?”
and “Has anyone, including people you know well, deliberately hit you with their fists or with a weapon of
any sort or kicked you or used force or violence in any other way?”.
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Table 5.7: Impact of Unemployment on Experience of Crime
Specification Theft from Theft from Violence against Violence against
Person Person Person Person
Total unemployment 0.099** 0.035*
in own-age group (0.017) (0.015)
Female unemployment 0.042 0.039
in own-age group (0.028) (0.028)
Male unemployment 0.056** 0.004
in own-age group (0.020) (0.021)
Area and time fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Linear age-in-years control yes yes yes yes
Other demographic controls yes yes yes yes
Observations 86,725 86,725 86,726 86,726
Notes: See notes to Table 4.
male and female unemployment have distinct impacts on the incidence of domestic abuse:
increases in male unemployment are associated with declines in domestic abuse while
increases in female unemployment have the opposite effect. These findings are consistent
with economic theory. The magnitude of the estimated relationships imply (a) that a
3.7 percentage point increase in male unemployment, as observed in England and Wales
between 2004 and 2011, causes a decline in the incidence of domestic abuse of between
10.1% and 12.1%, and (b) that the 3.0 percentage point increase in female unemployment
over the sample period causes an increase in the incidence of domestic abuse of between
9.1% and 10.3%.
5.4.3 Extended Results: Area Level Controls
Our estimates in the previous section would be biased if there were omitted variables
that are correlated with local unemployment and that affect the incidence of domestic
abuse. For example, a positive effect of unemployment on crime in general may trigger a
response by the criminal justice system, such as increased police efforts or higher incar-
ceration rates. If the response by the criminal justice system reduces domestic abuse by
increasing deterrence, omitting controls related to the general level of criminal activity and
the judiciary biases the estimated effect of unemployment on domestic abuse. Similarly,
assuming that the consumption of alcohol and drugs is correlated with unemployment and
also affects domestic abuse, omitting these factors from the regression again biases the es-
timates.28 Additionally, selective migration might confound our estimates. For example,
employment-driven migration of low-skilled men from areas with high local unemployment
28The association between business cycles and alcohol consumption is not clear cut. For instance, Dee
(2001) notes that average drinking is generally pro-cyclical, but finds that binge-drinking is counter-cyclical.
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Table 5.8
Impact of Unemployment on Physical Abuse and Non-Physical Abuse - Additional
Controls
Specification (2) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
(a) Physical Abuse
Female unemployment 0.097** 0.096** 0.102** 0.087** 0.097** 0.107** 0.092**
in own-age group (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.026)
Male unemployment -0.090** -0.088** -0.107** -0.086** -0.089** -0.069** -0.109**
in own-age group (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.025) (0.021) (0.026) (0.021)
(b) Non-Physical Abuse
Female unemployment 0.102** 0.101** 0.105** 0.091* 0.104** 0.109** 0.092*
in own-age group (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.037) (0.039) (0.037)
Male unemployment -0.081** -0.080** -0.090** -0.077* -0.083** -0.073* -0.104**
in own-age group (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.034) (0.031) (0.037) (0.030)
Local area crime-related controls no yes no no no no no
Local area drugs and alcohol no no yes no no no no
Local area qualifications distribution no no no yes no no no
Selective migration no no no no yes no no
Unemployment in neighbouring areas no no no no no yes no
Health and marital status no no no no no no yes
Observations 86,731 86,731 80,011 86,731 86,731 86,731 86,674
Notes: Standard errors clustered on police force area and age group in parentheses. All specifications include area
and time fixed effects, linear age-in-years control and other demographic controls (see notes to Table 4). Local
area crime related-controls include police force manpower per 10,000 capita, violent and non-violent crimes per
10,000 capita, and average time from charge to magistrate court appearance. Local area drugs and alcohol includes
the number of arrests for drugs possession per 10,000 capita and the number of alcohol-related hospitalisations
per 10,000 capita. Selective migration includes the number of in- and out-migrants as a percentage of the PFA
population in the respondent’s own-age and gender group. For a detailed description of controls used in this section,
see Appendix D.2. ** Significant at 1%. * Significant at 5%.
to areas with low local unemployment creates a downward bias (due to “compositional
effects”) if low-skilled males have a higher propensity to abuse their partners than high-
skilled males. To mitigate such omitted-variables bias, we now control extensively for
observable institutional and demographic covariates at the police-force area-level.
The results for physical abuse are shown in panel (a) of Table 5.8. Specification (2)
repeats our basic specification from Table 5.4 for convenience. In specification (10), we
add a set of controls that capture the general level of criminal activity and the potential
response by the criminal justice system to it. In particular, we include per capita measures
of violent and non-violent crimes. We include per capita measures of police force manpower
and a proxy for the “efficiency” of the criminal justice system: the average time from charge
to magistrate court appearance. Overall, the inclusion of these crime-related controls
leaves our key estimates unchanged. This suggests that variation in overall crime rates and
policing and criminal justice efforts do not confound our estimated effects of unemployment
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on domestic abuse.
Specification (11) includes a measure of the hospitalisation rate for alcohol-related
conditions as well as a per capita measure of drugs possession.29 Adjusting for the cyclical
consumption of criminogenic commodities in this way does not alter our main finding that
male and female unemployment have opposite-signed effects on the incidence of physical
abuse. In specification (12), we account for the possibility of skill-selective migration by
including the qualification distribution in the respondent’s own-age group. Specification
(13) controls directly for area-level migration by including the number of in- and out-
migrants as a percentage of the PFA population in the respondent’s own-age group. In
each case, the estimated marginal effects of gender-specific unemployment remain largely
unaffected.
The two remaining specifications provide additional robustness checks. Specification
(14) shows that our results are robust to the introduction of controls for the average
own-age group female and male unemployment rates in neighbouring police-force areas.
Specification (15) shows that our main findings remain intact also when we include con-
trols that capture a respondent’s marital and health status (measured at the time of the
interview and hence after the period to which the abuse information pertains).
Panel (b) of Table 5.8 provides the corresponding extended results for non-physical
abuse. Again, the general conclusion is that the estimated effects of unemployment by
gender are robust to the inclusion of further controls. The results presented in this section
thus suggest that our initial finding that female unemployment increases domestic abuse
while male unemployment reduces it is robust to including a wide variety of observable
institutional and demographic covariates at the PFA level.
5.4.4 Instrumental Variables Estimation
The analysis so far has treated the local unemployment variables as exogenous regressors.
Concerns about potential omitted variables motivated our use of additional regressors in
Section 5.4.3. However, this may not have entirely solved the potential issue of omitted
variables and would not address any potential problem of simultaneity. Solving these
problems requires constructing measures of local labour market conditions that do not
reflect characteristics of female and male workers, which could be affected by violence
itself, or unobservables that might be correlated with violence. Hence as a final robustness
check, we also consider an instrumental variables approach. Building on the work of Bartik
(1991) and Blanchard and Katz (1992), we interact the initial local industry composition
of employment with the corresponding national industry-specific trends in unemployment.
29Information on hospitalisation rates for alcohol-related conditions in particular is only available for
England. This accounts for the drop in the number of observations in this particular specification.
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Specifically, we use APS data on local PFA industry composition by gender and age
group at baseline, defined as the calendar year 2003, which we combine with APS data
on industry unemployment rates by gender and age group at the national level over the
sample period.30 For each PFA, gender, age-group and time period we construct an
industry-predicted unemployment rate as follows,
̂UNEMPL
h
jtg =
∑
k
ψhjgkUNEMPL
h
ktg, (5.11)
where ψhjgk is the share of industry k among employed individuals of gender h and age
group g in PFA j at baseline, and where UNEMPLhktg is the unemployment rate, at the
national level, in industry k among individuals of gender h and age group g in time period
t. Hence (5.11) is a weighted average of the national industry-specific unemployment rates
where the weights reflect the baseline local industry composition in the relevant gender
and age group. The weights are thus fixed over time and do not reflect local sorting into
industries over the sample period.
Our approach draws on recent work by Albanesi and Sahin (2013) who, using US
data, show how the gender gap in unemployment tends to vary over the business cycle.
In particular, they find that unemployment rises more for men than for women during
recessions, and also decreases more for men in subsequent recoveries. The authors also
explore the role played by gender differences in industry structure. Specifically with re-
spect to the recession in the late 2000s, Albanesi and Sahin show how gender differences in
industry composition explain around half of the difference in the observed unemployment
growth. Based on this observation, and on our previous finding that unemployment ap-
pears to matter for the incidence of domestic abuse only in the form of the unemployment
gender gap, our IV analysis will be focused on estimating models where the incidence of
domestic violence is related to the female-male unemployment gender gap. We instru-
ment for the actual gender gap using the corresponding industry-predicted gender gap in
unemployment.
Table 5.9 presents the results for two different specifications, each estimated as basic
probit and as IV probit model. Specification (1) in Table 5.9 includes the same controls
as in specification (2) in Table 5.4. Hence the difference is that here we include the
30Eight industries are used in the analysis based on a condensed version of the UK Standard Industrial
Classification of Economic Activities, SIC(2007):“Agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining, energy and water
supply”, “Manufacturing”, “Construction”, “Wholesale, retail & repair of motor vehicles, accommodation
and food services”, “Transport and storage, Information and communication”, “Financial and insurance
activities, Real estate activities, Professional, scientific & technical activities, Administrative & support
services”, “Public admin and defence, social security, education, human health & social work activities”,
“Other services”. The “industry unemployment rate” is defined as the unemployed by industry of last job
as percentage of economically active by industry.
123
5.4. Empirical Specification and Results 5. Unemployment and Domestic Violence: Theory and Evidence
Table 5.9: Impact of Unemployment on Physical Abuse - Instrumental Variables Estima-
tion
Specification (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b)
Probit IV Probit Probit IV Probit
(a) Gender Unemployment Gap in Own Age Group
Predicted unemployment gender 1.733** 1.723**
gap in own age group (0.106) (0.102)
(b) Physical Abuse
Gender unemployment gap 0.090** 0.104* 0.089** 0.105*
in own age group (0.021) (0.049) (0.021) (0.049)
(c) Non-Physical Abuse
Gender Unemployment gap 0.081** 0.083 0.084** 0.081
in own age group (0.031) (0.062) (0.031) (0.063)
Area and time fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Linear age-in-years control yes yes yes yes
Other demographic controls yes yes yes yes
Area-specific linear time trends no no yes yes
Observations 86,731
Notes: See notes to Table 4.
unemployment rates in the own age group in the form of the gender gap rather than as
levels. Specification (2) in Table 5.9 includes the same controls as in specification (5) in
Table 5.4. The probit estimated average marginal effects of the gender unemployment gap
on physical and non-physical abuse reported in columns (1a) and (2a) are naturally in line
with the corresponding estimates in Tables 5.4 and 5.5.
Turning to the IV probit estimates, panel (a) of Table 5.9 confirms that our instru-
ment is indeed a strong and relevant predictor of the gender unemployment gap in the
own age group. More precisely, the estimates show that the actual variation in gender
unemployment gap trends across PFAs and age groups is strongly positively related to the
corresponding variation in the unemployment gap trends predicted using local variation
in industry structure at baseline.
The IV probit estimated average marginal effects of the gender unemployment gap on
the incidence of domestic abuse are reported in columns (1b) and (2b). For physical abuse
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we find that, for both specifications, the IV estimated marginal effects are slightly larger
than, but not statistically significantly different from, the corresponding probit estimated
effects. Each estimated marginal effect is also statistically significant. For non-physical
abuse, the IV probit estimated average marginal effects of the gender unemployment gap
are also very similar to the basic probit estimated effects. However, due to lower precision,
they are not statistically significant. Overall, we view our IV estimates as evidence that
our basic probit estimates do not exaggerate the impact of unemployment on domestic
abuse.
5.5 Concluding Comments
This paper has examined the effect of unemployment in England and Wales on partner
abuse against women. The geographical variation in unemployment in these countries in-
duced by the Great Recession provides an interesting context in which to look at domestic
abuse. Our empirical approach was motivated by a theoretical model in which partnership
provides insurance against unemployment risk through the pooling of resources. The key
theoretical result is that an increased risk of male unemployment lowers the incidence
of intimate partner violence, while an increased risk of female unemployment leads to a
higher rate of domestic abuse. We have demonstrated that this prediction accords well
with evidence from the British Crime Survey matched to geographically disaggregated
labour market data. In particular, our empirical results suggest that a 1 percentage point
increase in the male unemployment rate causes a decline in the incidence of physical
abuse against women of around 3 percent, while a corresponding increase in the female
unemployment rate has the opposite effect. Moreover, our results also rationalise findings
in previous studies of near zero effects of the overall rate of unemployment on domestic
violence.
Overall, our theoretical model and empirical results contrast the conventional wisdom
that male unemployment in particular is a key determinant of domestic violence. Quite
the contrary, latent abusive males who are in fear of losing their jobs or who have lost their
jobs may rationally abstain from abusive behaviours, as they have an economic incentive to
avoid divorce and the associated loss of spousal insurance. However, when women are at a
high risk of unemployment, their economic dependency on their spouses may prevent them
from leaving their partners. This in turn might prompt male partners with a predisposition
for violence to reveal their abusive tendencies. Thus, high female unemployment leads to
an elevated risk of intimate partner violence. From a policy perspective, it is therefore
conceivable that policies designed to enhance women’s employment security could prove
an important contributor to domestic violence reduction.
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Figure A.1: Sharp RDD for all outcome variables
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Notes: The graphs display local-linear polynomial smooths, as described in Section 2.4.1, using a bandwidth of 48
months and a rectangular kernel, for the probability of becoming a mother at age 15 - age 19 (graphs a - e) and by
age 16 - by age 20 (graphs f - j). The horizontal axis measures the distance, in months, of individuals’ births to the
RoSLA cutoff. The scatterplot indicates the proportions of mothers in each month-bin. The dashed lines are 95%
confidence intervals of the local polynomial.
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Figure A.2: Cross-Validation functions
.
00
28
73
.
00
28
73
5
.
00
28
74
.
00
28
74
5
.
00
28
75
.
00
28
75
5
Cr
os
s−
va
lid
at
io
n 
fu
nc
tio
n
10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Bandwidth
(a) Mother at age 15
.
01
28
5
.
01
28
52
.
01
28
54
.
01
28
56
.
01
28
58
Cr
os
s−
va
lid
at
io
n 
fu
nc
tio
n
10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Bandwidth
(b) Mother at age 16
.
03
07
2
.
03
07
25
.
03
07
3
.
03
07
35
Cr
os
s−
va
lid
at
io
n 
fu
nc
tio
n
10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Bandwidth
(c) Mother at age 17
.
04
23
8
.
04
23
85
.
04
23
9
.
04
23
95
.
04
24
.
04
24
05
Cr
os
s−
va
lid
at
io
n 
fu
nc
tio
n
10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Bandwidth
(d) Mother at age 18
.
04
89
15
.
04
89
2
.
04
89
25
.
04
89
3
.
04
89
35
.
04
89
4
Cr
os
s−
va
lid
at
io
n 
fu
nc
tio
n
10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Bandwidth
(e) Mother at age 19
.
00
59
34
.
00
59
36
.
00
59
38
.
00
59
4
.
00
59
42
Cr
os
s−
va
lid
at
io
n 
fu
nc
tio
n
10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Bandwidth
(f) Mother by age 16
.
01
86
25
.
01
86
3
.
01
86
35
.
01
86
4
.
01
86
45
Cr
os
s−
va
lid
at
io
n 
fu
nc
tio
n
10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Bandwidth
(g) Mother by age 17
.
04
81
3
.
04
81
4
.
04
81
5
.
04
81
6
.
04
81
7
Cr
os
s−
va
lid
at
io
n 
fu
nc
tio
n
10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Bandwidth
(h) Mother by age 18
.
08
59
4
.
08
59
5
.
08
59
6
.
08
59
7
.
08
59
8
Cr
os
s−
va
lid
at
io
n 
fu
nc
tio
n
10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Bandwidth
(i) Mother by age 19
.
12
49
4
.
12
49
5
.
12
49
6
.
12
49
7
.
12
49
8
Cr
os
s−
va
lid
at
io
n 
fu
nc
tio
n
10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Bandwidth
(j) Mother by age 20
Notes: The graphs display the cross-validation function for each of the outcome variables over the range of band-
widths following the procedure described in Section 2.4.3. The optimal bandwidth is defined as the value of the
bandwidth, h, that minimizes the cross-validation function, CVY (h), which is computed as the mean square differ-
ence of the predicted value to the true value of Y
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Figure A.3: Sensitivity of Estimates to bandwidth choice
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Notes: The graphs display the magnitude of the estimates, along with the 95% confidence interval, over different
bandwidths based on the parametric regression discontinuity design as described in Section 2.4.2.
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Table B.1: EMA Income Thresholds
Year Median Lower % relative Higher % relative
Income Threshold to median Threshold to median
1999/00 15400 13000 84 30000 195
2000/01 16100 13000 81 30000 186
2001/02 17100 13000 76 30000 175
2002/03 17800 13000 73 30000 169
2003/04 18200 13000 71 30000 165
2004/05 18900 19630 104 30000 159
2005/06 19400 20270 104 30000 155
2006/07 20400 20817 102 30810 151
2007/08 21200 20817 98 30810 145
2008/09 21000 20817 99 30810 147
2009/10 22200 20817 94 30810 139
2010/11 22500 20817 93 30810 137
Table B.2: Pilot period - participation in post-compulsory education
Year 1 Participation Year 2 Participation Year 1&2 Participation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: All Areas
EMA 3.860*** 3.731*** 3.648*** 2.973*** 2.558*** 2.510*** 3.664*** 2.945*** 2.848***
(0.486) (0.436) (0.446) (0.397) (0.385) (0.390) (0.355) (0.343) (0.341)
N 988 986 986 992 990 990 989 987 987
Panel B: Evaluation Areas
EMA 3.361*** 3.943*** 3.516*** 2.716*** 1.835** 0.857 1.422* 1.320* 0.431
(1.243) (1.035) (0.990) (0.931) (0.866) (0.874) (0.821) (0.772) (0.703)
N 156 156 156 156 156 156 156 156 156
Area controls no yes yes no yes yes no yes yes
Region trends no no yes no no yes no no yes
Notes: The table reports estimation of equation (3.5) as described in Section 3.4.2.1 during the pilot period of the
EMA (Sept 1999 - Aug 2004). Panel A includes all non-pilot local authorities as the control group and are therefore
comparable to the analysis of Chowdry et al. (2008), whereas Panel B is restricted to only those areas used in
the final quantitative evaluation of the EMA pilots, and may be compared with the estimates of Middleton et al.
(2005) (See footnote 3 for details of the treated and control areas). All specifications include area fixed effects
and a quadratic aggregate year trend, and are weighted according to area population size. The vector of area
controls includes the gender ratio, gender specific unemployment rates and real hourly wage, as well as area-level
UK nationality and ethnic population proportions. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.1,
** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Figure B.1: EMA Timeline
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Figure B.2: Fertility Measures - 2007/08
(a) Conceptions (b) Abortions
(c) Maternities
Notes: The maps display underage fertility rates for the academic year 2007/08. Conception rates is calculated
as the number of conceptions to individuals under age 18 divided by the the area female 15-17 population. Map
b) indicates the percentage of underage conceptions terminated; c) shows the underage maternity rate, defined by
births to individuals who conceived before age 18.
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Figure B.3: Crime Measures - 2007/08
(a) 10-17 (b) Adults
Notes: The maps display the proportion of individuals in each area who are first time entrants to the Criminal
Justice System in academic year 2007/08.
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C.1 Figures and Tables
Figure C.1: Marriage Age
Notes: The graph displays singulate mean ages at marriage for men and
women which are obtained from marital statuses by age for each of 218
countries where such data exists. Source: UN
Figure C.2: Marital age gap (husband-wife) by academic cohort
(a) Wives–Census (b) Husbands–Census
Notes: The graphs show local polynomial smooths of marital age gaps in months (husband-wife). The dots reflect
mean age gaps by each bin on the abscissa. The solid line is the local polynomial smooth with the bandwidth
and degree as shown using a rectangular kernel and the grid on the abscissa. The dashed lines are 95% confidence
intervals of the local polynomial. The permission of the Office for National Statistics to use the Longitudinal
Study is gratefully acknowledged, as is the help provided by staff of the Centre for Longitudinal Study Information,
in particular Chris Marshall, Rachel Stuchbury and Wei Xun, as well as User Support (CeLSIUS). CeLSIUS is
supported by the ESRC Census of Population Programme (Award Ref: RES-348-25-0004). The authors alone
are responsible for the interpretation of the data. Census output is Crown copyright and is reproduced with the
permission of the Controller of HMSO and the Queen’s Printer for Scotland. Source: Census.
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Table C.1: RoSLA on own academic qualification by month of birth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Married Women
Optimal Bandwidth (24) 0.121∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.020) (0.015) (0.016) (0.020) (0.015)
N 40,264 40,264 40,264 40,264 40,264 40,264
G-statistic (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AIC 51,247 51,248 51,200 51,221 51,222 51,174
1/2 x Optimal B. (12) 0.089∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.015) (0.017) (0.013) (0.015) (0.017)
N 20,119 20,119 20,119 20,119 20,119 20,119
G-statistic (p-value) 0.004 0.086 0.277 0.002 0.044 0.165
AIC 25,689 25,679 25,675 25,675 25,665 25,661
2 x Optimal B. (48) 0.133∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.018) (0.017) (0.013) (0.018) (0.017)
N 79,397 79,397 79,397 79,397 79,397 79,397
G-statistic (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AIC 100,418 100,414 100,400 100,309 100,305 100,290
Married Men
Optimal Bandwidth (24) 0.111∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.020) (0.025) (0.013) (0.020) (0.025)
N 38,383 38,383 38,383 38,383 38,383 38,383
G-statistic (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AIC 51,625 51,628 51,622 51,590 51,593 51,587
1/2 x Optimal B. (12) 0.086∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.020) (0.016) (0.019) (0.020) (0.016)
N 19,391 19,391 19,391 19,391 19,391 19,391
G-statistic (p-value) 0.002 0.072 0.723 0.001 0.036 0.586
AIC 26,217 26,205 26,194 26,203 26,191 26,180
2 x Optimal B. (48) 0.111∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.014) (0.017) (0.011) (0.014) (0.017)
N 74,843 74,843 74,843 74,843 74,843 74,843
G-statistic (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AIC 100,029 100,021 100,020 99,929 99,922 99,921
Polyn. degree 1 2 3 1 2 3
Basic controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table shows estimates from local parametric estimation of equation (4.1) as described in
Section 4.3.1 using different bandwidths, over rows, and polynomial degrees 1 to 3 over columns. The
dependent variable is the spousal age gap measured in months (male-female). The bandwidth reflects
the number of values of the running variable (month of birth) on each side of the discontinuity. Standard
errors are robust and allow for random and identical specification errors. Below the estimates the p-value
of the Lee and Card (2008) G-statistic and the Akaike Information Criterion indicate goodness of the
polynomial fit. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table C.2: Change in marital qualifications gap at RoSLA threshold
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Married Women
Optimal Bandwidth (24) -0.117∗∗∗ -0.123∗∗∗ -0.065∗ -0.117∗∗∗ -0.123∗∗∗ -0.065∗
(0.016) (0.019) (0.027) (0.016) (0.019) (0.027)
N 39,764 39,764 39,764 39,764 39,764 39,764
p G 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
AIC 63,544 63,547 63,522 63,530 63,534 63,509
1/2 x Optimal B. (12) -0.100∗∗∗ -0.056 -0.141∗∗∗ -0.100∗∗∗ -0.057 -0.142∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.031) (0.019) (0.017) (0.031) (0.018)
N 19,885 19,885 19,885 19,885 19,885 19,885
p G 0.000 0.006 0.183 0.000 0.002 0.115
AIC 31,787 31,779 31,767 31,783 31,776 31,764
2 x Optimal B. (48) -0.122∗∗∗ -0.123∗∗∗ -0.110∗∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗ -0.123∗∗∗ -0.110∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.017) (0.017) (0.012) (0.017) (0.017)
N 78,318 78,318 78,318 78,318 78,318 78,318
p G 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AIC 124,159 124,162 124,161 124,159 124,161 124,160
Married Men
Optimal Bandwidth (24) 0.108∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.090∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.090∗
(0.016) (0.025) (0.036) (0.016) (0.025) (0.036)
N 38,041 38,041 38,041 38,041 38,041 38,041
p G 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AIC 59,364 59,368 59,357 59,364 59,367 59,356
1/2 x Optimal B. (12) 0.094∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.030) (0.034) (0.023) (0.030) (0.034)
N 19,217 19,217 19,217 19,217 19,217 19,217
p G 0.007 0.043 0.155 0.003 0.021 0.085
AIC 30,158 30,153 30,149 30,157 30,151 30,148
2 x Optimal B. (48) 0.095∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.017) (0.022) (0.012) (0.017) (0.022)
N 74,150 74,150 74,150 74,150 74,150 74,150
p G 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AIC 115,507 115,500 115,500 115,510 115,504 115,504
Polyn. degree 1 2 3 1 2 3
Basic controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table shows estimates from local parametric estimation of equation (4.1) as described in
Section 4.3.1 using different bandwidths, over rows, and polynomial degrees 1 to 3 over columns. The
dependent variable is the spousal age gap measured in months (male-female). The bandwidth reflects
the number of values of the running variable (month of birth) on each side of the discontinuity. Standard
errors are robust and allow for random and identical specification errors. Below the estimates the p-value
of the Lee and Card (2008) G-statistic and the Akaike Information Criterion indicate goodness of the
polynomial fit. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table C.3: Sensitivity to upper age limit
No upper limit Upper age=50 Upper age=45 Upper age=40
Polynomial order (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Married Women
Optimal Bandwidth (24) -3.059∗∗∗ -2.534∗∗ -5.835∗∗∗ -3.054∗∗∗ -2.537∗∗ -5.836∗∗∗ -3.223∗∗∗ -2.791∗∗ -6.280∗∗∗ -3.821∗∗∗ -3.530∗∗ -7.446∗∗∗
(0.696) (0.825) (1.326) (0.695) (0.825) (1.326) (0.763) (0.876) (1.404) (0.833) (1.141) (1.359)
N 48668 48668 48668 48657 48657 48657 44525 44525 44525 37420 37420 37420
G-statistic (p-value) 0.022 0.016 0.088 0.022 0.016 0.089 0.006 0.004 0.029 0.016 0.010 0.084
1/2 x Optimal B. (12) -4.595∗∗∗ -3.898∗∗ -0.674 -4.595∗∗∗ -3.898∗∗ -0.674 -4.889∗∗∗ -4.417∗∗ -0.347 -5.448∗∗∗ -5.934∗∗∗ -2.667
(0.790) (1.057) (1.264) (0.790) (1.057) (1.264) (0.865) (1.226) (1.626) (1.033) (1.256) (1.997)
N 24273 24273 24273 24273 24273 24273 22237 22237 22237 18686 18686 18686
G-statistic (p-value) 0.493 0.451 0.619 0.493 0.451 0.619 0.250 0.231 0.449 0.341 0.266 0.329
2 x Optimal B. (48) -2.434∗∗∗ -2.972∗∗∗ -3.289∗∗∗ -2.410∗∗∗ -2.989∗∗∗ -3.238∗∗∗ -2.504∗∗∗ -2.964∗∗∗ -3.663∗∗∗ -2.876∗∗∗ -3.590∗∗∗ -4.404∗∗∗
(0.542) (0.702) (0.760) (0.548) (0.711) (0.775) (0.599) (0.793) (0.867) (0.623) (0.876) (1.045)
N 97424 97424 97424 96657 96657 96657 89047 89047 89047 74957 74957 74957
G-statistic (p-value) 0.025 0.023 0.020 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.004
Married Men
Optimal Bandwidth (24) 1.171 1.159 2.040∗ 1.170 1.160 2.040∗ 1.310∗ 1.206 2.186∗ 1.178 1.163 1.593
(0.594) (0.698) (0.856) (0.594) (0.697) (0.855) (0.649) (0.719) (0.949) (0.779) (0.924) (1.205)
N 44475 44475 44475 44466 44466 44466 40497 40497 40497 33452 33452 33452
G-statistic (p-value) 0.823 0.871 0.850 0.823 0.871 0.850 0.507 0.663 0.626 0.138 0.293 0.267
1/2 x Optimal B. (12) 2.087∗∗ 1.066 -1.302 2.087∗∗ 1.066 -1.302 2.068∗∗ 1.164 -0.773 1.829∗ 0.572 -1.566
(0.691) (0.817) (1.158) (0.691) (0.817) (1.158) (0.646) (0.775) (0.885) (0.863) (1.018) (1.082)
N 22373 22373 22373 22373 22373 22373 20393 20393 20393 16886 16886 16886
G-statistic (p-value) 0.814 0.826 0.872 0.814 0.826 0.872 0.861 0.919 0.947 0.581 0.736 0.804
2 x Optimal B. (48) 1.703∗∗∗ 1.116 1.430∗ 1.668∗∗∗ 1.083 1.485∗ 1.926∗∗∗ 1.109 1.518∗ 2.014∗∗ 0.951 1.542
(0.444) (0.647) (0.706) (0.443) (0.646) (0.712) (0.469) (0.670) (0.715) (0.597) (0.843) (0.978)
N 87928 87928 87928 87187 87187 87187 79870 79870 79870 65894 65894 65894
G-statistic (p-value) 0.475 0.448 0.475 0.456 0.430 0.449 0.225 0.223 0.275 0.010 0.012 0.023
Notes: The table shows estimates from local parametric estimation of equation (4.1) as described in Section 4.3.1
using different bandwidths, over rows, polynomial degrees 1 to 3 over columns. The dependent variable is the
spousal age gap measured in months (male-female). The tables compare samples constructed using differing upper
age limits as indicated. The bandwidth reflects the number of values of the running variable (month of birth) on
each side of the discontinuity. Standard errors are robust and allow for random and identical specification errors.
Below the estimates the p-value of the Lee and Card (2008) G-statistic indicate goodness of the polynomial fit.
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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C.2 Technical Annex
C.2.1 The Regression Discontinuity Design
Eligibility for the increased compulsory school-leaving age was determined by a single
date, whether an individual was born prior to or after 1st September 1957. Therefore the
RoSLA reform can be thought of as a natural experiment inducing exogenous variation
in the length of education received by an individual. As this variation was determined
solely by a discontinuous function of an observed covariate, the individual’s birth date, the
estimation proceeds through a regression discontinuity design (RDD), an approach which
allows the identification of causal treatment effects in quasi-experimental settings. The
RDD approach is based on the idea that individuals are deterministically assigned to a
treatment based on whether the value of an observed covariate, the running variable, Zi,
falls on either side of a threshold value Zi = z
∗ such that a discontinuity in the assignment
function is induced precisely at this threshold value. The intuition is that individuals in
the neighborhood of this threshold are identical in all other characteristics, apart from
whether or not they are assigned to the treatment. Therefore by comparing individuals
‘close’ to the discontinuity from either side of the threshold, a causal effect of the treatment
can be identified. As there is local randomisation additional covariates are not necessary,
but may improve precision of the estimates (Lee and Lemieux, 2010).
C.2.2 Non-parametric Estimation
The estimate of interest is αRDD = [(Y1 − Y0)|Z = z∗], the difference between the pop-
ulation means of individuals subject to the reform, Y1, and individuals born prior to the
reform implementation threshold, Y0 evaluated at the threshold Z = z
∗. With a continu-
ously distributed running variable αRDD is estimated by taking the difference in the limits
of expected values in the outcome variable either side of the threshold so that
αˆRDD = lim
e→0
E[Y1|X = x∗]− E[Y0|X = x∗ − e] ≈ E[Y1 − Y0|X = x∗] (A1)
with non-parametric methods appropriate (Hahn et al., 2001) to be used in the estimation
.
Visual depictions of the RDD analyses are produced via kernel-weighted local poly-
nomial smoothing of the outcome variable either side of the RoSLA threshold. Although
Fan and Gijbels (1996) advocate the use of triangular kernels due to their superior bound-
ary properties, the estimation is not practically affected by kernel choice, and therefore
a rectangular kernel is used as this has become the de facto standard in the literature
(Imbens and Lemieux, 2008).
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C.2.3 Parametric Estimation
Although the underlying distribution of the running variable (timing of birth) in the
analysis is continuous, the Labour Force Survey contains only discrete measures of birth
dates - month and year of birth. Therefore it is only possible to observe E[Y1|X = x∗],
the outcome of an individual precisely at the threshold who is subject to the higher
compulsory school-leaving age, and E[Y0|X = x∗ − e], the outcome of individuals born
before the threshold date. Furthermore, as the Z is discretely measured e is also discrete
and hence takes on a finite number of values in Z = zj with (j = 1, ..., J). Thus the closest
realisation in the data below the threshold is E[Y0|Z = z∗ − e] = E[Y0|Z = z∗ − 1], as it
is not possible to allow lime→0 as in (A1). Instead, in order to project the limit points in
order to predict E[Y0|Z = z∗ − 0] a parametric approach is required, and the estimation
follows the methodology proposed by Lee and Card (2008) as described in Section C.2.1.
Key choices affecting the validity of the estimates are the degree of the polynomial function
applied and the size of the window width of observations around the discontinuity.
C.2.3.1 Polynomial Choice
In RDDs the magnitude of the estimates can be sensitive to the choice of polynomial
in the running variable applied. Although a certain degree of smoothing minimises the
influence of outliers and seasonality, an inappropriate order of polynomial in the empirical
model may prove a poor approximation to the underlying data generating process. Infor-
mation criteria such as the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information
Criterion (BIC) are often used in the literature to determine the optimal polynomial fit.
Lee and Card (2008) propose a simple test statistic for choosing the best approximation of
the data generating process, based on the closeness of the estimated polynomial function
to the true distribution of the running variable Z. With a discrete running variable there
is a natural comparison based on the smallest possible local polynomial, which captures
the means calculated at each value of zj . An auxiliary regression using a dummy for each
value of zj , which perfectly resembles means at each zj is used to estimate this ‘best’ pos-
sible fit, which can then be compared to the fit of the polynomial applied in the estimation
using the Lee and Card (2008) G-statistic:
G ≡ (RSSR −RSSUR)/(J − K)
RSSUR/(N − J)
where RSSR is the residual sum of squares for the estimated model, and RSSUR the
residual sum of squares for the unrestricted model (the auxiliary regression). Assuming
normality, G follows an F(J−K,N−J) distribution, with K the number of parameters esti-
mated in the restricted model, N the number of observations and J the total number of
139
C. Appendix to Chapter 4
individual values in the support of Z. The null hypothesis is that there is no systematic
difference in the residual sum of squares in the restricted and unrestricted estimations,
in other words that the order of polynomial used provides a good approximation of the
underlying data generating process.
C.2.3.2 Window Width
A fundamental issue in RDD estimation is the size of the window of observations to use in
the analysis. Theoretically the RD logic only needs a very small window of observations,
as the treatment effect is produced through a comparison of the expectations just before
and just after the discontinuity. However the smaller the window, the fewer the number
of data points used in the estimation, which may lead to inefficient, although unbiased
estimates. Increasing the window size increases the number of observations used in the
analysis, thereby increasing the efficiency of the estimate. However too large a window may
indicate that there is a discontinuity even if the data is in actuality smoothly distributed
around the threshold. Therefore when choosing the appropriate window of observations an
inherent trade-off arises between the bias and the efficiency of the estimate. Window width
choice is thus equivalent to bandwidth choice in a non-parametric RDD with local linear
regressions, and the parametric regressions therefore resemble local linear regressions of
equal bandwidth around the threshold value.
C.2.3.3 Cross-Validation
Figure C.3: Cross-Validation Function
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Notes: The graphs show the cross validation function for the marital age gap, calculated for each spouse over
bandwidths between 6 and 60.
The analysis uses the procedure proposed by Ludwig and Miller (2007) for optimal
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bandwidth selection in RDD settings. The cross-validation function is computed via a
leave-one-out procedure. For each candidate bandwidth h in turn a set of regressions are
computed: for every data point, i, a regression is estimated which omits observation i and
a predicted value of the outcome variable is obtained. As RDD estimates are estimated
at the boundary, where the value of the running variable for data point i is to the left
of the threshold only observations where zi − h ≤ z < zi are used in the regression, and
similarly if i lies to the right of the threshold then the regression uses only observations
where zi < z ≤ zi + h. The difference is then calculated between the predicted value
from the regression which omits i, yˆ(zi), and the actual value yi, which forms a value
of the cross-validation procedure for bandwidth h. By repeating this procedure for each
observation i over every possible bandwidth h and aggregating yields the cross-validation
function CVY (h) =
1
N
∑
i=1N(yi− yˆ(zi))2. The optimal bandwidth is then determined by
the value of h that minimises CVY (h), the mean square difference of the predicted value
to the true value of Y (Imbens and Lemieux (2008)).
The cross-validation function computed to determine the optimal bandwidth used in
the estimation of the impact of the RoSLA reform on the marital age-gap is displayed
in Figure C.3. For both husbands and wives the optimal bandwidth is indicated at ap-
proximately 24 months. Although the value of the cross-validation function continues
to decline with as the bandwidth size increases, the incremental decrease in precision is
marginal in comparison to the potential degree of bias in the estimate which may ensue
from estimation with higher bandwidths.
Figure C.4: Sensitivity of Estimates to Bandwidth Choice
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Notes: The graphs show RD estimates produced for each spouse of the effect of the RoSLA on the marital age
gap as described in Section C.2.1 for each bandwidth choice over the range 12-60, using a quadratic polynomial
in the running variable. The solid line indicates the magnitude of the estimate, the dashed lines indicate the 95%
confidence interval.
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C.2.4 Sensitivity of the Estimates
Direct examination of the sensitivity of the estimates to bandwidth choice is analogous
to the cross-validation procedure described in Section C.2.3.3. Figure C.4 displays the
magnitude of the estimates of the impact of the RoSLA reform on the marital age-gap
estimated using bandwidths ranging from 12 to 60
As would be expected, both graphs indicate imprecise estimates with very low band-
widths, with the width of the confidence interval decreasing as bandwidth size increases.
From a bandwidth size of approximately 24 months the magnitude of the coefficients be-
comes stable, and the increase in precision as indicated by the width of the confidence
interval becomes small relative to the increase in the size of the bandwidth.
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D Appendix to Chapter 5
D.1 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. We start by noting that, due to the functional form, M(pih, piw, , φˆ) is
a continuously differentiable function of (pih, piw, φˆ) and D(piw) is a continuously differen-
tiable function of piw. Differentiating yields that ∂M/∂pih < 0, ∂D/∂pih = 0, ∂M/∂piw < 0,
and ∂D/∂piw < 0, and, importantly,
∂ (M −D)
∂pih
< 0 and
∂ (M −D)
∂piw
> 0, (a1)
where the latter inequality follows from concavity of v (·). Hence an increase in the wife’s
unemployment risk makes marriage more attractive to her, as the loss in earnings asso-
ciated with unemployment has a larger negative impact on her utility when she does not
have access to her partner’s income.
Next we define
pi′h ≡
{
0 if M (0, 0, 0, 1) ≤ D (0)
sup {pih ∈ [0, 1] |M (pih, 0, 0, 1) ≥ D (0)} if M (0, 0, 0, 1) > D (0)
(a2)
and
pi′′h ≡
{
1 if M (1, 1, 0, 1) ≥ D (1)
inf {pih ∈ [0, 1] |M (pih, 1, 0, 1) ≤ D (1)} if M (1, 1, 0, 1) < D (1)
(a3)
Consider the case where M (0, 0, 0, 1) > D (0), the second case in (a2). By assumption
A1, M (1, 0, 0, 1) < D (0). Hence it follows that pi′h ∈ (0, 1) and is the unique critical value
for pih at which M = D given piw = 0 (and  = 0 and φˆ = 1). Similarly, consider the case
where M (1, 1, 0, 1) < D (1), the second case in (a3). By assumption A2, M (0, 1, 0, 1) >
D (1). Hence it follows that pi′′h ∈ (0, 1) and is the unique critical value for pih at which
M = D given piw = 1 (and  = 0 and φˆ = 1). Next we verify that pi
′
h < pi
′′
h. This follows
trivially if pi′h = 0 and/or pi
′′
h = 1. Hence consider the case where pi
′
h > 0 and pi
′′
h < 1 (as in
Figure 5.1). Note that since, per definition of pi′h, M (pi
′
h, 0, 0, 1) = D (0), and using (a1)
it follows that M (pi′h, 1, 0, 1) > D (1) and hence that pi
′′
h > pi
′
h.
Next we verify that (5.7) has a solution in the unit interval if and only if pih ∈ [pi′h, pi′′h].
Consider the case where pi′h > 0. Then, M (pih, piw, 0, 1) > D (piw) at any (pih, piw) ∈
[0, pi′h)× [0, 1] , implying that (5.7) does not have a solution in the unit interval. Similarly,
consider the case where pi′′h < 1. Then, M (pih, piw, 0, 1) < D (piw) for any (pih, piw) ∈
(pi′′h, 1] × [0, 1] , implying that (5.7) does not have a solution in the unit interval. Thus
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(5.7) can have a solution in the unit interval only if pih ∈ [pi′h, pi
′′
h]. Consider then some
pih ∈ (pi′h, pi′′h). By definition of pi′h and pi′′h if follows that M (pih, 0, 0, 1) < D (0) and
M (pih, 1, 0, 1) > D (1). It then follows from continuity of the value functions and (a1)
that (5.7) has a unique solution we denote by pˆiw (pih) ∈ (0, 1).
Implicitly differentiating (5.7) yields that
∂pˆiw
∂pih
= − ∂ (M −D) /∂pih
∂ (M −D) /∂piw > 0, (a4)
where the sign follows from (a1).
The sign of the derivatives of pˆiw (pih) with respect to the partners’ wages follow in a
similar way from the observation that
∂ (M −D)
∂ωh
> 0 and
∂ (M −D)
∂ωw
< 0, (a5)
where the latter inequality follows due to concavity of v (·).
Proof of Proposition 1. We first define the husband’s expected utility in the case of di-
vorce,
D (pih, ) ≡ E
[
udh|pih
]
− αh − ξ, (a6)
where E
[
udh|pih
]
is defined analogously to (5.4). The husband’s expected utility from
continued marriage on the other hand is type-dependent,
M (pih, piw, ; θ) = E [u
m
h |(pih, piw)]− δθκ (θ, )− ξ, (a7)
where E [umh |(pih, piw)] is defined analogously to (5.6). In particular, we obtain that a
husband of type N ranks the possible outcomes with respect to marriage and behavioural
effort in the following way:
M (pih, piw, 1;N) > M (pih, piw, 0;N) > D (pih, 0) > D (pih, 1) . (a8)
To see this, note that the first inequality follows from part (i) of assumption A4, the second
inequality follows from part (ii) of assumption A4, and the third inequality is trivial. In
contrast, a husband of type V ranks the possible outcomes in the following way:
M (pih, piw, 0;V ) > M (pih, piw, 1;V ) > D (pih, 0) > D (pih, 1) . (a9)
The first inequality follows from the assumption that δV = 0. The second inequality
follows from the fact that αh > ξ which is implied by the combination of parts (i) and (ii)
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of assumption A4.
The key difference between (a8) and (a9) is that a husband of type V does not value
the reduction in the risk of violence associated with the effort  = 1 whereas a husband of
type N values it more than its cost.
There are four possible pure strategy profiles that the husband can adopt:
• Strategy profile (1): separation with (′, ′′) = (0, 1);
• Strategy profile (2): separation with (′, ′′) = (1, 0);
• Strategy profile (3): pooling with (′, ′′) = (1, 1);
• Strategy profile (4): pooling with (′, ′′) = (0, 0).
We will consider each possible pure strategy profile within each regime.
D.1.1 Regime R1
Given that (pih, piw) ∈ R1, the wife obtains a higher expected payoff from marriage than
from divorce with any husband of type θ and any effort choice  by the husband. We will
now consider the four possible pure strategy profiles in turn:
Strategy profile (1). Bayesian updating implies that φˆ(0) = 1 and φˆ(1) = 0, and the
wife rationally chooses to remain married at either choice of , χ′ = χ′′ = m. According
to (a8) and (a9) each type of husband obtains his most preferred outcome and hence has
no incentive to deviate, confirming that this is a PBE.
Strategy profile (2). Bayesian updating implies that φˆ(0) = 0 and φˆ(1) = 1, and the
wife rationally chooses to remain married at either choice of , χ′ = χ′′ = m. In this case
neither type of husband obtains his most preferred outcome and, since the wife responds
to either choice of  by continuing the marriage, each type of husband would have an
incentive to deviate.
Strategy profile (3). Bayesian updating implies that φˆ (1) = φ, while φˆ (0) is not
determined by Bayesian updating. Irrespective of how the wife updates her beliefs at
 = 0, she rationally chooses to remain married at either choice of , χ′ = χ′′ = m. Given
this, a husband of type V would be better off deviating to  = 0.
Strategy profile (4). Bayesian updating implies that φˆ (0) = φ, while φˆ (1) is not
determined by Bayesian updating. Irrespective of how the wife updates her beliefs at
 = 1, she rationally chooses to remain married at either choice of , χ′ = χ′′ = m. Given
this, a husband of type N would be better of deviating to  = 1.
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D.1.2 Regime R0
In this regime, the wife’s decision whether or not to remain married depends on her beliefs
and on the husband’s observed effort.
Strategy profile (1). Bayesian updating implies that φˆ(0) = 1 and φˆ(1) = 0. The wife
then (by assumptions A1 and A3) continues the marriage if and only if the husband makes
the effort  = 1, that is χ′′ = m and χ′ = d. A type V would then be better of deviating
to  = 1 as by doing so he would avoid triggering divorce.
Strategy profile (2). Bayesian updating implies that φˆ(0) = 0 and φˆ(1) = 1. Given
these updated beliefs, the wife rationally responds (by Assumption A3) to  = 0 by
continuing the marriage, that is χ′ = m. This then cannot be an equilibrium since a type
V husband could then deviate to  = 0 and obtain is his most preferred outcome.
Strategy profile (3). Bayesian updating implies that φˆ (1) = φ and, by assumption A3,
the wife rationally responds to  = 1 by continuing the marriage, χ′′ = m. Note that φˆ (0)
is not determined by Bayesian updating. Suppose that the wife, at  = 0, believes that
the husband is of type V , that is φˆ (0) = 1. She would then rationally respond to  = 0 by
choosing divorce, χ′ = d. Given this, and given the preference orderings in (a8) and (a9),
neither husband type has any incentive to deviate. Note also that the out-of-equilibrium
belief φˆ (0) = 1 satisfies the Choo-Kreps “intuitive criterion”. For a husband of type N ,
 = 0 is equilibrium dominated as this type, by choosing  = 1, obtains his most preferred
outcome in equilibrium. In contrast, a husband of type V would benefit if the wife were
to respond to  = 0 by continuing the marriage.
Strategy profile (4). Bayesian updating implies that φˆ (0) = φ but does not determine
φˆ (1). Given this, and by assumption A3, the wife rationally continues the marriage upon
observing  = 0, that is χ′ = m. Next, note that by (a8) for a husband of type N
in particular to prefer to choose  = 0 it must be that the wife responds to  = 1 by
divorcing, that is χ′′ = d. Hence for this to be a PBE, φˆ (1) must be such that the wife
prefers divorce upon observing  = 1. In particular, from Assumption 3 it must be that
φˆ (1) > φ. Such a PBE however does not satisfy the “intuitive criterion”. For a husband
of type V ,  = 1 is equilibrium dominated as this type, by choosing  = 0, obtains his most
preferred outcome in equilibrium. In contrast, a husband of type N would benefit from
deviating if the wife were to respond to  = 1 by continuing the marriage. Hence, by the
“intuitive criterion” the wife’s out-of-equilibrium beliefs must be φˆ (1) = 0, contradicting
that she would chooseχ′′ = d.
D.2 Appendix B: Variable Descriptions
The following variables are used in Section 5.4.3 (“Extended Results”):
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1. Magistrate court timeliness: This is a measure of the duration from first listing
of an offence to completion, for defendants in indictable cases in magistrates courts,
and hence captures the “efficiency” of the criminal justice system, post arrest. The
data is released on an annual basis from the Ministry of Justice, and is at the Local
Justice Area (LJA) geography which coincides with the PFAs we use in the analysis.
2. Police force manpower: This variable refers to overall police manpower per 10,000
capita at PFA level. It is comprised of the number of (full-time equivalent) police
officers, police community support officers, and police staff. This data is released
annually by the Home Office.
3. Violent crime rate: This is the number of recorded violent crimes per 10,000
capita at PFA level. The data is from the Home Office.
4. Non-violent crime rate: This is the number of recorded non-violent crimes per
10,000 capita at PFA level. The data is from the Home Office.
5. Alcohol hospitalizations: This is the number of alcohol hospitalizations per
10,000 capita at PFA level. This is from the Local Alcohol Profiles for England
datasets, available from the North West Public Health Observatory data, which is
part of Public Health England. Note that this data is not available for the 4 welsh
PFAs. We aggregated the data up to PFA level from Local Authority level.
6. Internal migration: These are the number of in- and out-migrants as a percentage
of the PFA population in each age/gender group. The statistics are compiled using
the data series “Internal Migration by Local Authorities in England and Wales”
which are released annually by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) to coincide
with the mid-year population estimates. The data has received the “National Statis-
tics” accreditation, and are understood to be the best official source of information
on internal migration in England and Wales. The data is available by gender and
in 5 year age groups at Local Authority level. Here we aggregated up to PFA level
and using the APS defined age grouping.
7. Drugs possession: This is the number of arrests for possession per 10,000 capita
at PFA level. This data is from the quarterly Home Office Offences tables.
The data in (1)-(6) come from annual tables, so has been interpolated to produce data
at the period frequency.
D.3 Complete Set of Estimated Marginal Effects
147
D. Appendix to Chapter 5
T
ab
le
D
.1
:
Im
p
ac
t
of
U
n
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
on
P
h
y
si
ca
l
A
b
u
se
-
F
u
ll
S
et
of
R
es
u
lt
s
fr
om
M
ai
n
S
p
ec
ifi
ca
ti
o
n
S
p
e
c
ifi
c
a
ti
o
n
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
U
n
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
-0
.0
26
0
.0
0
8
in
ow
n
-a
ge
gr
ou
p
(0
.0
18
)
(0
.0
1
9
)
F
em
al
e
u
n
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
0
.0
9
7
*
*
0
.0
9
3
*
*
0
.1
0
2
*
*
0
.0
9
4
*
*
0
.0
8
3
*
*
0
.1
0
2
*
*
0
.0
9
1
*
*
in
ow
n
-a
ge
gr
ou
p
(0
.0
2
7
)
(0
.0
2
7
)
(0
.0
2
8
)
(0
.0
2
7
)
(0
.0
2
9
)
(0
.0
2
8)
(0
.0
3
5
)
M
al
e
u
n
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
-0
.0
9
0
*
*
-0
.0
9
7
*
*
-0
.0
8
1
*
*
-0
.0
8
9
*
*
-0
.0
9
4
*
*
-0
.0
6
7*
-0
.0
8
4
*
in
ow
n
-a
ge
gr
ou
p
(0
.0
2
1
)
(0
.0
2
2
)
(0
.0
2
7
)
(0
.0
2
1
)
(0
.0
2
9
)
(0
.0
2
9)
(0
.0
3
7
)
F
em
al
e
u
n
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
-0
.0
1
3
in
ot
h
er
ag
e
gr
ou
p
s
(0
.0
6
5
)
M
al
e
u
n
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
-0
.0
4
7
in
ot
h
er
ag
e
gr
ou
p
s
(0
.0
5
5
)
F
em
al
e
re
al
w
ag
e
0
.0
0
5
in
ow
n
-a
ge
gr
ou
p
(0
.0
0
9
)
M
al
e
re
al
w
ag
e
-0
.0
0
1
in
ow
n
-a
ge
gr
ou
p
(0
.0
0
6
)
U
n
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
ra
te
ga
p
0
.0
9
4
*
*
(F
-M
)
in
ow
n
ag
e
gr
ou
p
(0
.0
2
2
)
A
ge
in
ye
ar
s
-0
.0
01
**
-0
.0
0
1
*
*
-0
.0
0
1
*
*
-0
.0
0
1
*
*
-0
.0
0
1
*
*
-0
.0
0
1
*
*
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
o
n
n
ex
t
p
a
g
e
148
D. Appendix to Chapter 5
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
fr
o
m
p
re
v
io
u
s
p
a
g
e
S
p
e
c
ifi
c
a
ti
o
n
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
A
ge
G
ro
u
p
:
16
-2
4
0
.0
3
9
*
*
0
.0
2
7
0
.0
4
4
*
*
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
1
4
)
(0
.0
1
7
)
A
ge
G
ro
u
p
:
25
-3
4
0
.0
2
7
*
*
0
.0
1
3
0
.0
0
9
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
1
3
)
(0
.0
1
4
)
A
ge
G
ro
u
p
:
35
-4
9
0
.0
1
5
*
*
0
.0
0
9
0
.0
0
2
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
1
4
)
(0
.0
1
4
)
E
th
n
ic
it
y
:
W
h
it
e
-0
.0
03
-0
.0
0
3
-0
.0
0
3
-0
.0
0
3
-0
.0
0
3
-0
.0
0
3
-0
.0
0
3
-0
.0
0
3
-0
.0
0
3
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
4)
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
E
th
n
ic
it
y
:
A
si
an
-0
.0
07
-0
.0
0
7
-0
.0
0
7
-0
.0
0
7
-0
.0
0
7
-0
.0
0
7
-0
.0
0
7
-0
.0
0
7
-0
.0
0
7
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
7)
(0
.0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
7
)
E
th
n
ic
it
y
:
B
la
ck
-0
.0
10
-0
.0
1
0
-0
.0
1
0
-0
.0
1
0
-0
.0
1
0
-0
.0
1
0
-0
.0
1
0
*
-0
.0
1
0
*
-0
.0
1
0
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
5)
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
Q
u
al
ifi
ca
ti
on
s:
O
th
er
-0
.0
01
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
1
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
Q
u
al
ifi
ca
ti
on
s:
G
C
S
E
-0
.0
03
-0
.0
0
3
-0
.0
0
3
-0
.0
0
3
-0
.0
0
3
-0
.0
0
3
-0
.0
0
3
-0
.0
0
3
-0
.0
0
3
gr
ad
es
A
-C
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
Q
u
al
ifi
ca
ti
on
s:
A
L
ev
el
-0
.0
09
**
-0
.0
0
9
*
*
-0
.0
0
9
*
*
-0
.0
0
9
*
*
-0
.0
0
9
*
*
-0
.0
0
8
*
*
-0
.0
0
9
**
-0
.0
0
9
*
*
-0
.0
0
9
*
*
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
Q
u
al
ifi
ca
ti
on
s:
H
ig
h
er
ed
u
c,
-0
.0
08
**
-0
.0
0
8
*
*
-0
.0
0
8
*
*
-0
.0
0
8
*
*
-0
.0
0
8
*
*
-0
.0
0
8
*
*
-0
.0
0
8
*
*
-0
.0
0
8
*
*
-0
.0
0
8
*
*
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
o
n
n
ex
t
p
a
g
e
149
D. Appendix to Chapter 5
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
fr
o
m
p
re
v
io
u
s
p
a
g
e
S
p
e
c
ifi
c
a
ti
o
n
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
b
el
ow
d
eg
re
e
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
Q
u
al
ifi
ca
ti
on
s:
D
eg
re
e
or
ab
ov
e
-0
.0
20
**
-0
.0
2
0
*
*
-0
.0
2
0
*
*
-0
.0
2
0
*
*
-0
.0
2
0
*
*
-0
.0
2
0
*
*
-0
.0
2
0
*
*
-0
.0
2
0
*
*
-0
.0
2
0
*
*
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
R
el
ig
io
n
:
C
h
ri
st
ia
n
-0
.0
08
**
-0
.0
0
8
*
*
-0
.0
0
8
*
*
-0
.0
0
8
*
*
-0
.0
0
8
*
*
-0
.0
0
8
*
*
-0
.0
0
8
*
*
-0
.0
0
8
*
*
-0
.0
0
8
*
*
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
R
el
ig
io
n
:
M
u
sl
im
-0
.0
09
-0
.0
0
9
-0
.0
0
9
-0
.0
0
9
-0
.0
0
9
-0
.0
0
9
-0
.0
1
0
-0
.0
0
9
-0
.0
0
9
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
6)
(0
.0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
6
)
R
el
ig
io
n
:
H
in
d
u
-0
.0
15
-0
.0
1
5
-0
.0
1
5
-0
.0
1
5
-0
.0
1
5
-0
.0
1
6
-0
.0
1
6
-0
.0
1
6
-0
.0
1
5
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
0
9
)
(0
.0
0
9
)
(0
.0
0
9
)
(0
.0
0
9
)
(0
.0
0
9
)
(0
.0
0
8)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
9
)
R
el
ig
io
n
:
S
ik
h
-0
.0
11
-0
.0
1
1
-0
.0
1
1
-0
.0
1
1
-0
.0
1
1
-0
.0
1
2
-0
.0
1
2
-0
.0
1
2
-0
.0
1
1
(0
.0
12
)
(0
.0
1
2
)
(0
.0
1
2
)
(0
.0
1
2
)
(0
.0
1
2
)
(0
.0
1
2
)
(0
.0
1
2)
(0
.0
1
2
)
(0
.0
1
2
)
R
el
ig
io
n
:
J
ew
is
h
-0
.0
37
*
-0
.0
3
7
*
-0
.0
3
7
*
-0
.0
3
7
*
-0
.0
3
7
*
-0
.0
3
7
*
-0
.0
3
7
*
-0
.0
3
7
*
-0
.0
3
7
*
(0
.0
16
)
(0
.0
1
6
)
(0
.0
1
6
)
(0
.0
1
6
)
(0
.0
1
6
)
(0
.0
1
6
)
(0
.0
1
6)
(0
.0
1
6
)
(0
.0
1
6
)
R
el
ig
io
n
:
B
u
d
d
h
is
t
0.
00
8
0
.0
0
8
0
.0
0
8
0
.0
0
8
0
.0
0
8
0
.0
0
7
0
.0
0
7
0
.0
0
7
0
.0
0
8
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
8)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
R
el
ig
io
n
:
O
th
er
0.
00
9
0
.0
0
9
0
.0
0
9
0
.0
0
9
0
.0
0
9
0
.0
0
8
0
.0
0
9
0
.0
0
9
0
.0
0
9
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
6)
(0
.0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
6
)
N
u
m
b
er
of
ch
il
d
re
n
0.
00
5*
*
0
.0
0
5
*
*
0
.0
0
5
*
*
0
.0
0
4
*
*
0
.0
0
5
*
*
0
.0
0
5
*
*
0
.0
0
5
*
*
0
.0
0
5
*
*
0
.0
0
5
*
*
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
o
n
n
ex
t
p
a
g
e
150
D. Appendix to Chapter 5
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
fr
o
m
p
re
v
io
u
s
p
a
g
e
S
p
e
c
ifi
c
a
ti
o
n
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
H
H
co
n
ta
in
s
k
id
s
ag
ed
u
n
d
er
5
0.
00
5*
0
.0
0
5
*
0
.0
0
5
*
0
.0
0
5
*
0
.0
0
5
*
0
.0
0
5
*
0
.0
0
5
*
0
.0
0
5
*
0
.0
0
5
*
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
A
re
a
an
d
ti
m
e
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
ts
ye
s
ye
s
y
es
ye
s
y
es
ye
s
y
es
ye
s
ye
s
L
in
ea
r
ag
e-
in
-y
ea
rs
co
n
tr
ol
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
n
o
n
o
n
o
ye
s
A
ge
gr
ou
p
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
ts
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
y
es
ye
s
y
es
n
o
A
ge
gr
ou
p
*
P
er
io
d
F
E
s
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
ye
s
ye
s
n
o
A
ge
gr
ou
p
*
A
re
as
F
E
s
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
y
es
n
o
O
th
er
d
em
og
ra
p
h
ic
co
n
tr
ol
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
y
es
ye
s
A
re
a-
sp
ec
ifi
c
li
n
ea
r
tr
en
d
s
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
y
es
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
O
b
s.
8
6
,7
3
1
N
o
te
s:
S
ee
n
o
te
s
to
T
a
b
le
4
.
*
*
S
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
t
a
t
1
%
.
*
S
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
t
a
t
5
%
.
151
D. Appendix to Chapter 5
T
ab
le
D
.2
:
Im
p
ac
t
of
U
n
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
on
N
on
-P
h
y
si
ca
l
A
b
u
se
-
F
u
ll
S
et
of
R
es
u
lt
s
fr
om
M
ai
n
S
p
ec
ifi
ca
ti
o
n
S
p
e
c
ifi
c
a
ti
o
n
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
U
n
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
-0
.0
12
0
.0
2
1
in
ow
n
-a
ge
gr
ou
p
(0
.0
23
)
(0
.0
2
4
)
F
em
al
e
u
n
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
0
.1
0
2
*
*
0
.1
0
8
*
*
0
.1
1
0
*
*
0
.1
0
4
*
*
0
.0
7
8
*
0
.0
9
3
*
0
.0
8
7
in
ow
n
-a
ge
gr
ou
p
(0
.0
3
7
)
(0
.0
3
8
)
(0
.0
3
8
)
(0
.0
3
7
)
(0
.0
4
0
)
(0
.0
4
2)
(0
.0
4
8
)
M
al
e
u
n
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
-0
.0
8
1
*
*
-0
.0
7
4
*
-0
.0
6
1
-0
.0
8
5
*
*
-0
.0
9
0
*
-0
.0
6
6
-0
.0
7
7
in
ow
n
-a
ge
gr
ou
p
(0
.0
3
0
)
(0
.0
3
2
)
(0
.0
3
7
)
(0
.0
3
1
)
(0
.0
3
9
)
(0
.0
3
9)
(0
.0
4
8
)
F
em
al
e
u
n
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
0
.0
3
1
in
ot
h
er
ag
e
gr
ou
p
s
(0
.0
8
0
)
M
al
e
u
n
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
0
.0
3
5
in
ot
h
er
ag
e
gr
ou
p
s
(0
.0
6
8
)
F
em
al
e
re
al
w
ag
e
-0
.0
0
2
in
ow
n
-a
ge
gr
ou
p
(0
.0
1
0
)
M
al
e
re
al
w
ag
e
0
.0
0
8
in
ow
n
-a
ge
gr
ou
p
(0
.0
0
7
)
U
n
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
ra
te
ga
p
0
.0
9
3
*
*
(F
-M
)
in
ow
n
ag
e
gr
ou
p
(0
.0
3
2
)
A
ge
in
ye
ar
s
-0
.0
01
**
-0
.0
0
1
*
*
-0
.0
0
1
*
*
-0
.0
0
1
*
*
-0
.0
0
1
*
*
-0
.0
0
1
*
*
(0
.0
00
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
)
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
o
n
n
ex
t
p
a
g
e
152
D. Appendix to Chapter 5
c
o
n
ti
n
u
e
d
fr
o
m
p
re
v
io
u
s
p
a
g
e
S
p
e
c
ifi
c
a
ti
o
n
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
A
ge
G
ro
u
p
:
16
-2
4
0
.0
4
6
*
*
0
.0
2
7
0
.0
4
3
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
2
1
)
(0
.0
2
4
)
A
ge
G
ro
u
p
:
25
-3
4
0
.0
2
9
*
*
0
.0
2
1
0
.0
0
8
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
1
7
)
(0
.0
1
8
)
A
ge
G
ro
u
p
:
35
-4
9
0
.0
2
0
*
*
0
.0
1
8
0
.0
2
5
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
1
7
)
(0
.0
1
7
)
E
th
n
ic
it
y
:
W
h
it
e
0.
00
5
0
.0
0
5
0
.0
0
5
0
.0
0
5
0
.0
0
5
0
.0
0
5
0
.0
0
5
0
.0
0
5
0
.0
0
5
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
5)
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
E
th
n
ic
it
y
:
A
si
an
-0
.0
11
-0
.0
1
1
-0
.0
1
1
-0
.0
1
1
-0
.0
1
1
-0
.0
1
1
-0
.0
1
1
-0
.0
1
1
-0
.0
1
1
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
8)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
E
th
n
ic
it
y
:
B
la
ck
0.
00
2
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
2
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
7)
(0
.0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
7
)
Q
u
al
ifi
ca
ti
on
s:
O
th
er
0.
00
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
3)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
Q
u
al
ifi
ca
ti
on
s:
G
C
S
E
-0
.0
03
-0
.0
0
3
-0
.0
0
3
-0
.0
0
3
-0
.0
0
3
-0
.0
0
3
-0
.0
0
3
-0
.0
0
3
-0
.0
0
3
gr
ad
es
A
-C
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
Q
u
al
ifi
ca
ti
on
s:
A
L
ev
el
-0
.0
09
**
-0
.0
0
9
*
*
-0
.0
0
9
*
*
-0
.0
1
0
*
*
-0
.0
0
9
*
*
-0
.0
0
9
*
*
-0
.0
0
9
**
-0
.0
0
9
*
*
-0
.0
0
9
*
*
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
3)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
Q
u
al
ifi
ca
ti
on
s:
H
ig
h
er
ed
u
c,
-0
.0
08
**
-0
.0
0
8
*
*
-0
.0
0
8
*
*
-0
.0
0
9
*
*
-0
.0
0
8
*
*
-0
.0
0
8
*
*
-0
.0
0
8
*
*
-0
.0
0
8
*
*
-0
.0
0
8
*
*
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
o
n
n
ex
t
p
a
g
e
153
D. Appendix to Chapter 5
c
o
n
ti
n
u
e
d
fr
o
m
p
re
v
io
u
s
p
a
g
e
S
p
e
c
ifi
c
a
ti
o
n
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
b
el
ow
d
eg
re
e
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
Q
u
al
ifi
ca
ti
on
s:
D
eg
re
e
or
ab
ov
e
-0
.0
23
**
-0
.0
2
4
*
*
-0
.0
2
4
*
*
-0
.0
2
4
*
*
-0
.0
2
3
*
*
-0
.0
2
3
*
*
-0
.0
2
3
*
*
-0
.0
2
3
*
*
-0
.0
2
4
*
*
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
3)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
R
el
ig
io
n
:
C
h
ri
st
ia
n
-0
.0
08
**
-0
.0
0
8
*
*
-0
.0
0
8
*
*
-0
.0
0
8
*
*
-0
.0
0
8
*
*
-0
.0
0
8
*
*
-0
.0
0
8
*
*
-0
.0
0
9
*
*
-0
.0
0
8
*
*
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
R
el
ig
io
n
:
M
u
sl
im
-0
.0
12
-0
.0
1
3
-0
.0
1
2
-0
.0
1
3
-0
.0
1
3
-0
.0
1
2
-0
.0
1
2
-0
.0
1
2
-0
.0
1
3
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
8)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
R
el
ig
io
n
:
H
in
d
u
0.
00
2
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
2
(0
.0
12
)
(0
.0
1
2
)
(0
.0
1
2
)
(0
.0
1
2
)
(0
.0
1
2
)
(0
.0
1
2
)
(0
.0
1
2)
(0
.0
1
2
)
(0
.0
1
2
)
R
el
ig
io
n
:
S
ik
h
0.
01
7
0
.0
1
7
0
.0
1
7
0
.0
1
7
0
.0
1
7
0
.0
1
7
0
.0
1
7
0
.0
1
6
0
.0
1
7
(0
.0
11
)
(0
.0
1
1
)
(0
.0
1
1
)
(0
.0
1
1
)
(0
.0
1
1
)
(0
.0
1
1
)
(0
.0
1
1)
(0
.0
1
1
)
(0
.0
1
1
)
R
el
ig
io
n
:
J
ew
is
h
-0
.0
21
-0
.0
2
1
-0
.0
2
1
-0
.0
2
1
-0
.0
2
2
-0
.0
2
2
-0
.0
2
2
-0
.0
2
1
-0
.0
2
1
(0
.0
18
)
(0
.0
1
8
)
(0
.0
1
8
)
(0
.0
1
8
)
(0
.0
1
8
)
(0
.0
1
8
)
(0
.0
1
8)
(0
.0
1
8
)
(0
.0
1
8
)
R
el
ig
io
n
:
B
u
d
d
h
is
t
0.
00
4
0
.0
0
4
0
.0
0
4
0
.0
0
4
0
.0
0
4
0
.0
0
4
0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
4
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
0
9
)
(0
.0
0
9
)
(0
.0
0
9
)
(0
.0
0
9
)
(0
.0
0
9
)
(0
.0
0
9)
(0
.0
0
9
)
(0
.0
0
9
)
R
el
ig
io
n
:
O
th
er
0.
00
6
0
.0
0
6
0
.0
0
6
0
.0
0
6
0
.0
0
6
0
.0
0
6
0
.0
0
6
0
.0
0
6
0
.0
0
6
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
8)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
N
u
m
b
er
of
ch
il
d
re
n
0.
00
7*
*
0
.0
0
7
*
*
0
.0
0
7
*
*
0
.0
0
7
*
*
0
.0
0
7
*
*
0
.0
0
7
*
*
0
.0
0
7
*
*
0
.0
0
7
*
*
0
.0
0
7
*
*
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
o
n
n
ex
t
p
a
g
e
154
D. Appendix to Chapter 5
c
o
n
ti
n
u
e
d
fr
o
m
p
re
v
io
u
s
p
a
g
e
S
p
e
c
ifi
c
a
ti
o
n
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
H
H
co
n
ta
in
s
k
id
s
ag
ed
u
n
d
er
5
0.
00
4
0
.0
0
4
0
.0
0
4
0
.0
0
4
0
.0
0
4
0
.0
0
5
*
0
.0
0
4
0
.0
0
4
0
.0
0
4
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
3)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
A
re
a
an
d
ti
m
e
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
ts
ye
s
ye
s
y
es
ye
s
y
es
ye
s
y
es
ye
s
ye
s
L
in
ea
r
ag
e-
in
-y
ea
rs
co
n
tr
ol
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
n
o
n
o
n
o
ye
s
A
ge
gr
ou
p
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
ts
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
y
es
ye
s
y
es
n
o
A
ge
gr
ou
p
*
P
er
io
d
F
E
s
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
ye
s
ye
s
n
o
A
ge
gr
ou
p
*
A
re
as
F
E
s
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
y
es
n
o
O
th
er
d
em
og
ra
p
h
ic
co
n
tr
ol
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
y
es
ye
s
A
re
a-
sp
ec
ifi
c
li
n
ea
r
tr
en
d
s
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
y
es
n
o
n
o
n
o
n
o
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
8
6
,7
3
1
N
o
te
s:
S
ee
n
o
te
s
to
T
a
b
le
4
.
*
*
S
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
t
a
t
1
%
.
*
S
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
t
a
t
5
%
.
155
D. Appendix to Chapter 5
D.4 A Simple Model of Household Bargaining Under Uncertainty
In this appendix, we present a bargaining model of domestic violence. The model extends
the Nash bargaining approach presented by Aizer (2010) to allow for income uncertainty.
In order to simplify the analysis we assume additively separable preferences. When in-
comes are uncertain, the couple has an incentive to bargain at the ex-ante stage, before
their incomes are realized, and we assume that the outcome of their ex-ante negotiations
is binding.
As one would expect, a key feature of ex-ante bargaining is risk sharing. Hence the
couple’s ex-ante bargained allocation will smooth consumption as far as possible given the
uncertainty they face regarding total household income. However, by direct analogy, the
couple also have an incentive to “smooth violence” across states of nature. As there is no
uncertainty regarding the available choices of violence, the ex-ante bargained allocation
features equilibrium violence that is independent of the income realization. However, it is
not independent of the partners’ income prospects. Generalizing the theoretical prediction
from Aizer (2010), we show that a shifting of the income probability distribution which
reduces the husband’s expected income and increases the wife’s expected income while
leaving the probability distribution over household income unchanged reduces the ex-ante
bargained level of violence.
This conclusion holds for two possible consequences of failing to agree in the ex-ante
bargaining. It holds if a failure to agree ex-ante implies that the couple will not engage in
any further negotiations but instead behave non-cooperatively or divorce, and it also holds
if failure to agree ex-ante leads to ex-post bargaining once all uncertainty is resolved.
D.4.1 Setup
Consider a couple consisting of a husband h and a wife w. Let the preferences of the
spouses be defined over private consumption (ci) and violence (v), with the husband’s
utility increasing in violence and the wife’s decreasing in violence. For simplicity, suppose
that the utility functions of the spouses are additively separable and given by
Uh(ch, v) = uh (ch) + ϕh (v) and Uw(cw, v) = uw (cw) + ϕw (1− v) , (d1)
where ci ∈ R+ and v ∈ [0, 1], and where each sub-utility function is twice continuously
differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave, with ui (ci)→ −∞ as ci → 0+.
Each partner faces income uncertainty, with yh and yw being independent draws from
two distributions Fh (yh) and Fw (yw) defined on a common discrete support denoted
Y ≡ {y1, y2, ..., yN}, ordered increasingly. The associated probability density functions are
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denoted by fh (yh) and fw (yw), respectively. Hence the set of possible states of the world is
Y ×Y = Y 2 with a typical element (yh, yw). The probability distributions are known to the
couple who bargain ex-ante, before uncertainty is resolved, over which allocation to choose.
An allocation is defined as a mapping {ch (yh, yw) , cw (yh, yw) , v (yh, yw)} detailing the
couple’s consumption profile and violence choice in each state of the world (yh, yw) ∈ Y 2.
The consumption profile (ch, cw) chosen at the state (yh, yw) must satisfy being non-
negative in both components and ch + cw ≤ yh + yw.
D.4.2 Ex-Ante Bargaining: Consumption and Violence Smoothing
When bargaining ex-ante, the fallback is either to bargain ex-post or not to bargain at all.
If the fallback is not to bargain at all, then each partner j will have a fallback expected
utility which depends only on his or her own income distribution Fj . If the fallback is to
bargain ex-post—i.e., once all uncertainty has been resolved—then each partner’s fallback
expected utility depends on both Fh and Fw. Both cases will be considered below. We will
highlight here some properties of ex-ante bargaining which are independent of the nature
of the fallback. Hence we adopt the general notation U0i (F ) for the fallback expected
utility of partner i, where F ≡ {Fh, Fw}.
Given an equilibrium-negotiated allocation {ch (yh, yw) , cw (yh, yw) , v (yh, yw)}, the gain
in expected utility to the husband is
∆h = U
∗
h −U0h (F ) =
∑
yh∈Y
∑
yw∈Y
fh (yh) fw (yw) [uh (ch (yh, yw)) + ϕh (v (yh, yw))]−U0h (F ) ,
(d2)
while the corresponding gain in expected utility to the wife is
∆w = U
∗
w−U0w (F ) =
∑
yh∈Y
∑
yw∈Y
fh (yh) fw (yw) [uw (cw (yh, yw)) + ϕw (1− v (yh, yw))]−U0w (F ) ,
(d3)
where U∗h and U
∗
w are the equilibrium expected utilities of the husband and the wife
respectively.
The ex-ante Nash bargained agreement maximizes ∆h∆w. Consider first the first order
conditions with respect to the partners’ consumption levels in state (yh, yw). These reduce
to:
u′h (ch (yh, yw))
u′w (cw (yh, yw))
= ∆r, (d4)
where
∆r ≡ ∆h
∆w
, (d5)
denotes the relative expected utility gain of the husband. Noting that the right hand side
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of (d4) is independent of the state of the world, it follows that the same is true of the
left hand side. Hence, as the bargained outcome is ex-ante efficient it features complete
consumption insurance in the standard sense that the ratio of the partners’ marginal
utilities of consumption is constant across states of the world (see e.g. Cochrane, 1991).
It does not imply complete consumption smoothing in the sense that each partner has
an consumption that is independent of the state of the world: this is since the couple
face uncertainty regarding total household income, yh + yw, which per construction is not
constant across states of the world.
Considering violence, the first order condition for the bargained level of violence
v (yh, yw) reduces to
ϕ′h (v (yh, yw))
ϕ′w (1− v (yh, yw))
= ∆r. (d6)
Noting again that the right hand side is constant across states of the world, it follows
that the same is true for the left hand side. In contrast to consumption, this implies that
v (yh, yw) is constant across states of the world. The analogy to consumption is clear: in
both cases, concavity of each partner’s utility function implies a benefit from smoothing.
In the case of consumption, the possibility for smoothing is limited due to the uncertainty
about total household income. There is no such uncertainty regarding the available choices
of violence, and thus violence is perfectly smoothed across states of the world. Hence the
following conclusion holds irrespective of the specification of the fallback utilities.
Lemma 2. Ex-ante Nash bargaining by the couple leads to:
(a) Complete consumption insurance: the partners’ relative marginal utilities are con-
stant across states of the worlds [see eq. (d4)];
(b) Complete violence smoothing: the chosen violence level is constant across states of
the world [see eq. (d6)].
Moreover, as can be seen from (d4) and (d6), the bargained outcome is effectively
summarized by ∆r. Of particular interest to us is to note that:
Lemma 3. The ex-ante bargained state-independent level of violence v∗ = v (yh, yw) is
strictly decreasing in ∆r.
In general, the ex-ante bargained allocation “discriminates” against the partner whose
expected utility gain from implementing it exceeds that of the other partner. Thus, as the
relative expected utility gain of the husband (∆r) increases, he has to “compensate” his
spouse by agreeing to a lower level of equilibrium violence.
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In order to conduct comparative statics on the bargained outcome, it is useful to
rephrase the bargaining problem as the general problem of choosing expected utilities U∗h
and U∗w for the two partners in order to maximize(
U∗h − U0h (F )
) (
U∗w − U0w (F )
)
, (d7)
subject to (U∗h , U
∗
w) being in a feasible set. In order to define the feasible set of expected
utilities we first formally define the set of feasible allocations.
Definition 1. An allocation {ch (yh, yw) , cw (yh, yw) , v (yh, yw)} is said to be feasible if
for all states of the world (yh, yw) ∈ Y 2 and for each i ∈ {h,w}: ci (yh, yw) ∈ [0, yh + yw],
ch (yh, yw) + cw (yh, yw) ≤ yh + yw, and v (yh, yw) ∈ [0, 1].
We can now define a feasible expected utility profile
Definition 2. The expected utility profile (Uh, Uw) is said to be feasible if there exists a
feasible allocation {ch (yh, yw) , cw (yh, yw) , v (yh, yw)} such that for each state of the world
(yh, yw) ∈ Y 2:
Uh =
∑
yh∈Y
∑
yw∈Y
fh (yh) fw (yw) [uh (ch (yh, yw)) + ϕh (v (yh, yw))] ,
and
Uw =
∑
yh∈Y
∑
yw∈Y
fh (yh) fw (yw) [uw (cw (yh, yw)) + ϕw (1− v (yh, yw))] .
The set of feasible expected utility profiles is denoted T . We want to demonstrate that
T is a convex set. Let
(
U0h , U
0
w
)
and
(
U1h , U
1
w
)
be two elements in T . We then need to
verify that, for any α ∈ (0, 1)
(
U2h , U
2
w
) ≡ (αU0h + (1− α)U1h , αU0w + (1− α)U1w) , (d8)
is also in the set T . Let
{
ckh (yh, yw) , c
k
w (yh, yw) , v
k (yh, yw)
}
denote a feasible allocation
that supports the expected utility profile (Ukh , U
k
w) for each k = 0, 1. Consider then the
convex combination of the two supporting allocations: at each node (yh, yw) define
cˆi (yh, yw) = αc
0
i (yh, yw) + (1− α) c1i (yh, yw) , (d9)
for i = h,w, and
vˆ (yh, yw) = αv
0 (yh, yw) + (1− α) v1 (yh, yw) , (d10)
and note that this is a feasible allocation. Consider then the expected utility profile
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generated by this allocation. For the husband we obtain the expected utility,
Uˆh =
∑
yh∈Y
∑
yw∈Y
fh (yh) fw (yw) [uh (cˆh (yh, yw)) + ϕh (vˆ (yh, yw))] . (d11)
Due to concavity of uh (·) and ϕh (·) it follows that, in each state of the world:
uh (cˆh (yh, yw)) > αuh
(
c0i (yh, yw)
)
+ (1− α)αuh
(
c1i (yh, yw)
)
, (d12)
and
ϕh (vˆ (yh, yw)) > αϕh
(
v0 (yh, yw)
)
+ (1− α)ϕh
(
v1 (yh, yw)
)
, (d13)
and hence it follows that Uˆh > U
2
h . An identical argument shows that, for the wife,
Uˆw > U
2
w. Since it is always possible to reduce the expected utility of either (or both
partners) by reducing consumption at some arbitrary node, it follows that
(
U2h , U
2
w
) ∈ T .
Moreover, the argument above makes clear that if even if
(
U0h , U
0
w
)
and
(
U1h , U
1
w
)
are both
boundary points of T ,
(
U2h , U
2
w
)
is not a boundary point. Hence we have that:
Lemma 4. The feasible set of expected utilities T is strictly convex.
We also take it as given that the set T is compact. For simplicity we further assume
that the Pareto frontier—i.e., the downward sloping part of the boundary of T—is twice
differentiable. Letting Uw (Uh) denote the Pareto frontier, it thus follows that U
′
w (Uh) < 0
and U ′′w (Uh) < 0.
The solution to the ex ante bargaining problem (d7) satisfies the general first order
condition
∆r ≡
(
U∗h − U0h (F )
)
(U∗w − U0w (F ))
= − 1
U ′w
(
U∗h
) , (d14)
where U∗w = Uw (U∗h). This feature will be key to the comparative statics below.
D.4.3 Comparative Statics with Autarky (“Divorce”) as the Threat Point
In order to conduct a comparative statics analysis, we specify the fallback to be autarky.
Ex-post bargaining as a fallback (see e.g. Riddell, 1981) will be considered below. Hence
we define the fallback utilities to be:
U0h (Fh) =
∑
yh∈Y
fh (yh) [uh (yh) + ϕh (0)] and U
0
w (Fw) =
∑
yw∈Y
fw (yw) [uw (yw) + ϕw (1)] ,
(d15)
for the husband and the wife respectively. Thus, when living in autarky each spouse
consumes his or her own income and there is no violence.
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Having assumed that the two partners have income distributions with the same sup-
port, we can now consider a simple comparative static exercise. Consider two income
levels y and y in Y with y > y and a small constant ∆ > 0. Then consider the following
shifting of probability:
∆fh
(
y
)
= ∆, ∆fh (y) = −∆, ∆fw
(
y
)
= −∆, ∆fw (y) = ∆. (d16)
Hence there is a shifting of probability mass ∆ for each partner. For the husband, this
shifting involves decreasing the probability of the higher income level y and increasing the
probability of the lower income level y. For the wife, the shifting goes in the opposite
direction.
In interpreting the model, we can think of the lower income level y as unemployment
and the higher level y as employment. The perturbation thus increases the husband’s
probability of unemployment while increasing the wife’s probability of employment. We
will show that the shifting of probability leads to a reduction in the ex-ante bargained
level of violence.
Note in particular that, per construction, the income shift in (d16) does not affect
the distribution of household income. Hence the perturbation leaves the feasible set of
expected utilities T unchanged.1 Next we note that the perturbation decreases the fall-
back/autarky value for the husband but increases it for the wife,
∆U0h (Fh) = ∆
[
uh
(
y
)− uh (y)] < 0 and ∆U0w (Fw) = −∆ [uw (y)− uw (y)] > 0. (d17)
Consider then the impact of the reform on the bargaining outcome, in particular on
(d14). As the reform has not affected the set of feasible expected utility profiles, it has
not changed the Pareto frontier Uw (Uh). From inspecting (d14) we obtain the following
key result:
Lemma 5. The shifting of probability in eq. (d16) leads to:
(a) A decrease in the husband’s equilibrium expected utility U∗h ;
(b) An increase in the wife’s equilibrium expected utility U∗w;
(c) An increase in the relative expected utility gain of the husband ∆r =
U∗h−U0h(Fh)
U∗w−U0w(Fw) .
1In principle, the argument for this requires the definition of a feasible allocation to be generalized to
allow for randomization at any given state of the world. This means that if the couple behave differently
at the two nodes
(
y, y
)
and
(
y, y
)
, then after the shift in probability they can still “replicate” the same
probability distribution over outcomes by adopting the behaviour associated with node
(
y, y
)
at node(
y, y
)
with probability ∆.
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The first two parts are intuitive results. The third part, which is central for our
purposes, says that, as the husband’s probability of unemployment increases, he has more
to gain in expected utility terms than his spouse from striking an ex-ante agreement. As
a consequence, his relative bargaining position weakens. Combining Lemmas (3) and (5)
we obtain the main result:
Proposition 2. Suppose that the relevant threat point in the ex-ante bargaining process
is autarky (“divorce”). Then the shifting of probability in eq. (d16) leads to a decrease in
the ex-ante bargained state-independent equilibrium level of violence v∗ = v (yh, yw).
D.4.4 Comparative Statics with Ex-Post Bargaining as the Threat Point
The assumption of divorce in the case of failure to agree in ex-ante negotiations may be
overly strong. If the couple cannot agree on an allocation at the ex-ante stage, they can
still bargain ex-post once all uncertainty is resolved.2 We show here that Proposition 2 also
holds in this case. In order to demonstrate that result we need to start by characterizing
the outcome of ex-post Nash bargaining over consumption levels and violence.
D.4.4.1 Ex-Post Bargaining
Suppose that the state of the world (yh, yw) has been realized without any ex-ante agree-
ment having been reached. The couple can then bargain over the allocation of consumption
ex post. The fallback position here is “no trade” (or divorce). Hence in absence of an
agreement the partners’ utilities are
U0h = uh (yh) + ϕh (0) and U
0
w = uw (yw) + ϕw (1) , (d18)
respectively. Ex-post Nash bargaining solves max ∆∗h∆
∗
w where
∆∗h = Uh − U0h = uh (ch) + ϕh (v)− U0h , (d19)
and
∆∗w = Uw − U0w = uw (cw) + ϕw (v)− U0w,
and subject to feasibility, ch + cw ≤ yh + yw and v ∈ [0, 1]. The first order conditions with
respect to consumption and violence imply
u′h (ch)
u′w (cw)
=
∆h
∆w
, (d20)
2See Riddell (1981) for a seminal contribution here.
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and
ϕ′h (v)
ϕ′w (1− v)
=
∆h
∆w
, (d21)
Note that the bargained outcome is ex-post efficient in the sense that the partners’
marginal rates of substitution are equalized:
ϕ′w (1− v)
u′w (cw)
=
ϕ′h (v)
u′h (ch)
. (d22)
This relation summarizes the “ex-post contract curve” which is defined for a particular
level of household income. Moreover, it is easy to see that the contract curve is monotonic:
the higher is the husband’s utility, the higher is ch and v.
In any realized state of the world, there will thus be an ex-post bargained utility for
each partner, which we denote by U˜h (yh, yw) and U˜w (yh, yw), along with actions c˜i (yh, yw)
and v˜ (yh, yw). In a similar fashion each partner would associate each state of the world
with a particular bargained indirect utility and actions.
For our comparative statics purposes we want to compare the outcome at two different
states of the world that have the same total household income. Hence consider two states
of the world (y, y) and (y, y) where y > y. Since total household income is the same at the
two nodes, the utility possibility set is the same at the two nodes. However, comparative
statics along the lines used above (or, noting that the shift from (y, y) to (y, y) is equivalent
to an income redistribution) yields that
Lemma 6. (Aizer, 2010) Consider two states of the world, (y, y) and (y, y) where y >
y. Ex-post bargaining then implies that U˜h(y, y) < U˜h(y, y) and U˜w(y, y) > U˜w(y, y).
Moreover, the ex-post negotiated violence level satisfies v˜(y, y) < v˜(y, y).
We can now consider ex-ante bargaining with ex-post negotiations—i.e., bargaining
once all uncertainty is resolved—as the fallback position.
D.4.4.2 The Ex-Ante Problem
Note that the resource allocation that the spouses would obtain through ex-post bargain-
ing, {c˜h (yh, yw) , c˜w (yh, yw) , v˜ (yh, yw)}, is a feasible allocation according to Definition 1.
Hence ex-post bargaining would generate an ex-ante expected utility for partner i
U˜i (F ) =
∑
yh∈Y
∑
yw∈Y
fh (yh) fw (yw) U˜i (yh, yw) . (d23)
Moreover, the expected utility profile (U˜h (F ) , U˜w (F )) is in the set T . However, noting
that an allocation that would arise through ex-post bargaining is not ex-ante efficient, the
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expected utility profile (U˜h (F ) , U˜w (F )) is not a boundary element of T and hence it is
Pareto dominated by some other element in T . Thus, both partners have an incentive to
bargain for an ex-ante agreement, in this case with U˜h (F ) and U˜w (F ) as their respective
fallback utilities.
In order to establish the result of interest, we need to verify that the husband’s expected
utility from ex-post bargaining is reduced from the shifting of probability defined in (d16)
while that of the wife is increased. But this follows directly from Lemma 6. Hence by an
analogous argument to the case with autarky as the threat point we obtain:
Proposition 3. Suppose that the relevant threat point in the ex-ante bargaining process
is ex-post bargaining. Then the shifting of probability in eq. (d16) leads to an decrease in
the ex-ante bargained state-independent equilibrium level of violence v∗ = v (yh, yw).
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